As we head into this next phase of the campaign, I'm reminded of an excerpt from the book, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals, (2001), by Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist David Halberstam:
<<...In [the Kosovo war]…Clinton's commander in the field, General Wes Clark, would be the man caught in the middle between conflicting forces: a hesitant White House, a skeptical Congress, a reluctant Pentagon, and of course the other members of NATO, all of them having very different attitudes on how much or how little power to use.
Because of what Clinton had said about ground troops and the decisions made by the principals about the Kosovo campaign, Clark would be in constant collision with the secretary of defense and the Joint Chiefs…[and] with his air commander.
The pressure on Clark was almost unbearable, his aides thought. Everybody in NATO, and everybody in Washington, both civilian and military, [thought they] knew what he should be doing, and their calls would soon be followed by a call from someone else, often from the same country and of the same or greater rank, telling him not to do it. Those around him, even senior officers who disagreed with him on policy or did not always like him personally, thought that Clark was at his very best during this period. He worked endlessly hard, generally treated subordinates well, kept his cool, balanced difficult warring constituencies with considerable grace, and never lost sight of his essential purpose. He was getting little support from his own military, but he did not whine and he remained resolute. To the degree he had allies, they were civilians, not military men. Whatever you thought of Wes Clark—that unusual but occasionally maddening blend of great talent, intelligence, ego, and purpose—this was him at his best. He had the job he had always wanted, and his confidence never flagged...>> |
