Iraq exit strategy: Promise or hope?
By Paul Reynolds
BBC News Online world affairs correspondent
The "exit strategy" suddenly being talked about by the office of the British Prime Minister Tony Blair is probably more of a hope than a promise.
Looking for a way out of Iraq?
A sceptical diplomatic source suggested that it was connected to Mr Blair's current political needs rather than to any change of policy.
According to this interpretation, the prime minister's office was responding to pressure, from the former foreign secretary Robin Cook among others, for a date or at least a procedure to be set for the withdrawal of British troops. Mr Cook said that they should leave once an elected Iraqi government was in power at the start of 2005.
But it is a shift of emphasis from previous insistence that troops would stay for as long as necessary and shifts of emphasis can often lead to shifts of policy.
First signs of withdrawal strategy?
So is this the first sign that the British government is seriously looking at how to get out?
If so, it seems to be setting two conditions. The first is the formation of an elected Iraqi government. The second is the development of strong local security forces.
Certainly the British government has decided to put the best interpretation possible on existing plans.
Indeed, a Downing Street spokeswoman said on Monday: "It was a reiteration of where we are. We wanted to make sure that people were aware of what the strategy is. It has always been there."
This therefore does not amount to a new policy but it does amount to a plan which can be presented as an exit strategy.
It was a reiteration of where we are - we wanted to make sure that people were aware of what the strategy is
British spokeswoman
Its problem however is that it is very vague and depends hugely on actual events. There is no actual commitment to a withdrawal at any particular stage.
The briefings from Mr Blair's office started on Sunday and officials were quoted as saying that the US and UK had agreed to speed up the training and deployment of Iraqi security forces.
The implication was that Iraqisation might mean that their own occupation troops could leave as soon as possible, but not it seems until 2006 or 2007.
Supporting interim government
The reports are a follow up to the statement made in Washington on Friday by the US, the UK, Italy and Japan that they would stay on in Iraq only by request.
This statement was designed to bolster the status of the interim Iraqi government which will take over on a caretaker basis until elections are held by the end of January next year.
In any event, the interim government is most unlikely to ask for troops to be withdrawn. That would leave it at the mercy of the people who have killed the current chairman of the Governing Council Ezzedine Salim.
Iraqi security forces plan
The strategy of handing over control to Iraqi security forces is certainly not new.
Targets for the various branches of these forces were set months ago, though training for some of them has been very slow and could be speeded up if more resources were available.
The target is to have about 260,000 members of the Iraqi security forces. These would be made up of:
* Police: 75,000
* Army: 40,000
* Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC- a paramilitary force): 40,000
* Border police and enforcement: 34,000
* Facilities Protection (static guard force): 70,000
The difficulty has been that the training has been very limited. At the end of March a report by the conservative Washington think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) revealed that, according to the Pentagon, 54,000 of the police force had not been trained.
Even today, the British Foreign Office said that of the planned 40,000 in the Iraqi army, only four battalions had been formed, about 3,000 men, with only 2,000 more currently in training.
The only force more or less up to strength is the ICDC, which is used as a paramilitary police unit.
There is clearly a long way to go.
And the loyalty of some of these units is in doubt.
Many members of the police force have sided with insurgents and some of the ICDC units refused to fight in Falluja.
With a pattern developing of US commanders making local arrangements as they did in Falluja, it is not clear whether the planned Iraqi forces will in fact be able to take control. |
