I have a few bones to pick with Pollack, for the first time in a long time:
1.- He no longer deals with whether it was worth getting rid of Saddam from a purely strategic standpoint, a question he answered equivocally in his The Atlantic piece published in 1/04 by saying it was not an error. I took his wiggly answer then to be a "yes." I assume that he had no objections from a purely moral standpoint.
He's wiggling even harder in this piece even though the moral and strategic issues haven't changed.
Why not say, then, that the war was not a strategic error again instead of suggesting that he is "deeply torn?" Any thinking person who considers the issue is "torn." Sheeesh, guy.
I think for the first time in a long time there may be some political considerations in Pollack's thinking. After all, there may be a new team in DC that might take a look at him. Nothing wrong with that, but one needs to use triple heavy duty Super X Spin Filters in reading stuff during an election cycle, especially if the author might be considered for a job in a new Administration.
2. What guarantee does he have that anything would be different if 250,000 troops had been used initially? Perhaps the looting and initial civil strife would have been avoided, but I don't believe that having more troops now would make any difference now. It seems that troop levels are presently adequate.
How does having more boots on the ground keep a secretive bunch from planting bombs where the troops aren't placed? And that is what the military issue is now. Perhaps more troops could aid in a quicker reconstruction, a valid point, but it nevertheless seems to be progressing. The new Dinar is worth a lot more than it was initially and the standard of living has increased significantly. Baghdad was not built in a day, though the opponents of the Administration unrealistically demand perfection now.
Nothing wrong with trying to save a little money--the cost has been high as it is.
3. Again, not a word from Pollack about the possibility that Saddam, funded with dollars stolen from Oil-for-Food and the inevitable fall of containment, would have been likely to purchase WMD on the black market, in my view a more rational tactic (for Saddam) than developing them in Iraq. Obviously, the US and others would have had a close watch on his domestic WMD production. Why not do and end run?
Why does no one--not Pollack, not Rose, not any of the think tanks whose work I follow--wish to discuss this issue as a justification for the war? Is it that much out in left field? I don't think so. Answers are completely unsatisfactory, though from an intuitive standpoint, the possibility that Saddam could have bought WMD on a black market certainly seems to be a valid point. Perhaps worth the war all by itself.
Pollack acknowledges the point that Saddam was not easily deterred when he says that "[s]imilarly, Saddam again proved himself to be exactly the kind of dangerous decision-maker that I, and other Iraq experts, feared would make him difficult to deter if he were to acquire nuclear weapons."
Does the source of the nukes make a difference if Saddam is not subject to what others might consider to be rational deterrence?
A few articles--no answers:
cfr.org
usinfo.state.gov
cns.miis.edu
and, last but not least, lgf:
littlegreenfootballs.com
4. This bothers me for a couple of reasons, the first is that it is such an obvious point and, secondly, because it fails to acknowledge some frankly positive trends. Fodder for a jopb with Kerry? Could be. I hope not since Pollack is one of the best, in my book:
But, as I warned beforehand, I suspect history will judge that decision based principally upon whether reconstruction succeeds or fails. If it fails--and Iraq and the region are plunged into chaos--as current trends threaten, then it will be hard for anyone to justify the war. |
