Sistani
He runs a heavy duty organization.
sistani.org
This wedsite I find easier to use
najaf.org
His own rather hagiographic biography claims modernistic credentials for him.
piece from Jan CFR:
cfr.org
Middling hagiographic piece from Washington Times. Has more info than CFR summary.
washingtontimes.com
From a politically engaged Iraq Arab Sunni
nationalreview.com
UPI Pentagon correspondent's view. Seems to be an intelligent reporter.
upi.com
Italian Christian view.
213.92.16.98
A peacenik View:
usip.org
Some random thoughts about him.
I expect Sistani after 1st July will act very much the way he does now. He's the leading religious jurist of millions of people inside and outside Iraq. Such a person must be consistent and changes in fundamental positions can only be taken in serious circumstance and reasons for such change well argued.
I thnk, in the end, he's going to have to follow the desires of the majority of Shiites.
He says interpretation of scripture must reflect the circumstances of the time. How far he goes with this position isn't clear to me.
He and his family are practical religious leaders intent on improving the conditions of their followers and increasing the numbers of folk who would adhere to their type of Shiism.
His deep support is in Iraq. He is also playing a spoiler game against the Iranian khomeiniist mullahs and he has his own followers in Iran. One obvious project of his is to move the centre of Shia learning and influence back to Najaf.
The pictures of the affiliated centres of his various organizations with their new, high quality furniture are evidence of his money raising power. He doesn't need the Iranians or anyone else to subsidize him.
In many ways he's analogous to the Pope. His word is authoritative for many of his followers and many other Shiites take his statments seriously. He does not claim infallibilty, though.
He doesn't seem to condone or support the Shiite tradition of recklessness as seen in the history the faith's martyrs, and as recently exemplified by the behaviour of al Sadr, who is a Khomeiniist.
He has representatives in most countries with significant muslim populations and is quite likely well informed of conditions and conflicts abroad, including the US.
He seems to be conservative in the do least harm style. Has always avoided acrimony. Is very careful expending his political capital.
I've been reading A Code of Practice For Muslims in the West, published under his auspices, and must say it looks positively liberal compared to the Salafists. He basically instructs his followers not to do things which reflect badly on Islam, but far more important, not violate the trust of their host country as this would be "perfidy" and therefore a sin. He also intructs his followers abroad to obey the general thrust of Sharia but to be flexible enough that they not violate what I would call common sense. For example it's preferable to be examined or treated by a doctor of the same sex, but if that's not possible, then go with the less preferable option, because there is no religious demand that health be sacrificed to modesty.
On the other hand, he does enjoin Shiites not 'fall into the melting pot' but to nurture their Islamic values. Nonetheless, he doesn't exactly enjoin them not have non-Muslim friends and does say they should be good neighbours and friendly to non-Muslims of good character. It's OK to greet non-Mulslim folk on the occasion of their festivals, such as Christmas.
Where he is clearly very hard nosed is in the area of ritual purity. Folk must do the very best they can to say all their prayers and do purificatory things even if circumstances are difficult.
It would seem that his basic philosophical operating principle is that 'if it's not forbidden, then it's allowed'. Nonetheless, because his type of religion does not distinguish between sacred and secular some of what is forbidden can differ from what is forbidden in western modernity.
He is definitrly what US folk would label a social conservative.
He does expect his followers to consult people such as himself on a much larger range of issues than say, the Pope expects Catholics to consult their priests.
No doubt, some do, and others do not.
Will he take a more active role in Iraqi politics next year? I dunno. It's claimed for him that:
His ideological production
As-Sayyid as-Seestani is not a jurist per se. He is a highly educated man who keeps abreast with modern vision with regard to the development of political and economic thought. He has very good ideas in the realm of administrative theory as well as social thought that is compatible with modern progress. With all this in perspective, he views the dispensation of religious edicts as a right of good path for the Islamic society.
najaf.org
I've not found any writing or statements by him except the non-religious opinion about the the Iraq interim constitution in the transition period.
any law drafted for the transition period will not gain legitimacy unless approved by the elected national assembly. In addition, this law places obstacles in reaching a permanent constitution for the country that preserves its unity and the rights of its people from all ethnicities and sects.
The part about legitimacy is clearly true, I think, and can be seen as a broad message to occupying authoriies and to Iraqis.
The second part is thrown out with several things in mind. He wants wider discussion of the constitutional structure and on that basis negotiated modifications. And if those aren't undertaken a warning that in his view it's flawed and could lead to undesirable consequences.
The thinking is that any constititon which divides a country in power groups according to both religious and ethnic differences might lead to more than just political conflict. But neither is there any guarantee it will as outcomes depend on the people's cooperativeness, etc.
What is notable is that he's putting forward a secular argument.
Here's an editorial which rather nicely sums up his political situation. It was posted to a Shia chatroom by a London spokesman of his.
Ayatollah Sistani is Hardly 'Quietist'
shiachat.com
By Ibrahim Mousawi, chief editor of the foreign news department at Al-Manar television
Written for The Daily Star
Saturday, May 29, 2004
The crucial role played in Iraq by the marjaiyyeh, or the Shiite clergy that acts as a source of reference, should invite no astonishment. The marjaiyyeh has always had a pivotal function, especially during crises, as was shown this week when Ayatollah Ali Sistani helped broker a deal that may end seven weeks of fighting in Najaf and Kufa. However, the importance of the marjaiyyeh is not limited to Iraq; it is also present in Iran, Lebanon and elsewhere.
In 1979, a senior marjaa, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, succeeded in overthrowing the pro-American regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, and establishing the first ever Shiite Islamic republic. The marjaiyyeh in Iraq played a similar role in fighting colonial powers.
However, there has also been a contrary view that the behavior of the marjaiyyeh has, at many times, been "quietist," suggesting the clergy was indifferent to the affairs of the world. Whether one considers the marjaiyyeh in a positive or a negative light, its significance cannot be questioned. Moreover, the quietism of the Shiite marjaiyyeh (if quietism there has been) can only be attributed to the world of politics, as the marjaiyyeh has always been active intellectually and theologically.
Due to long periods of repression and persecution in Shiite history, the marjaiyyeh often had to turn inward and limit its activity to religion. However the same marjaiyyeh also found itself drawn to intervene in politics, mainly for two reasons: because of the intertwined nature of religion and politics in Islam, and because the seriousness of particular situations demanded it. However, this involvement was never designed to confiscate the political life of a community or impose a system that was religiously oriented - that is, unless the people themselves expressed a willingness to embrace a religious model.
Let us take Iraq, today, as an example. Sistani has assumed a paramount role in establishing guidelines to take Iraq out of its crisis. Many Iraqis, even those having different sectarian, ethnic and political affiliations, have applauded his prescriptions for early elections, and the way he has defined the situation in the transitional period toward a free and independent Iraq. All those who have met Sistani have expressed respect for his moderation and tolerance, and, indeed, one cannot but admire the flexibility and transparency of the marjaiyyeh.
A Western journalist who recently interviewed Sistani suggested that the cleric regarded a secular state in Iraq as the best formula to preserve the diversity of Iraqi society. I disagree, and would even expect the marjaiyyeh to display a hard-line attitude against secularism to secure cohesiveness and unity among its followers. After all, no one can expect the marjaiyyeh to preach secularism or approve of the dichotomy between religion and politics, or between the here and the hereafter. True, Sistani is for democracy, with all of its ramifications, as a remedy to cure Iraq's ailments. However, he cannot undermine his own authority or dig the marjaiyyeh's grave by advocating a divorce between God and man.
Sistani is not a politician, yet he finds himself compelled to lay down markers for Iraq's future at such a critical juncture in its history. What are the guidelines of Sistani's approach to politics in Iraq? Based on what he has said, or what he has been quoted as saying, we can infer the following:
l Sistani has sternly refused to meet with or negotiate directly with the US civilian administrator in Iraq, Paul Bremer. This replicates a practice whereby the most senior Shiite clerics who were seen as sources of reference never, throughout Iraq's history, met with occupation authorities or their representatives.
l He has also firmly rejected all attempts to sow discord and fragmentation in Iraq, or anything that threatens the unity of the Iraqi people and land.
l He has rejected terrorism in all of its manifestaions.
l He has stressed the necessity for tolerance and dialogue among all Iraqi ethnic and sectarian groups, and has favored maintaining good relations with non-Muslim communities.
l He has sought openness toward the international community, as was demonstrated by his meeting representatives of the United Nations, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
l He has highlighted the need for democracy and elections to create genuinely representative entities and to secure a transparent means of elite rotation.
l He has refused all attempts to undermine state institutions or civil society by issuing fatwas prohibiting this.
l And very importantly, Sistani did not call for a jihad against the occupation forces, as he believes that circumstances are not yet ripe for this.
One can conclude from this that Sistani heavily favors state and civil society institutions in Iraq. At the same time, his attitude underscores the surge in activism of the marjaiyyeh, contrary to the stereotype suggesting that it is quietist. The marjaiyyeh has once again proved that it is politically quietist only when the political situation is stable. However, when the state is in trouble and the expertise and wisdom of the religious authorities are needed, the marjaiyyeh becomes an indispensable actor in helping to bring back stability. |
