Electing Chaos
The Bush administration's timeline for political transition in Iraq, announced only in November, is already in deep trouble. Although the first of its five milestones -- a law defining how to choose constitutional convention delegates -- is still nearly two months away, even administration leaders are sounding doubtful. Will elections lead to a political outcome that is peaceful, democratic and stable, or is it possible the post-election period will find us facing chaos, even civil war?
There are two election scenarios that could lead to disastrous outcomes for the Iraqis and ourselves: (1) the Shiites win and (2) the Shiites lose.
The Shiites' winning seems the most likely outcome, since they account for about 60 percent of the population. But thanks to decades of oppression by Saddam Hussein, the Shiites have never had the chance to develop political skills in leadership and accommodation outside of the mosque.
We are already seeing the emergence of splits within Shiite society as long-suppressed differences -- doctrinal, tribal, political, ideological -- come out in the open. Shiite political positions on such key issues as the relationship between Islam and the state are fluid and ill-defined. Without a capacity for consensus-building, political debate easily turns violent.
We're already seeing the emergence of militia politics and armed clashes among contending Shiite groups in the south. This disturbing trend is likely to accelerate if U.S. forces do not move decisively with force that Americans find hard to accept and that Iraqis will certainly not welcome. Instead, in a move we will surely regret, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is giving the formation of militias its implicit blessing with a bizarre plan to form a multi-militia security force. Once started, this process could slide into Northern Ireland-style chaos, with each faction forming its own militia for defense against all the other militias.
The only Shiite parties ready to field a solid political alternative to militia politics are the clergy themselves. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani's ability to to marginalize the handpicked Governing Council shows that the Shiite leaders are no slouches at political infighting. But can they keep the militias in check and transform their political skills into those needed for governance, performing the delicate balancing act necessary to keep peace among themselves while simultaneously reaching out to historical enemies among the Sunnis and Kurds and defining a common national course? We're not that lucky.
How might these divisions play out in an election? The Shiites have the numbers for an absolute victory, but only if they can pull their factions together into an effective working coalition. A victorious Shiite coalition would likely be achieved only with a substantial Islamist representation.
Would the Sunni Arabs and Kurds accept the victory of such a coalition, with its implicit pledge of an Islamic state? Don't bet on it. On the contrary, such an outcome could well broaden Sunni unrest beyond its core of disaffected Baathists. Major disruption, even civil war, could not be ruled out.
With the Shiites highly disorganized and fragmented, however, the alternative scenario of a Shiite defeat may actually be the more likely one. The fractious Shiites may well fail to organize into a coalition in the run-up to the election. If Sistani remains dissatisfied with the process, substantial Islamist segments might boycott the election altogether, cutting Shiite influence at the polls. The Sunnis, with even weaker organization, would be hard-pressed to field a solid campaign.
Either way, division of the Shiites could open the path to a truly disastrous outcome: emergence of a Kurdish coalition as the winner, holding a plurality of votes cast.
Compared with the Shiites or Arab Sunnis, the Kurds are political sophisticates. During the post-Persian Gulf War period, the Kurds learned Ben Franklin's famous lesson that they must hang together or hang separately. After years of civil warfare, the two leading Kurdish factions came together in a coalition that, under U.S protection, proved highly functional, if not always friendly.
If the Kurds can keep this unified front in place and capitalize on their greater political experience to get out their vote, emergence of the Kurdish bloc as the largest vote-getter becomes a real possibility.
And a Kurdish victory would lead straight to civil war. Neither of the other parties would accept a Kurdish-led government. A Kurdish victory would, therefore, increase the pressure on the Kurds to demand greater autonomy, bargaining for a larger share of the oil fields as well. These are outcomes that neither the Arabs nor neighboring Turkey could accept. Moreover, a Kurdish victory would create almost irresistible pressure within Turkey to send troops over the border, and maybe within Syria as well. The aftermath of a Kurdish victory could then slide into civil war, regional war or both.
Given the facts in Iraq, it would be foolish to think that free and fair elections will lead straight to a stable government or put U.S. troops on the home stretch toward graceful withdrawal. Unless and until an Iraqi military is rebuilt with the will and the capacity to hold the country together, U.S. troops may find themselves the only force standing between the Iraqi people and a descent into chaos for a long time to come.
washingtonpost.com
lurqer |
