Clarke Versus Clarke
"Just one Minute" Blog
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Richard Clarke<font size=3>, March 2002 Frontline Interview. He is talking about John O'Neill, the former FBI counterterrorism head who died at the World Trade Center on 9/11:
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Q: Was he, were you, listened to [about the Al Qaeda threat]?
CLARKE: Yes, slowly. Certainly after the embassy bombing
in Africa in 1998, it was very obvious that what John was
saying, what I was saying, was right: that this was more
than a nuisance; that this was a real threat. But I don't
think everyone came to the understanding that it was an
existential threat. The question was, "This group is more
than a nuisance, but are they worth going to war with?
After all, they've only attacked two embassies. Maybe
that's a cost of doing business. This kind of thing
happens. Yes, we should spend some time some energy trying
to get them, but it's not the number one priority we have."
Clarke, March 2004, before the 9/11 Commission:
CLARKE: My impression was that fighting terrorism, in
general, and fighting Al Qaida, in particular, were an
extraordinarily high priority in the Clinton
administration -- certainly no higher priority. There were
priorities probably of equal importance such as the Middle
East peace process, but I certainly don't know of one that
was any higher in the priority of that administration.
After Saturday's WaPo, with props to the OxBlogsters, are we still arguing about this?
And, on the sense of urgency in the summer of 2001, we extract this:
Q: A lot of people looked at Sept. 11, and said "Massive intelligence failure. Haven't seen an intelligence failure like this since Pearl Harbor." What's your opinion on that allegation?
Clarke: I think it's a cheap shot. I think when people say, no matter what event it is, they say, "Oh, it was an intelligence failure," they frequently don't know what the intelligence community said prior to the event.
In June 2001, the intelligence community issued a warning
that a major Al Qaeda terrorist attack would take place in
the next many weeks. They said they were unable to find
out exactly where it might take place. They said they
thought it might take place in Saudi Arabia.
We asked, "Could it take place in the United States?" They
said, "We can't rule that out." So in my office in the
White House complex, the CIA sat and briefed the domestic
U.S. federal law enforcement agencies, Immigration,
Federal Aviation, Coast Guard, and Customs. The FBI was
there as well, agreeing with the CIA, and told them that
we were entering a period when there was a very high
probability of a major terrorist attack. Now I don't think
that's an intelligence failure. It may be a failure of
other parts of the government, but I don't think that was
an intelligence failure.
Charles Krauthammer is all over this.
On obsessing, and the link to Iraq:
Q: Because one of the things that surprises a lot of the public, I think, is that immediately after Sept. 11, the administration knew exactly who had done it. Was that why?
CLARKE: No. On the day of Sept. 11, then the day or two
following, we had a very open mind. CIA and FBI were
asked, "See if it's Hezbollah. See if it's Hamas. Don't
assume it's Al Qaeda. Don't just assume it's Al Qaeda."
Frankly, there was absolutely not a shred of evidence that
it was anybody else. The evidence that it was Al Qaeda
began just to be massive within days after the attack.
Q: Somebody's quoted as saying that they walked into your
office and almost immediately afterwards, the first words
out of your mouth was "Al Qaeda."
Clarke: Well, I assumed it was Al Qaeda. No one else had
the intention of doing that. No one else that I knew of
had the capability of doing that. So yes, as soon as it
happened, I assumed it was Al Qaeda.
Uhh, is it still OK for the President to ask his NSC
expert to go beyond his assumptions and look around? Dick
Clrke thought so in his book, at least. |
