Bin Laden Tape: Honesty and Gloom
Summary
The release of a new tape by Osama bin Laden is always an
important event. The most recent one is particularly important
because of the tone it takes. It is far from resigned, but it is
a gloomy analysis of al Qaeda's situation, focusing on the
failure of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to resist the United
States. Al Qaeda has a great deal to be gloomy about. Events were
very much moving in its favor since the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
But December was a terrible month for al Qaeda: The United States
began to gain control over the insurrection, and the diplomatic
situation in the region began to shift in the U.S. favor. Al
Qaeda has a problem and is searching for a solution.
Analysis
Osama bin Laden released a new audio tape during the week of Jan.
5. It was different in tone and focus than prior tapes. The focus
was less on the United States, Israel or Kashmir than on the Arab
world in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular. The
tone was bleak and filled with anger at betrayal by Arab rulers.
It represents an honest assessment of the war from al Qaeda's
view, and it reveals the war is not going well for them.
Among the things bin Laden said:
O Muslims: The situation is serious and the misfortune is
momentous.
By God, I am keen on safeguarding your religion and your worldly
life.
So, lend me your ears and open up your hearts to me so that we
may examine these pitch-black misfortunes and so that we may
consider how we can find a way out of these adversities and
calamities....
These (Gulf) states came to America's help and backed it in its
attack against an Arab state which is bound to them with
covenants of joint defense agreement ... they finally submitted and
succumbed to U.S. pressure and opened their air, land and sea
bases to contribute toward the U.S. campaign, despite the immense
repercussions of this move. Most important of these repercussions
is that this is a sin against one of the Islamic tenets...
Based on the above, the extent of the real danger -- which the
region in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular is
being exposed to -- has appeared. It has become clear that the
rulers are not qualified to apply the religion and defend the
Muslims. In fact, they have provided evidence that they are
implementing the schemes of the enemies of the nation and
religion and that they are qualified to abandon the countries and
peoples.
This is the essential tone of the entire statement: A serious
misfortune has befallen the Islamic world. The responsibility
rests with Arab rulers in general and on Saudi Arabia in
particular. It was their collaboration with the United States
that created these "pitch-black misfortunes" and forced al Qaeda
to search for a way out of the "adversities and calamities." It
is far from a declaration of surrender, but it is also far from
the defiant triumphalism of earlier statements.
To understand bin Laden's mood, it is important to look at the
war from a strategic standpoint. The United States mounted an
effective invasion of Iraq, using Kuwait as a base of operations,
and with the overt or covert cooperation of all other contiguous
Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia. The United States was
surprised by the coherence and tempo of operations of the Iraqi
guerrillas, but the insurrection never moved outside the
country's Sunni areas in any substantial way and therefore was
confined to a relatively small part of Iraq. Even in this region,
after several months of indecisive and ineffective action, the
United States mounted a counteroffensive after Ramadan that
resulted in a substantial decline in guerrilla operations north
of Baghdad, and a much less intense tempo of operations in
Baghdad and to the west.
Iraq's internal politics also have moved in an unsatisfactory
direction. The majority Shia, in a vague alliance with the Kurds,
have not so much supported the United States as opposed the
Sunnis. They also have no use for the foreign jihadists moving
into Iraq. They are prepared to cooperate with the Americans,
exchanging support now for control of the government later. The
Sunni sheikhs, observing the deterioration of the guerrillas'
military situation, are repositioning themselves, making deals
with the Americans. The prospect of Shiite domination without any
U.S. goodwill cushioning that process is more frightening to the
Sunnis than the guerrilla movement. Therefore, the Baathist
guerrilla movement is under severe pressure, while the foreign
jihadists operating without the Baathists have no roots in Iraq,
nor does the Sunni leadership welcome them. Therefore, al Qaeda's
hope of bogging down the United States in Iraq as they bogged
down the Soviets in Afghanistan is disappearing.
The broader strategic situation is even more unsatisfactory. Al
Qaeda was hoping that Sept. 11 would trigger a massive rising
among the Islamic masses, toppling regimes that were
collaborating with the United States and forcing others to change
their policies. That simply hasn't happened. Some expected the
invasion of Iraq to generate a massive upheaval in the Islamic
world. It didn't. Whatever the feelings of the Islamic masses,
they have not translated into a massive political moment.
Quite the contrary: The movement in the Islamic world has been
toward collaboration with the United States. The most important
case is Iran, which has been moving toward such an alignment
since September 2003, in a process that broke into public view
after the earthquake in Bam. The Iraqi Shiite leadership has
generally close ties to Iran, forged during years of exile and
struggle against Saddam Hussein. Their accommodation with the
United States and participation in the Iraqi Governing Council
would not have taken place without Iran's approval. Iran's
interests are geopolitical. The United States, seeking a solution
to the Iraqi guerrilla war, induced Iranian-Shiite cooperation by
promising a Shiite-dominated government in Iraq that certainly
would be, if not a satellite, a buffer on Iran's western flank.
The Iranian shift increased Saudi Arabia's dependence upon the
United States. Saudi Arabia's nightmare is Iran as the dominant
regional power without a Saudi security guarantee from the United
States. That is precisely the direction events were going this
past fall. Saudi Arabia grudgingly accommodated the United States
before the war. Afterward, as the guerrilla movement intensified
in Iraq, the United States turned to Iran, further eroding Saudi
security. As this process took place, the Saudis had to move
against al Qaeda in the kingdom. This was a fundamental U.S. goal
in its invasion of Iraq. It did not happen quite the way the
United States might have wanted it, but it did happen. The Saudis
and the other Gulf states have moved aggressively to accommodate
U.S. interests -- including attacking al Qaeda throughout the
region.
The avalanche of bad news did not stop there. Libya, fully aware
of the trends in the region, decided this was a propitious time
to move closer to the United States. In the Arab world, only
Syria remained outside the process. The Syrians had badly misread
the situation during last summer, betting that the United States
would get bogged down in Iraq. They bet on the guerrillas.
Suddenly, as December wore on, they realized that they had not
only guessed wrong, but had become completely isolated in the
Arab world and surrounded on all sides by enemies. Damascus began
to make accommodating gestures as the New Year began, inviting
Likud Knesset members to Damascus and sending President Bashar
al-Assad off to Turkey.
In Pakistan, jihadists tried -- and failed -- twice to kill
President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The danger to Musharraf's life
did not prevent him from reaching out to India in a peace
process, nor did the attempts trigger a military or popular
rising against him. Al Qaeda knows that the culminating battle of
the war will be waged in northwestern Pakistan when U.S. forces
go after Osama bin Laden and his command cells. They must topple
Musharraf to generate a major obstacle to U.S. plans. Therefore,
the jihadists must get Musharraf. So far, they have failed.
At the moment, nothing is going al Qaeda's way. That does not
mean al Qaeda is defeated. The war isn't over 'til it's over, and
as the United States is showing in Iraq, reversals in war are
common; the measure of victory is how quickly and effectively one
adjusts to the reality and creates a new strategy. Al Qaeda has
clearly lost the first round; it is readying for the second.
This second round appears to consist of two parts. One has been
clearly defined: Al Qaeda will try to bring down the Saudi
government. Riyadh's assault on al Qaeda certainly has hurt the
group, but it has not destroyed it. The Wahhabi zeal -- which has
fueled al Qaeda -- has its home in Saudi Arabia and is deeply
rooted there. Opposition to the Saudi regime is not trivial.
Whether al Qaeda can overthrow the regime is unclear, but bin
Laden's statements make it clear that this is where his focus
will be.
There is then the question of an attack on the United States. Bin
Laden concedes that Sept. 11 failed to achieve al Qaeda's
strategic goals. In fact, events since then have moved in just
the opposite direction. The problem was the lack of political
preparation in the Islamic world. The weakness among Arab regimes
generally and Saudi Arabia particularly meant that the U.S.
response -- rather than triggering massive anti-American
resistance -- resulted in broad-based collaboration.
Another attack on the United States on the same order as Sept. 11
is not likely to succeed either, since collaboration has
intensified. Given that al Qaeda does not intend simply to kill
Americans, but rather to achieve political goals in the Islamic
world by killing Americans, an attack at this moment squanders
resources without achieving the wanted goal. At the same time, al
Qaeda must demonstrate that it has a way out of the "pitch-black
misfortunes" that have befallen it. It must do something, and do
it quickly. Overthrowing the Saudi regime is not going to happen
soon.
From a strictly strategic viewpoint, al Qaeda should postpone
attacking the United States until it can reshape the politics of
the Saudi peninsula. From a political viewpoint, the more
impotent al Qaeda appears, the less its chances to achieve that
political redefinition. It is caught in a chicken-or-egg problem
-- and time, most definitely, is not on al Qaeda's side.
One solution would be what we would call a trans-Sept. 11 attack
-- an attack that dwarfed Sept. 11 in significance. Obviously a
nuclear, biological or chemical attack designed to cause enormous
casualties would be such an attack and potentially -- and we
emphasize potentially -- would accomplish two things. It might
reinvigorate al Qaeda in the Islamic world by reinforcing its
capabilities and competence -- neither is highly respected at the
moment -- thus contributing to the political reality bin Laden
spoke of. Second, it might -- in al Qaeda's mind -- convince the
American public that the price of fighting al Qaeda is too high.
There is a risk, of course. The Islamic masses might well take
the same course that followed Sept. 11: vigorous conversation
coupled with inaction, and the American public might want blood
instead of withdrawal.
A serious question is whether al Qaeda can pull off a trans-Sept.
11 attack. It might be forced to go for a Sept. 11-type attack
because that is the best available. Or, alternatively, it might
decide to avoid any attacks in the United States, opting instead
to focus resources on the struggle in Saudi Arabia and on
bringing down Musharraf in Pakistan.
These are some of al Qaeda's choices. Which it will choose is an
open question. What is clear is that al Qaeda is at a crossroads
and -- like the United States in the spring of 2002 -- it does
not have really good choices, and therefore, must choose the best
of a bad lot. Al Qaeda's original war plan is obsolete. The
straight line it drew from Sept. 11 to the Caliphate has hit a
wall. Bin Laden knows it. He doesn't have a good Plan B, but he
will have to cook one up anyway. The war is not over, but for the
moment, it is al Qaeda's turn to sweat out a solution to a
difficult strategic problem. If they can't do that, then the war
could very well be over, at least for this generation. |
