9/11 STAND DOWN,
While the Kean Commission will most likely engage in more of its cover-up work tomorrow, here at SI we are furthering the real investigation into 9/11:
deceptiondollar.com
Anyone who can fly to San Francisco for this event will be flabbergasted at how much we already know, and how little the silly little Kean Commission is really doing to get at the truth.
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Here's an excellent synopsis of the currently available research on how NORAD and the USAF stood down on 9/11:
911research.wtc7.net
Like Ritter, O'Neill, now Clarke, maybe there is someone who will come forward with the truth about 9/11 - if they're still alive: NORAD Stand-Down
The Prevention of Interceptions of the Commandeered Planes
It is standard operating procedure (SOP) to scramble jet fighters whenever a jetliner goes off course or radio contact with it is lost. Between September 2000 and June 2001, fighters were scrambled 67 times. 1
There are several elements involved in domestic air defense. The air traffic control system continuously monitors air traffic and notifies NORAD of any deviations of any aircraft from their flight-paths or loss of radio contact. NORAD monitors air and space traffic continuously and is prepared to react immediately to threats and emergencies. It has the authority to order units from the Air National Guard, the Air Force, or other armed services to scramble fighters in pursuit of jetliners in trouble.
Routine interception procedures were not followed on September 11th, 2001. This can be seen clearly by comparing incidents.
A Case for Comparison
An example of how the air defense network normally responds to domestic emergencies is illustrated by the well-reported 1999 case of Payne Stewart's Lear jet. When the golfer's jet failed to respond to air traffic controller communications, F-16 interceptors were quickly dispatched. According to an Air Force timeline, a series of military planes provided an emergency escort to Payne's stricken Learjet starting about 20 minutes after contact with his plane was lost. 2
This contrasts with the long periods of time apparently hijacked planes roamed the skies of the Northeast on September 11th without any interceptions. 83 minutes elapsed between the time that Flight 11 veered off course and the Pentagon was hit, and 112 minutes elapsed between the time that contact was lost with Flight 11 and Flight 93 crashed. According to the official story, not a single fighter was scrambled in time to intercept any of the four jetliners. At least 28 air stations were easily within distance to protect New York City and Washington DC. 3 None of them did. Note that, if anything, intercept times for the four jetliners should have been far shorter than for Payne Stewart's jet:
Stewart's jet merely failed to respond to communications. Each of the four jetliners, in addition to going silent, veered dramatically off course and switched off their transponders.
Stewart's jet went off course in the South, which has fewer air defense stations than the NorthEast corridor.
Air traffic controllers more carefully monitor large passenger aircraft in crowded air corridors than small private aircraft.
Stewart's jet went off-course at 45,000 feet, 10,000 feet higher than jetliners fly.
After the first hijacking, the air traffic controllers, the FAA, and NORAD should have been prepared to respond immediately to subsequent off-course aircraft.
Layered Failures
The air defense network had, on September 11th, predictable and effective procedures for dealing with just such an attack. Yet it failed to respond in a timely manner until after the attack was over, more than an hour and a half after it had started. The official timeline describes a series of events and mode of response in which the delays are spread out into a number of areas. There are failures upon failures, in what might be described as a strategy of layered failures, or failure in depth. The failures can be divided into four types.
Failures to report: Based on the official timeline, the FAA response times for reporting the deviating aircraft were many times longer than the prescribed times.
Failures to scramble: NORAD, once notified of the off-course aircraft, failed to scramble jets from the nearest bases.
Failures to intercept: Once airborne, interceptors failed to reach their targets because they flew at small fractions of their top speeds.
Failures to redeploy: Fighters that were airborne and within interception range of the deviating aircraft were not redeployed to pursue them.
Had not there been multiple failures of each type, one or more parts of the attack could have been thwarted. NORAD had time to protect the World Trade Center even given the unbelievably late time, 8:40, when it claims to have first been notified. It had time to protect the South Tower and Washington even given its bizarre choice of bases to scramble. And it still had ample opportunity to protect both New York City and Washington even if it insisted that all interceptors fly subsonic, simply by redeploying airborne fighters.
Failures to Report
Comparing NORAD's timeline to reports from air traffic control reveals inexplicable delays in the times the FAA took to report deviating aircraft. The delays include an 18-minute delay in reporting Flight 11 and a 39-minute delay in reporting Flight 77. The delays are made all the more suspicious given that, in each case, the plane failed to respond to communications, was off-course, and had stopped emitting its IFF signal.
Failures to Scramble
No plausible explanation has been provided for failing to scramble interceptors in a timely fashion from bases within easy range to protect the September 11th targets. Fighters that were dispatched were scrambled from distant bases. Early in the attack, when Flight 11 had turned directly south toward New York City, it was obvious that New York City and the World Trade Center, and Washington D.C. would be likely targets. Yet fighters were not scrambled from the bases near the targets. They were only scrambled from distant bases. Moreover there were no redundant or backup scrambles.
New York City
Flight 11 had been flying south toward New York City from about 8:30 AM. Yet no interceptors were scrambled from nearby Fort Dix or Laguardia, or from Langley, Virginia. Numerous other bases were not ordered to scramble fighters.
Washington D.C.
No interceptors were scrambled from Andrews Air Force Base to protect the capital, at least not before the Pentagon was hit. Andrews Air Force Base had two squadrons of fighters on alert, and is only 10 miles from the Pentagon.
Failures to Intercept
Even though the interceptors were not dispatched from the most logical bases, the ones that were scrambled still had adequate time to reach their assigned planes. Why didn't they? Because they were only flying at a small fraction of their top speed. That is the conclusion implicit in NORAD's timeline.
Otis to the WTC
The first base to finally scramble interceptors was Otis in Falmouth, Massachusetts, at 8:52, about a half-hour after Flight 11 was taken over. This was already eight minutes after Flight 11 hit the North Tower, and just 9 minutes before Flight 175 hit the South Tower.
According to NORAD, at the time of the South Tower Impact the two F-15s from Otis were still 71 miles away. Otis is 153 miles east-northeast of the WTC. That means the F-15s were flying at: (153 miles - 71 miles)/(9:03 - 8:52) = 447 mph
That is around 23.8% of their top speed of 1875 mph.
At 9:11 the F-15s finally reached the World Trade Center. Their average speed for the trip was: 153/(9:11 - 8:52) = 483 mph
That is around 25.8% of their top speed.
Langley to the Pentagon
The F-16s from Langley reached the Pentagon at 9:49. It took them 19 minutes to reach Washington D.C. from Langley AFB, which is about 130 miles to the south. That means the F-16s were flying at: 130 miles/(9:49 - 9:30) = 410.5 mph
That is around 27.4% of their top speed of 1500 mph.
Andrews to the Pentagon
Andrews Air Force Base, located on the outskirts of the capital, is just over 10 miles from the Pentagon. One would have expected interceptors to be scrambled to protect the capital within a few minutes of the 8:15 loss of contact with Flight 11. Instead, no fighters from Andrews reached the Pentagon until 9:49, several minutes after the assault.
Failures to Redeploy
Fighters that were in the air when the attack started were not redeployed to intercept the deviating planes. When fighters scrambled to protect Manhattan arrived there too late, they were not redeployed to protect the capital even though they had plenty of time to reach it before the Pentagon was hit.
Long Island to Manhattan
Two F-15s flying off the coast of Long Island were not redeployed to Manhattan until after the second tower was hit. 4
WTC to the Pentagon
By the time the two F-15s from Otis reached Manhattan, the only jetliner still flying with its IFF transponder off had just made a 180-degree turn over southern Ohio and had been headed for Washington D.C. for 12 minutes. It was still 34 minutes before the Pentagon was hit. Had the fighters been sent to protect the capital, they could have traveled the approximately 300 miles in: 300 miles/1875 mph = 9.6 minutes
They even could have made it to the capital in time to protect the Pentagon if they had continued to fly at only 500 mph.
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References
1,AP,8/12/02
2,Dallas Morning News,10/26/99
3,StandDown.net,
4,Cape Cod Times,8/21/02
911research.wtc7.net |
