Increasing openness in China's foreign policy
By Evan S. Medeiros
CHINA recently conducted a quiet but important policy debate over the country's strategic direction. In newspapers, magazines, and internal papers, Chinese officials and scholars argued whether the concept of 'China's peaceful rise' (Zhongguo de heping jueqi) should be adopted.
Beginning late last year, senior Chinese leaders and analysts began promoting the notion of 'peaceful rise' (heping jueqi) as 'the new pathway' (xin dao lu) for China in the coming decades.
'Peaceful rise' is China's way of acknowledging the historical problems associated with being a rising power. In many ways, it is China's long-delayed answer to the 'China Threat' debate and the efforts by other countries to define China's future global position.
Chinese policymakers and analysts argue that as China rises, it should seek to avoid the competition-inducing policies of Weimar Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
According to Professor Zheng Bijian, the main architect of this theory and a former senior government official with strong links to the current leadership: 'The only choice for China under the current international situation is to rise peacefully - namely, to develop by taking advantage of the peaceful international environment and, at the same time, to maintain world peace through its development.'
Despite this high-level endorsement, however, the acceptance of this new term within China has not been a fait accompli.
Many Chinese scholars and analysts have questioned its meaning and accuracy. International observers have also noticed some of its weaknesses, such as its unclear and potentially contradictory treatment of the Taiwan issue.
China's internal debate has centred on a few arguments. Many opposed the use of the term 'rise' (jueqi), arguing that China is not rising and will not rise given its myriad of economic and social problems. They argue that 'rising' is a far too optimistic characterisation of China's current socio-economic evolution.
Others objected to the use of 'rise' because it connotes a China-led 'power transition' in the region. Such terminology would do little to assuage neighbouring nations.
Furthermore, a small but vocal minority opposed China's commitment to a 'peaceful' rise.
This group, which did not just include the military, argued that committing to a peaceful rise could undermine China's ability to deter Taiwan from moving towards a formal, legal separation from the mainland.
A turning point in the debate occurred last month. During a speech at the Boao Forum for Asia held on Hainan island, China's version of the annual World Economic Forum, Chinese President Hu Jintao used the expression 'peaceful development' to refer to China's external strategy. Mr Hu's non-use of the term 'rise' indicates his agreement with analysts who favoured a less confrontational phrase.
To be sure, it is still too early to know whether the new expression will traverse the increasingly bumpy road from academic lexicon to party orthodoxy, or will end up in the Communist Party's overflowing dustbin of meaningless expressions.
To some extent, China's internal debate is encouraging. It provides further evidence of increasing openness in foreign-policy thinking. Chinese leaders are actively seeking input and guidance from analysts with extensive training, expertise and experience in regional and world affairs.
The concept of peaceful rise, however, leaves Taiwan as a looming contradiction.
In discussing the implications of the concept for the Taiwan issue, most Chinese commentators view Taiwan as an exception. A large body of scholars and analysts highlight China's strong national sentiment for reunification and the leadership's stated willingness to bear 'any costs' for that goal.
Yet, for many American policymakers and analysts, Taiwan is the litmus test of China's future role in global affairs. According to a speech last November by Secretary of State Colin Powell, 'whether China chooses peace or coercion to resolve its differences with Taiwan will tell us a great deal about the kind of role China seeks with its neighbours and seeks with us'.
The differences between United States and Chinese perceptions could not be starker.
Some of China's neighbours, such as Japan, South-east Asian nations and India, likely share Washington's assessment. If a military conflict over Taiwan erupted, it is not difficult to envision a scenario in which regional concerns about China's willingness to use force to resolve outstanding territorial disputes in Asia would become a prominent driver of foreign and military policies in the region.
The future evolution of China's new external strategy of peaceful rise is unclear. It reflects an encouraging recognition by Chinese policymakers that they need to define how China will use its expanding global influence in ways conducive to regional and global stability.
Regardless of how peace-loving the Chinese people feel they are, Chinese leaders need to take into account the legitimate concerns of its Asian neighbours and major powers in the region.
Whether Chinese leaders can translate this new expression into tangible policies and deeds of reassurance remains an open question.
The writer is a political analyst in the Washington office of the Rand Corporation. Rights: Yale Centre for the Study of Globalisation.
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