"And the response was that Saddam already had the weapons so, at any time, he could attack his neighbors or give some to terrorists."
Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet
"The history of our judgments on Iraq’s weapons programs is clear and consistent."
"The National Intelligence Estimate remains the Intelligence Community's most authoritative product. The process by which we produce NIEs—including the one on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction—has been honed over nearly 30 years."
"Building upon ten years of analysis, intelligence
reporting, and inspections that had to fight through
Iraq’s aggressive denial and deception efforts, including
phony and incomplete data declarations to the UN and
programs explicitly designed with built-in cover stories,
the Intelligence Community prepared the NIE on Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction. In it we judged that the
entire body of information over that ten years made clear
that Saddam had never abandoned his pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction."
"We note yet again that uranium acquisition was not part of
this judgment. Despite all the focus in the media, it was
not one of the six elements upon which the judgment was
based. Why not? Because Iraq already had significant
quantities of uranium."
Biological Weapons
"All agencies of the Intelligence Community since 1995 have
judged that Iraq retained biological weapons and that the
BW program continued. In 1999 we assessed Iraq had
revitalized its program. New intelligence acquired in 2000
provided compelling information about Iraq’s ongoing
offensive BW activities, describing construction of mobile
BW agent production plants—reportedly designed to evade
detection—with the potential to turn out several hundred
tons of unconcentrated BW agent per year. Thus, it was not
a new story in 2002 when all agencies judged in the NIE
that Iraq had biological weapons—that it had some lethal
and incapacitating BW agents—and was capable of quickly
producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents,
including anthrax. We judged that most of the key aspects
of Iraq’s offensive BW program were more advanced than
before the Gulf war.
Chemical Weapons
As early as 1994, all agencies assessed that Iraq could
begin limited production of chemical agents almost
immediately after UN sanctions, inspections and monitoring
efforts were ended. By 1997, the Intelligence Community
judged that Iraq was protecting a breakout capability to
produce more weapons and agent quickly. We further
assessed in 1997, that within months Iraq could restart
full-scale production of sarin and that pre-Desert Storm
agent production levels—including production of VX—could
be achieved in two to three years. And so it was not a
surprising story when all agencies judged in the NIE in
2002 that Baghdad possessed chemical weapons, had begun
renewed production of mustard, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX
and probably had at least 100 metric tons (MT) and
possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents, much of it added
in the last year."
Delivery Systems
"Also by 1999 we had noted that according to multiple sources, Iraq was conducting a high-priority program to convert jet trainer aircraft to lethal UAVs, likely intended for delivering biological agents. Again, not a new story for the NIE to judge that Iraq maintained a small missile force and several development programs, including an UAV that could deliver a biological warfare agent."
"In sum, the NIE on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was the product of years of reporting and intelligence collection, analyzed by numerous experts in several different agencies. Our judgments have been consistent on this subject because the evidence has repeatedly pointed to continued Iraqi pursuit of WMD and efforts to conceal that pursuit from international scrutiny. Modifications of our judgments have reflected new evidence, much of which was acquired because of our intensified collection efforts. Thus, noting that Saddam had continued to pursue weapons of mass destruction was not startling. That he probably was hiding weapons was not new. That he would seek means to improve his capabilities using alternative-use cover stories would have been expected. That we would have alternative views is respected as part of the process.
We stand by the soundness and integrity of our process,
and no one outside the Intelligence Community told us what
to say or not to say in this Estimate.
As with any other topic addressed in an NIE, the acquisition of further evidence may confirm some of our judgments while calling others into question. Operation Iraqi Freedom obviously has opened a major new opportunity for learning about the WMD activities of Saddam Husayn’s regime. We have no doubt, however, that the NIE was the most reasonable, well-grounded, and objective assessment of Iraq’s WMD programs that was possible at the time it was produced."
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