The Marines have really been "badmouthing" the 4th ID tactics. About time we had a reply. You can be sure this was "vetted" by Army PIO.
The Risk of Velvet Gloves
The writer, an Army lieutenant colonel, teaches military history at West Point.
Monday, January 19, 2004; Page A21
washingtonpost.com
It was April 21, and I was the executive officer for the 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 4th Infantry Division, conducting a relief in place with a Marine reconnaissance battalion in Tikrit, Iraq. For the most part, major combat operations were on the wane as the 4th Infantry Division advanced from Kuwait into Iraq, and the Marines in Tikrit were applying a "velvet glove" to the local Iraqis. Yet as we quickly learned through operations in the Sunni Triangle, the enemy was preparing its insurgency and adapting. The Marines' velvet glove covered some dangerous problems that we were soon to face.
At the direction of their commanding general, the Marines in Tikrit took off their Kevlar helmets and body armor and worked in a friendly manner with the Iraqis. In the spirit of winning the hearts and minds of the locals, they limited checkpoints and patrols during the day and conducted essentially none of these activities at night. As a Marine officer pointed out to me, this approach brought friendly Iraqis over to the American side and at the same time allowed the Marines to isolate former regime members from the population.
When the 1st Brigade assumed control of Tikrit and its surrounding area in the Sunni Triangle, our approach was in some ways very different. While we immediately began the important work of rebuilding infrastructure and institutions, we intentionally took a hard approach toward hunting down former regime members and stopping the looting of weapons and ammunition.
On the first night of operations in Tikrit, the brigade's infantry battalion sent out a combat patrol into the northern part of the city. It came across some 30 Iraqi terrorists looting military goods such as rocket-propelled grenades and mortar rounds. The Iraqis opened fire, and a sharp firefight ensued. Fifteen Iraqi terrorists were killed and the looting was stopped.
Was this approach "hard" compared with that of the Marines? Yes. In this case, did it stop the looting and even the potential of remote-controlled mines and rocket-propelled grenades getting into the hands of terrorists trying to kill Americans? Absolutely. Had these kinds of activities by Iraqi terrorists been going on in Tikrit while the Marines were applying their velvet glove? Undoubtedly.
The brigade also started raids in late April against former regime members and other incipient terrorist groups. These military operations, coupled with an aggressive campaign to build an intelligence picture of former regime members operating in the Sunni Triangle, contributed significantly to the capture of Saddam Hussein a few weeks ago.
But the 1st Brigade Combat Team as well as the rest of the Army units operating in the Sunni Triangle and Baghdad have done more than just conduct raids and capture the former Iraqi president. They have, among many other things, rebuilt schools, delivered fuel, increased electrical power capacity and, most important, developed strong relationships with Iraqi Sunnis in the region. This approach has not been perfect, but the progress is steady and significant.
In recent weeks some Marine Corps leaders have criticized Army units operating in the Sunni Triangle for their apparent "get tough" methods for dealing with the Sunni population. They recall that before they left southern Iraq early last summer, their velvet glove was winning the hearts and minds of local Iraqi Shiites, because Marines were able to apply military power only when it was needed and in a precise amount. Their prudent use of military power and their ability to build close ties with the Iraqis in the south was a winning combination that kept Marines from being killed and produced a stable, secure environment. Now these Marine leaders ask: If it worked for us in southern Iraq back in early summer, why can't it work now in the Sunni Triangle?
Unfortunately, the Sunni Triangle is nothing like southern Iraq or the part of northern Iraq around Mosul. The Sunni Triangle, and especially the Tigris River Valley, which lies in its heart, is where Hussein's broken regime fled in early April. In this troubled and violent area, the Marines' simplistic solution doesn't square with conditions on the ground.
In late April, when a Marine battalion moved into a southern Iraqi city to begin post-conflict operations, its senior leaders ordered that its tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers be sent back to Kuwait. Such large pieces of military hardware, they reasoned, actually attracted attacks and were not needed to deal with remaining insurgents.
This technique may have made sense in southern Iraq in early summer. But it would be foolish and even deadly to apply it in the Sunni Triangle. The resistance by terrorists to raids in the area -- such as the one that captured Hussein -- has been relatively weak, because it's known that American Army units can bring immediate and overwhelming firepower to bear. Without tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and attack helicopters at the ready for military operations in the Sunni Triangle the United States courts multiple Mogadishus.
It's possible that U.S. Army units in the Sunni Triangle have at times been too heavy-handed in their approach. This is a potential problem, because Iraq's Sunnis must be involved in the political future of their country. The simple logic for American forces today in Iraq is to make the insurgents lose so that the coalition and the Iraqi people can win.
Such a goal requires a complex and sophisticated strategy that separates the insurgent forces from the Iraqi people, strengthens the rule of law in Iraq, demonstrates the coalition's will to win, enhances the political legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi government and uses military force appropriately. There may be situations, however, in areas such as the Sunni Triangle, that call for stern military measures like barricading a village to prevent terrorist activity and firing artillery on confirmed terrorist locations.
If the velvet glove works in Iraq, the reason probably is that the energy of the insurgency has been spent. But if the insurgency continues, the Marines will find themselves quietly but inexorably resorting to the stern measures that veteran Army units have been using all along.
I truly hope the Marines' velvet glove works, that it saves the lives of Marines and Iraqis, and leads to a stable and secure region. But I also fear that this approach, by dismissing the cultural and tactical differences in the Sunni Triangle, will ignore the hard-won gains of Army units over the past eight months.
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