[CFR] Sunni and Shiite Unrest
Updated: April 9, 2004
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Where is the most significant anti-coalition resistance?
Violence has flared in Iraq on two fronts. A largely Sunni force fought coalition troops north of Baghdad, and Shiite fighters clashed with them in Baghdad and at least five cities south of the capital. Hundreds of Iraqis were reported killed in Falluja, a predominately Sunni city of some 250,000 encircled by U.S. forces. Rebel forces aligned with radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr continued to hold parts of at least two southern cities as of April 9. U.S. military officials vowed to root the fighters out and destroy them.
Who are the Sunni fighters?
They appear to include members of the former ruling Baath Party, other Sunnis opposed to the occupation, and foreign jihadists. Their main base is in the so-called Sunni triangle north of Baghdad, though they are also believed to have staged attacks in the capital, as well as in Kurdish and Shiite areas of Iraq. It remains unclear if the insurgency is led by a number of diffuse groups fighting independently or by an increasingly unified front of fighters.
What’s the composition of the Shiite opposition?
It is made up of Shiite fighters associated with the Imam al-Mahdi Army, an illegal militia headed by anti-U.S. cleric Sadr. U.S. military officials say the militia consists of between 1,000 and 6,000 fighters; Sadr’s spokesmen claim to have 10,000 armed rebels. In addition, news reports indicate that sympathy sparked by the rebellion may have spurred additional Shiites to join the fight.
How have coalition forces responded?
U.S. officials have announced they will "attack to destroy" the Mahdi Army and recapture territory lost to the insurgents. In Falluja, some 1,200 marines, backed by attack helicopters and bombers, were trying to root out fighters in fierce block-by-block fighting April 8, according to The New York Times. A cease-fire was called April 9 to allow humanitarian aid to enter the besieged city and permit U.S. and Iraqi officials to meet with local leaders in Falluja. At issue: coalition authorities want local leaders to hand over the men responsible for the brutal killing and mutilation of four American contractors March 31.
Do the recent clashes represent a significant military challenge to coalition control?
No. Coalition forces are well-equipped to turn back the insurgents. U.S. officials maintain that the situation has not gotten out of hand. Still, the upheaval has been the most violent since the end of major combat operations in May 2003; some 40 U.S. and allied soldiers and hundreds of Iraqis were killed from April 4 to April 9. Previously, anti-coalition violence had been largely confined to Sunni areas.
Is political control threatened?
Experts warn that the occupation would be undermined if moderate Shiites join Sadr’s movement or if the insurgency develops into a national movement that unites Sunnis and Shiites. Much depends on how the occupying forces respond to the insurgency, experts say. "Sadr is trying to turn his battle with the United States into a Shiite issue, not a law-and-order issue. He’s making the argument that all Shiites are under attack," says Phebe Marr, author of "A History of Iraq." President Bush has vowed the violence will not disrupt the planned handover of power to Iraqis on June 30.
What is the situation in the Sunni areas?
The largest battle was in Falluja, but there were also clashes in nearby Sunni cities. In Ramadi, some 30 miles west of Falluja, 12 marines were killed April 6 when insurgents raided their base. Fighting spread to western Baghdad April 9. Iraqi convoys of food and medicine headed out of Baghdad, and news reports indicated that both Sunni and Shiite fighters were attempting to sneak through U.S. checkpoints surrounding the city to join the uprising. Major combat operations in Iraq ended last May without heavy fighting in the Sunni area. Instead, anti-U.S. forces in these areas melted back into the population and began to wage a guerrilla-style insurgency.
How much support does the insurgency have among Sunnis?
It’s unclear. There are two levels of support: those who fight and provide direct assistance to the fighters and those who sympathize with them but do not actively participate in the fighting. U.S. officials say they do not believe they are facing a broad-based Sunni resistance.
How much direct support are the insurgent forces getting?
U.S. officials say former Baathists draw support from stores of cash and weapons left behind from the days of Saddam Hussein. Foreign jihadists may be getting support from al Qaeda and terrorism-financing networks. U.S. intelligence has indicated that some tribal leaders are now supporting the insurgents, according to The New York Times. It is difficult to know how much of the general Sunni population is actively involved in supporting the insurgency.
How widespread is sympathy for the Sunni insurgents?
News reports indicate that sympathy is significant, fed by anti-U.S. anger among many Sunnis. The heightened fighting in recent days has led some Sunni clerics to sanction open warfare with the U.S.-led occupation, further strengthening the resistance, according to press reports. Rebels appear able to hide among the population of Falluja and other Sunni areas. This is a classic problem in counterinsurgency warfare, because an insurgency can succeed "even if only 4 or 5 percent of the population is actually participating, if the rest of the population sits on the sidelines," says William Flavin, a professor of multinational stability operations at the U.S. Army War College <http://carlisle-www.army.mil>.
What Sunnis are working with the occupation?
Some Sunni tribal and political leaders sit on the U.S.-backed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). There are also thousands of Sunnis who have joined the Iraqi security forces, served on U.S.-backed town councils, and participated in reconstruction efforts - sometimes at the cost of their lives. Some experts say they believe that a silent majority of Sunnis does not support the armed rebellion, but is waiting to see how things turn out and will not speak out against the resistance.
Is the Shiite opposition organized?
Sadr, 31, formed his Mahdi Army in August 2003. He appears to have used the past eight months to stockpile arms and prepare for the possibility of an armed rebellion, some experts say. His support is organized via a network of mosques and charities spread throughout much of Shiite-dominated southern Iraq. Experts say this network is largely inherited from his father, the former top Shiite cleric in Iraq who was killed in 1999. Sadr has opposed the U.S.-led occupation since its start. However, he did not call for violence until April 4, after U.S. forces closed his organization’s newspaper, arrested one of his close associates, and announced Sadr was wanted for the April 2003 murder of a U.S.-backed cleric, Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei.
How much support does Sadr have?
He is believed to have a few thousand fighters. Juan Cole <http://www.juancole.com/>, a professor of history at the University of Michigan, estimates that some 20 percent of Shiites - or about 3 million Iraqis - are sympathetic to his cause. The coalition’s recent moves against Sadr may have attracted more fighters and won him additional sympathy. "Many Shia believe the United States provoked him," says Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East analyst at the Congressional Research Service. Sadr is also thought to receive some financial support from Iran.
How does Sadr’s support compare to that of other clerics?
Experts say Sadr’s network of supporters is far smaller than that of 73-year-old Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the preeminent Shiite cleric in Iraq. For his part, Sistani has dismissed Sadr as a cleric of minor significance and has called on both the U.S.-led coalition and Sadr to seek a peaceful solution to the violence. Other Shiite militias and political organizations appear to be staying out of the fighting. Among them: the 10,000 Iran-trained fighters associated with the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Shiite political party with representation on the IGC, and the militia of the Da’wa Party, a political party also represented on the IGC.
Where has the Shiite uprising occurred?
At least eight cities have reported violent clashes:
* Sadr City, Baghdad: Some 57 Shiites have been killed in the vast Shiite slum of 2 million, which is a stronghold of Sadr support. Eight U.S. soldiers died in the fighting.
* Kadhimiya, Baghdad: Three U.S. soldiers from the First Armored Division were killed in ambushes in this middle-class Shiite quarter, according to press reports. In the past, it wasn’t a center of radicalism, but anti-American sentiment is spreading there, according to Cole.
* Najaf: Sadr’s forces continued to hold this city of 500,000 as Shiite pilgrims began to stream in for the Arbaeen religious observance. The city is holy because it holds the remains of Ali, the Prophet Mohammed’s son-in-law and the fourth caliph. Sadr reinforcements reportedly moved in from East Baghdad.
* Kut: Ukranian coalition troops under Polish command in central Iraq withdrew from Kut on April 7 after heavy fighting with Sadr supporters, according to the Ukrainian Defense Ministry. U.S. troops retook the city April 9.
* Kufa: Sadr supporters seized the police stations and government buildings in this city of 120,000 north of Najaf. Kufa is Sadr’s hometown and his stronghold; the mosque in which he gives his regular Friday evening sermons is there.
* Karbala: Fighting continued April 9 in this holy city, the site of the death of Ali’s son Hussein in 680 A.D.
* Nasiriya: Wire services reported heavy gun battles April 6 with Italian forces. By April 8, the city appeared calm.
* Amara: British troops killed 15 Iraqis and wounded eight April 5 and 6. The city was relatively calm by April 8, according to the Associated Press.
* Diwaniya: CNN reported fighting on April 7 between Mahdi Army and Spanish forces.
Is there a possible political solution to the violence?
Press reports indicate that the IGC has discussed a proposal to dismiss Sadr’s arrest warrant if he agrees to halt the uprising. IGC member Ahmad Chalabi confirmed that the council was seeking a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Sistani has called for a political solution to end the Shiite uprising. In general, Iraq experts recommend letting Iraqis take the lead in political negotiations to lend legitimacy to any truces reached. A delegation of U.S. officials and IGC members visited Falluja to try to negotiate an end to fighting, and U.S. officials announced April 9 that they were temporarily suspending operations there.
Could Shiites and Sunni rebels join forces?
Conceivably, though so far experts say there is not much evidence of substantive military cooperation. For most of the 20th century, Iraqi Sunnis dominated their Shiite countrymen and women, who make some 60 percent of the population. Still, some news reports indicate that both Sunni and Shiite fighters attempted to join the battle in Falluja, and some recent attacks in Baghdad are reported to be Sunni-Shiite operations. On a non-military level, the recent violence appears to have increased cooperation between Sunnis and Shiites, who have organized food and medicine shipments to Falluja. Sunnis and Shiites prayed together in the southern city of Basra, the Associated Press reported. In these moves, some commentators see the potential for a broader-based national resistance movement.
-- By Sharon Otterman, staff writer, cfr.org |
