9/11 Commission Finds Gaps in U.S. Border Security
Findings Stand in Contrast to Contentions of Many Senior U.S. Officials
By Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, January 26, 2004; 8:42 PM
The U.S. government fumbled repeated opportunities to stop many of the men responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks from entering the country, missing fraudulent passports and other warning signs that should have attracted greater scrutiny, according to a preliminary report released today.
The new findings by the independent commission investigating the terrorist strikes stand in marked contrast to the contentions of many senior U.S. officials, who for more than two years have portrayed the 19 hijackers as law-abiding travelers who did little to attract government suspicion and who, in nearly all cases, entered or resided in the country legally.
Today's report disclosed that as many as eight of the hijackers carried passports that "showed evidence of fraudulent manipulation," while as many as five of the passports had "suspicious indicators." The report did not identify the details missed by authorities and did not elaborate further.
The report also found that at least six hijackers, including ringleader Mohamed Atta, violated U.S. immigration laws either while in the United States or while returning. Five of the hijackers aroused enough suspicion that they were questioned individually by Customs or immigration inspectors, but were eventually allowed to enter the United States. None of the hijackers filled out his visa application correctly, and three clearly lied on the forms, according to the report.
"There were many opportunities to stop the 9/11 plot," said commission member Jamie Gorelick, a former Justice Department official in the Clinton administration.
Several current and former government officials who testified today disputed such assertions, arguing that little more could have been done to detect the plotters. "I don't believe that in a visa interview, you would ever uncover a terrorist," said Mary A. Ryan, former assistant secretary for consular affairs in the State Department.
In today's report, commission investigators also identified five suspected al Qaeda associates by name who they believe may have intended to join the plot but were thwarted. Four were blocked from obtaining visas in a variety of ways by U.S. consular officials abroad, while a fifth was sent back to the Middle East by an observant immigration inspector in Orlando, Fla.
Jose E. Melendez-Perez, now an inspector with the Department of Homeland Security, recounted an interview he conducted with a Saudi national, Mohamed al-Kahtani, whom investigators now believe was planning to meet Atta at the Orlando airport on Aug. 4, 2001. Al-Kahtani had no return ticket and no hotel reservations and he refused to identify a friend who, he said, would provide him with money and other assistance on his trip.
"The bottom line was, he gave me the creeps," Melendez-Perez said in his prepared statement, adding that his first impression was that al-Kahtani was a "hit man" because of his hostile and arrogant attitude and his refusal to disclose his plans. "A 'hit man' doesn't know where he is going because if he is caught, that way he doesn't have any information to bargain with," he said. "My wife said I was watching too much movies."
Before departing, al-Kahtani turned to Melendez-Perez and said, in English: "I'll be back."
Melendez-Perez said he was taking a bit of a risk by refusing al-Kahtani entry to the United States because Saudis were generally treated more permissively than other foreign nationals by U.S. border agents. In the end, al-Kahtani -- who would later be apprehended by U.S. forces in Afghanistan -- was eventually escorted onto a flight bound for Dubai via London, a decision that was applauded by the audience and the commission at today's hearing.
"It is extremely possible, and perhaps probable, that Mohamed al-Kahtani was to be the 20th hijacker," said Richard Ben-Veniste, a former Watergate prosecutor and Democratic member of the commission. "It is entirely plausible to suggest that your actions . . . may well have contributed to saving the Capitol or the White House and all the people who were in those buildings."
Ben-Veniste was referring to the plane that crashed in a Pennsylvania field on the day of the attacks after passengers attempted to wrest control from the four hijackers aboard. Authorities believe it was headed to Washington, probably aimed at the Capitol or the White House. It was the only aircraft to be commandeered by four hijackers instead of five, and authorities have long debated whether the plan called for a "20th hijacker" to be aboard.
Said Melendez-Perez, a 12-year veteran of the immigration service: "I was just doing my job."
The commission's findings go farther than some previous investigations of this subject. The FBI and others have said it is not clear whether the men prevented from entering the country sought to participate directly in the attacks.
Under questioning from commissioners, Melendez-Perez also said that when Atta attempted to re-enter the United States in January 2001, his case raised enough red flags that he should have been blocked from getting in.
Today's hearing marked a watershed moment for the 10-member bipartisan panel, known formally as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, which has produced little information since it was established by Congress in late 2002.
The panel's work has been delayed by a series of battles for access to classified information held by the Bush administration, leading a majority of commissioners to favor an extension of its May 27 deadline. The White House and House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.) have indicated they would oppose such a move, and the commission is expected to decide this week whether to press the fight more publicly.
Unlike a joint inquiry by the House and Senate intelligence committees -- which detailed shortcomings in the intelligence process prior to the hijackings -- the commission is charged with investigating a wide range of topics, including the immigration and border issues highlighted yesterday.
Among other findings released by the commission's staff:
-- Two of the Saudi hijackers may have obtained their passports with help from family members who worked in the passport office.
-- Khalid Sheik Mohammed, who has been identified as the mastermind behind the attacks, obtained a visa to enter the United States on July 23, 2001, using a Saudi passport and an alias. There is no evidence he used the document, however.
-- In addition to al-Kahtani, those identified in the report as having attempted to enter the United States to participate in the attacks are Ramzi Binalshibh, who authorities have long said helped coordinate the plot when he could not secure a visa to participate in it; Moroccan operative and "potential pilot" Zakariya Essabar; Mohammed's nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, an alleged financier of the plot; and Saeed al-Gamdi, who was known by the nickname "Jihad," or holy war.
A hijacker with a similar name, Saeed al-Ghamdi, who helped commandeer United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania, was referred to an immigration inspector in June 2001 because he had a one-way ticket, provided no address and only had $500 in his possession. But he was able to persuade the inspector that he was a tourist and was allowed to enter the United States. |
