An agenda? You don't present an agenda to a brick wall.
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A May 5 cable, intercepted and decoded by the U.S.,
dispelled any possible doubt that the Japanese were eager to sue for peace. Sent to Berlin by the German ambassador in Tokyo, after he talked to a ranking Japanese naval officer, it read:
"Since the situation is clearly recognized to be hopeless, large sections of the Japanese armed forces would not regard with disfavor an American request for capitulation even if the terms were hard."
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Later that month, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson
almost capriciously dismissed three separate high-level
recommendations from within the Roosevelt administration to
activate peace negotiations. The proposals advocated signaling Japan that the U.S. was willing to consider the all-important retention of the emperor system; i.e., the U.S. would not insist upon "unconditional surrender".
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"His Majesty is extremely anxious to terminate the war as soon as possible", said one communication. "Should, however, the United States and Great Britain insist on unconditional surrender, Japan would be forced to fight to the bitter end."
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And, of course, the emperor did retain his throne, plus America helped him avoid prosecution.
Tom |
