And dissent by our paper..on Surrender or die, terrorists warned!
dailytimes.com.pk
Editorial today- Use military force through a political strategy
(A democracy is characterised by one simple thing that is ability to dissent and not being punished, in Pakistan today we do that every day, those who claim that I do not criticise Pakistan enough and go after ME much more fail to se freedoms that we enjoy the others in the Islamic world do not. our quasi democracy has seen a many a bloodless coups, we have condemned atrocities of our soldiers in Bangladesh, we have been apologetic, remorseful for the acts committed, not like Halebja or Hama or most of these countries that election and dissent lead to tongues being cut).
Use military force through a political strategy
General Pervez Musharraf has again expressed his resolve to root out terrorist elements from the tribal areas using a combination of political and military means. He has also dismissed the ‘misconception’ that the government had withdrawn in the face of tribal insurgency and effected a compromise to save face. “Al Qaeda terrorists will be eliminated from the tribal areas by political and military means. We will not compromise on our fight against terrorism,” he thundered.
Well spoken, sir. But we must be forgiven our scepticism because of a number of factors. Consider.
When the military build-up in South Waziristan began, we supported the move not only because in today’s world a state cannot live with the anachronism of areas that lie outside its jurisdiction but also because the area, without doubt, housed elements that are a clear and present danger to Pakistan. Nonetheless, we advised at that point that any military activity must be undertaken carefully and should seek to target undesirable elements by isolating them. But as things unfolded, it became clear that the operation had been undertaken with poor preparation and on the basis of flawed intelligence. The government’s actions betrayed confusion over the aims of the operation (military-first, political-later, or vice versa). But even at the operational level, the performance left much to be desired. The operating troops had no idea about the extent of local support to the Al Qaeda-Taliban elements which resulted in heavy casualties to the army and paramilitary troops.
There were multiple strategies going the rounds but they were more at cross-purposes than supplementing each other. Even the secret deal which has now become a matter of contention remains secret enough to allow both sides to interpret its provisions differently. The FATA MNAs who were instrumental in stitching the deal as well as the wanted former Taliban commander Nek Mohammad say the deal did not include registration of foreign elements in the area. Nek also said immediately after the much-publicised ceremony at Shakai that he had not surrendered to the troops and that the government had sued for peace. He has now gone back on the ‘deal’ and says he is free to do as he pleases.
The issue of the presence of foreigners has also caused much confusion. The recent lashkar put together to bring them in says the foreigners have left the area for fear of a crackdown. The rightwing parties say two different things in the same breath — there are no foreigners in the area and the foreign elements that are there have married local women and are settled since the first Afghan jihad. But clearly this is a red herring. Even if it is accepted that there are no foreigners in the area in the sense of Al Qaeda elements, why cannot the foreigners that are settled in the area get registered with the government? There is also the equally important question: where are these ‘settled’ foreigners?
Meanwhile, US troops in Afghanistan have violated Pakistani territory for the third time in less than a month. This indicates there is no coordination between troops operating on both sides of the border; also, that the US army does not think the Pakistan army is doing an effective job of hunting down Al Qaeda-Taliban elements. The lack of coordination becomes even more visible from the latest report which says the company commander of Tochi Scouts refused to talk to the Americans after they entered Pakistani territory. This incursion business is dangerous and if it is not stopped at the highest level it could provoke an armed clash between Pakistani and US troops. The funny thing is that the idea of joint patrolling along the border was dropped early on because of issues of sovereignty and other political pressures on the Pakistani side. But given the situation, there is clearly a need to re-visit the issue and devise procedures that can prevent things from getting out of hand.
This is also important because General Musharraf’s reasons for sending the army into the tribal areas were premised on the logic that it was better to have our troops man the area and prevent it from being used as jumping off ground by undesirable elements to mount attacks on the western side of the Durand Line rather than get American troops to do the job. Islamabad needs to emphasise this point to those who are opposed to the operation. How should the government go about this?
There are two aspects here: the strategic and the tactical. The strategic pertains to the overall politico-military operations, the tactical to the operational efficacy of the troops. On both counts the performance needs to be improved. Politically, the government needs to sit down with the MMA and tell the alliance clearly and firmly the dangers inherent in its current approach. It must, if necessary, arm-twist the MMA to use its influence in the tribal areas to dissuade tribesmen from sheltering undesirable elements. Indeed, it would be good to form a committee with representation from all political parties and involve its members in the conduct of this operation. The importance of a political consensus in this case can hardly be overemphasised.
There is also need for a longer-term strategy to inject development funds in the area and introduce the reforms that have been withheld, including General Musharraf’s own devolution plan. This would help break the traditional patterns of power in the area and bring forth new actors beholden to the government for their empowerment.
At the operational level, the army should not fall into the kind of trap it fell into last time round. It must improve its intelligence and ground coordination. It should use air power whenever and wherever necessary instead of simply relying on ground troops. And it must secure the likely escape routes before moving in for the kill. But it is important to note that military power will only succeed in and through an effective political strategy and not as a stand-alone device. Resolve is good, but it must be backed with credible operational plans. On both counts, the government has been lacking so far. *
dailytimes.com.pk |
