SOS to 'disgraced' Ba'athists
By Erich Marquardt
Washington's ultimate success in creating a stable Iraq completely hinges on its ability to create viable Iraqi security forces capable of handling all of the security tasks currently being undertaken by US-led forces. While the United States is presently taking the majority role in attempts to bring security to Iraq, it will be able to fulfill this role at its present intensity for only so long. Washington does not have the funds, troop reserves, or domestic support to sustain a permanent occupation with troops numbering in the tens of thousands and coming under consistent guerrilla attack. Washington will have to replace the bulk of its troops with indigenous Iraqi security forces, or else risk the chance of having to end the occupation of Iraq on terms not in synch with US regional interests.
This is not the first time in the history of US foreign policy that it has faced the difficult task of creating indigenous security forces in the midst of an ongoing guerrilla struggle. Back during Washington's involvement in the Vietnam conflict, spanning from the 1950s to the 1970s, subsequent presidential administrations realized that their ultimate success in creating a stable South Vietnam generally in line with US interests depended on their ability to create indigenous Vietnamese security forces capable of quelling the Vietnamese nationalist and communist insurgency.
Washington never managed to achieve its aims in Vietnam, and was finally forced out of the country when Vietnamese guerrillas and North Vietnamese regulars overran the South and established military and political control over Saigon two years after the departure of US troops. There were a multitude of reasons why Washington failed in its objectives in Vietnam, but a central one was the fact that the US was never able to create viable Vietnamese security forces that were not corrupt or ineffective. Instead, US policymakers consistently had to deal with a Vietnamese security apparatus that often stole from Vietnamese peasants, or performed poorly in combat against nationalist and communist insurgents in addition to the North Vietnamese Army.
In Iraq, Washington faces a similar predicament. Thus far, the indigenous Iraqi security forces trained by the US have been both corrupt and ineffective. For instance, much of the equipment supplied to the new Iraqi security forces has fallen into the hands of Iraqi insurgents, and it is believed by Pentagon officials that various individuals in the Iraqi security forces reveal critical and sensitive information to the guerrillas.
The US has trained and fielded more than 200,000 Iraqi security forces serving in police, border patrol and site protection. But the process of setting up the armed forces has been fraught with problems. Most members of the first Iraqi battalion formed quit within weeks because of dissatisfaction over pay and conditions.
And the newly trained Iraqi security forces have also been quite ineffective, which was brutally evident during the recent Shi'ite uprising throughout central and southern Iraq. According to Major General Martin Dempsey, the commander of the US 1st Armored Division, who recently spoke with Associated Press reporters, during the Shi'ite uprising and violence in Fallujah, 10 percent of Iraq's security forces "actually worked against" US troops, implying that some of this 10 percent took up arms against the US-led coalition.
Indeed, during the uprising, many insurgents were seen still wearing US-issued uniforms, and using US-issued military equipment to fight against US-led troops. As one lieutenant of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps told the New York Times: "We may work for the government now. But if anything happens, we all work for [Muqtada al-]Sadr." Muqtada is the Shi'ite leader who called on his private militia, the Mahdi Army, to forcefully resist US governance.
Just as concerning, Dempsey said that an additional 40 percent of Iraq's security forces simply quit due to either fear or out of an unwillingness to fight fellow Iraqis under the orders of the US government. Dempsey said: "It's very difficult to convince [Iraqi security forces] that Iraqis are killing fellow Iraqis and fellow Muslims, because it's something they shouldn't have to accept. Over time I think they will probably have to accept it."
If Washington has any hopes of creating a stable Iraq, then Dempsey's words must not go unheeded and Iraq's security forces will "have to accept" standing with the US in fighting against the present insurgency. One way to accomplish this may be reincorporating former Ba'athist leaders who have knowledge and experience in running Iraq's military services, despite their history of repression over much of the Iraqi populace. While such a decision may be scorned on by ideological thinkers inside the current Bush administration, considering the lack of options on the ground in Iraq, this option may be one that has to be pursued.
Administration officials have recognized this, and there are now attempts to bring back former members of Ba'athist leader Saddam Hussein's military establishment. In the same interview, Dempsey articulated this policy shift, stating that "part of me says our jobs may have been easier had we just found a way to keep some of the Ba'ath Party in place". Other US military commanders have made similar statements, such as Major General John Batiste and Brigadier General Carter Ham.
US Central Command General John Abizaid made parallel comments in the early days after the start of the Shi'ite uprising, announcing: "It's also very clear that we've got to get more senior Iraqis involved - former military types involved in the security forces." He continued: "In the next couple of days, you'll see a large number of senior officers being appointed to key positions in the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi joint staff and in Iraqi field commands."
And US Army Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt said: "Sooner or later, there would come a time when we need senior officers, and there are many senior officers remaining from this country who can meet all the criteria established in the 'de-Ba'athification' policy and still have a significant contribution to offer the nation of Iraq in the defense structure."
In the end, however, even if Washington is able to create effective Iraqi security forces, the stability of Iraq will largely depend on how well Washington can isolate the insurgents from the rest of the population. As in all guerrilla conflicts, in order to destroy an insurgency, the occupying power must discredit it in the eyes of its own people. Failure to do this will mean that the insurgency can only be destroyed by overwhelming force at such a level that is often considered politically unacceptable by the occupying power's domestic population. In the case of Iraq, if Washington fails to isolate the insurgents, it is highly unlikely that the American people would support their government in its attempts to destroy the insurgency using the level of force that will be required.
In the meantime, a senior US defense official said this week that the total US force in Iraq was likely to remain at more than 130,000 for another three months - well after the scheduled June 30 handover of sovereignty.
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