US space plan should include China
By JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE
NEWPORT (US) - More than three millennia ago, the Chinese invented wei qi, a type of chess with 361 pieces that allows for immense strategic complexity. Generations of Chinese leaders have studied the game to hone their decision-making skills.
Today, China views long-term geostrategic politics as having a similar number of possible permutations to a wei qi board, and Beijing is posturing accordingly.
When astronaut Yang Liwei completed China's first manned space flight last October, China made a significant geostrategic wei qi move. The next move goes to the United States, and President George W. Bush appears ready to make it.
While a space race is not a foregone conclusion, it's possible. The US is considering a new space initiative. Whether the Moon, Mars or something in between or beyond, that's the what. Equally important is the how.
The US has three basic options. It can do nothing, which equates to sending congratulations and then continuing the status quo, excluding China from cooperative space efforts.
Alternatively, the US can launch a new manned space race reminiscent of US-Soviet competition during the Cold War.
Or the US can initiate an incremental programme of cooperation with China and other international space partners.
In deciding between these options, it is important to remember that while wei qi involves two players, here other players are simultaneously involved. This complication both influences manoeuvring alternatives and increases the significance of Washington's next move on the larger geostrategic gameboard.
All things considered, cooperation is the best long-term choice.
Doing nothing is likely not a viable long-term option. Though the US public was initially apathetic about Colonel Yang's flight, that could change.
As the Chinese continue their manned space plans while the US shuttle is grounded, the US will be perceived as having been overtaken by the Chinese in manned space activity. Chinese technology will not really have outpaced the US, but its sustained political commitment will.
Additionally, while the US ignores China, the Chinese are seeking out and increasingly finding other countries favourably disposed towards working with them. They are already participating in the European Galileo navigation satellite programme that could challenge the Global Positioning System developed and still completely controlled by the US.
In sum, public perception-cum-prestige considerations and 'control' issues make maintaining the status quo unacceptable.
Alternatively, the US can declare a space race, unilaterally announcing a long-awaited manned programme to return to the Moon and/or a manned Mars mission. However, the International Space Station (ISS) partners, especially Russia and Europe, are unlikely to support a programme developed without their input or one that excludes the Chinese.
Further, the continuing financial and technical problems with the still incomplete ISS make it unlikely they would be anxious to commit to an expanded manned programme. So if the US were to start another space race, it would likely be alone.
Domestically, a competitive approach would accrue benefits to the US, including prestige, technology development and jobs.
Strategically, at the risk of losing face and allowing the technology gap to grow, China would be pushed towards increased spending on its manned programme at a faster pace than it would otherwise choose. That would divert funds from Chinese military programmes and potentially cause substantial economic hardship, similar to what happened when the Soviet Union felt compelled to spend money countering Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) technology.
However, there are three critical uncertainties that would make initiating a space race an unwise move - whether the US can afford an independent programme and maintain the requisite political will to fund it to completion; whether it is really the best long-term strategy for long-term US-China ties; and whether the US can afford to reinforce further the view that it prefers unilateralism to multilateralism.
It can be argued that the US doesn't really need to stay the course and bring a new space race to a conclusion, as the unfinished SDI programme still significantly impacted the Soviet Union. However, to start with anything less than a full commitment sets a new programme up for failure. US history is replete with space visions and programmes set forth from podiums and later forgotten.
Additionally, Americans' desire and ability to carry the economic burden alone must be considered. Public support for paying the entire bill for a new manned space programme is doubtful. Manned space exploration is viewed by the public as a good thing to do, but low on its list of funding priorities.
Equally important is whether a competitive race with China is in the best interests of the US. While spending the Soviets into bankruptcy unquestionably played a role in the eventual fall of communism in the Soviet Union, dealing with Russia as a near-failed state in subsequent years is not a model to set up deliberately in China.
The third alternative focuses on cooperation. The US has a long and successful tradition of international cooperation in space. Especially in the areas of space science and environmental monitoring, the US has historically viewed space as an opportunity to build bridges with countries while simultaneously co-opting them into working on areas of its choice, rather than areas not to its liking.
The US could start slowly, rewarding Beijing for reciprocity and transparency by granting China an increasingly larger role in a joint programme of manned exploration and development.
Specifically, a US proposal to multilaterally review and expand the future of manned space exploration - from the ISS to another lunar voyage or even a Mars mission - on an incremental, inclusive basis would allow Washington to revitalise American space leadership.
Crucially, it would also give the US a means to influence the future direction of the Chinese space programme. This option would counter the prevailing view of the US as a unilateralist hegemon and allow for a focus on infrastructure development that does not require unrealistic budget burdens.
While there is the risk of international politics intruding into the process, that is counterbalanced by the vested interest such a programme would give participants in system stability.
There will be resistance to working with China. Washington is replete with individuals who object to cooperation with China on grounds from human rights to its status as the largest remaining communist country.
Isolating China, however, is increasingly a stance counterproductive to US interests, as a world without China is simply not possible. US and Chinese interests frequently overlap, on North Korea and the global war on terror, for example.
The US has a window of opportunity to use space cooperation to its advantage. As space is critical to the futures of both the US and China, any activity by one can be considered zero-sum by the other, triggering an action-reaction cycle and threatening escalation into an arms race.
That direction can be changed. An inclusive vision will give the US an opportunity to assume the mantle of leadership on a mission that could inspire the world and shift Chinese activities into areas more compatible with US interests.
On the geostrategic wei qi board, cooperation is the best 'next move' for the US.
The writer is chairman of the National Security Decision-Making Department at the United States Naval War College. These views do not represent those of the US government. Copyright: YaleGlobal Online, www.yaleglobal.yale.edu
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