Iran: Coming in from the cold
Despite the reverses, Tehran has been working steadily over the past
few years to improve relations with the West and its Arab neighbours
Upstream, June 18
By Vahe Petrossian
Tomatoes and a couple of firecrackers aimed by demonstrators at the British embassy in Tehran may not be the best way of conducting foreign policy. Nor is a formal message of warning to the US about its actions in Iraq likely to win friends in Washington.
However, judging Iranian behaviour requires context a quarter-century after a revolution that was at least partly aimed against Western political and cultural influences.
Even one week earlier in May, a first group of angry demonstrators had hurled petrol bombs and stones at the embassy building on Ferdowsi Avenue, raising the spectre of earlier violent attacks, not to speak of the November 1979 seizure of the US embassy and holding its staff as hostages.
As for the warning message to the US in late May, it was the first time that Iran acknowledged of its own accord any kind of diplomatic initiative involving Washington.
Iran has, in fact, been trying very hard to improve relations with the world, in particular Europe and even the US in the past few years. Progress has been slow but the authorities and even militants in the street are learning the rules of the game.
Despite impressions outside Iran, there has long been a consensus over foreign policy between the so-called reformists and conservatives. Except for a few individuals, all sides agree that the country must improve its relations with its Arab neighbours and with the West.
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, the moderate face of Iran since reformist Mohammad Khatami became president in 1997, has close ties with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei while having a foot in the reformist camp.
His efforts to normalise ties with Europe and encourage a process of rapprochement with the US in the past few years all have the approval of Khamenei.
Insiders say it would be inconceivable for Kharrazi to undertake controversial foreign policy initiatives without first getting the full backing of Khamenei. Indeed, the smiling President Khatami is also known to consult Khamenei closely on foreign policy issues.
Iran's policies in recent years have been heavily motivated by practical considerations, including the need for foreign investment and an end to, or relaxation of, US economic sanctions. Hostility abroad is also preventing Iran from playing what it thinks is its rightful role as a gateway to the newly independent Caspian states and a transit route for their energy exports.
The foreign policy initiative in Europe was having considerable success until revelations about Tehran's controversial nuclear energy programme in late 2002 caused the EU to eventually postpone a decision on allowing Iranian exports easier access to its markets.
The dispute over the nuclear programme, which Iran insists is purely civilian, has been dragging on through this spring and early summer with the Intenational Atomic Energy Agency due soon to consider a report from its inspectors.
With the US, the Iranians also appeared to be having considerable success until the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and the subsequent characterisation by President George W. Bush of Iran as part of an "axis of evil".
Until then, it had seemed that the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, designed to keep non-US oil companies out of Iran, and earlier unilateral sanctions aimed at US oil companies were about to be eased.
In the past year, US-Iran relations have see-sawed wildly, often giving the impression that the two are on the verge of military hostilities. After the invasion of Iraq in early 2003 there was much speculation about the US somehow also pushing for regime change in Tehran.
The US, particularly the Bush administration, clearly has a problem with Iran. Given the humiliation of the embassy hostage crisis of 1979-81 under President Carter and the subsequent Iran-Contra affair under President Reagan, the US has yet to forget or at least forgive. By contrast, the Iranians appear to have resolved most of their psychological problems with the West, in particular with the US, and are not as paranoid as they were in the 1980s.
Indeed, the failure of Iran's religious and political authorities to provide solutions to the country's problems has led to a distinct majority of the population, particularly the young, to lean towards Western ways.
In the US context, having confronted Washington in the years after the revolution and seemingly won the Iranians are no longer obsessed with America as 'The Great Satan'.
The Iranians, particularly officials, are nervous about the huge US military presence in the region but they can also see benefits. The US invasion of Afghanistan got rid of the very hostile Taleban regime while putting Persian-speaking tribes and factions less hostile to Tehran in power in Kabul.
In Iraq, US soldiers and taxpayers are bearing the cost of ousting Saddam Hussein, who invaded Iran in 1980, and have opened the way for Iraq's majority Shia population to exercise more power.
The US may have supported Saddam in his 1980-1988 war against Iran but it has since been mainly responsible for first keeping him in check and then removing him, allowing Iran to enjoy proportionately one of the lowest defence budgets in the region. Such considerations, while welcome in Tehran, have added an extra edge to US resentments against Iran.
However, the underlying trend towards more normal ties apparent before Bush's "axis of evil" speech may well return, especially if there is a change of administration in Washington after this November's presidential election.
Even now, despite all the rhetoric, Halliburton and a few other US oil services companies are somehow being allowed to do work in Iran through subsidiaries. A Halliburton affiliate is favoured to win a big drilling contract for phases 9 and 10 of South Pars. Unless Iran is shown to be working on nuclear weapons or breaks with its more recent tradition by committing some outrage such as substituting tomatoes with grenades, relations between Tehran and Washington, and by extension with the rest of the West, could take a significant turn for the better next year. |
