have yet to see, post-war, any evidence that the war was, on the whole, a better idea than continued sanctions and no-fly zones
If that was the choice, I agree. However, the arguments that containment was failing were persuasive to me then, and nothing I've seen since invalidates them.
So the downside potential of leaving things as they were went something like this: containment falls apart as UNSC support evaporates. Sanctions are lifted [France and Russia make billions]. The No Fly zones become untenable. Saddam is free to go shopping [and we know a lot more now about where he could have gone shopping]. Meanwhile, Saddam is free to enhance his working relationship with Abu Nidal, Ansar al Islam and Al Qaeda, while continuing to fund the Palestinian sucide bombers.
Saddam having scored a major victory, all the other Arab regimes play kissy-face with him, and all thought of reform evaporates in the Arab world. The US does another major climb-down in the Arab world, to add to a long list: Beirut, Somalia, the Cole, etc.
What part of this argument seems far-fetched to you, or has become invalidated by new information?
It wasn't an attractive option before 9/11, and after 9/11 the idea of it became insupportable. |