Part 4 >> (•) On January 24, 2003, in response to a question for the Office of the Secretary of
Defense/International Security Affairs for information on Nigerien uranium sales to Iraq, the DIA
provided a background paper which described the original CIA Niger reporting and the
November 25 Navy report on alleged storage of uranium destined for Iraq. The paper concluded
that "DIA cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore or yellowcake from
Niger. However, sufficient time has elapsed since the commencement of the recent alleged
uranium agreement, that we cannot discount that Iraq may have received an unknown quantity."
The report made no mention of the foreign language documents on the alleged uranium deal and
did not indicate that there were any concerns about the quality of those documents.
(U) On January 26, 2003, Secretary of State Powell addressed the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland. He said, "why is Iraq still trying to procure uranium and the
special equipment to transform it into material for nuclear weapons?"
On January 27, 2003, a CIA intelligence report ^ ^ H i ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ I indicated
that foreign government service reported that the uranium sodium compound in storage at the
warehouse in Cotonou, Benin was destined for France, not Iraq. The same report said that
separate foreign government service had information on Iraqi attempts to obtain uranium from
Niger, dating from 1999, but had no further information. The foreign government service also
indicated that Niger had been looking to sell an old stock of uranium for years to the highest
bidder. According to the foreign government service, other countries had expressed interest.
I. The State of the Union
(U) On January 27, 2003, the DCI was provided with a hardcopy draft of the State of the
Union address at an NSC meeting. When he returned to the CIA, he passed the draft to an
executive assistant to deliver to the office of the DDL No one in the office of the DDI recalls
who the point of contact for the speech was, or if a point of contact was ever named. No one
recalled receiving parts of the speech for coordination and because the speech was hand carried,
no electronic versions of the speech exist at the CIA. The DCI testified at a July 16, 2003
hearing that he never read the State of the Union speech.
(U) In late January, the Director of WINPAC discussed, over the phone, the portion of the
State of the Union draft pertaining to uranium with his NSC counterpart, the Special Assistant to
the President for Nonproliferation. Neither individual can recall who initiated the phone call.
Both the WINPAC Director and NSC Special Assistant told Committee staff that the WINPAC
Director's concerns about using the uranium information pertained only to revealing sources and
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methods and not to any concerns about the credibility of the uranium reporting. The WINPAC
Director said because the Niger information was specifically and directly tied to a foreign
government service, his concern was about releasing classified information in an unclassified
speech. He told Committee staff that this had been the CIA's longstanding position and was the
reason the CIA wanted the reference removed from the British white paper. Both the WINPAC
Director and NSC Special Assistant agreed that the discussion was brief, cordial, and that they
mutually agreed that citing the British information, which was already unclassified, was
preferable to citing U.S. classified intelligence.
(U) The WINPAC Director and the NSC Special Assistant disagreed, however, about the
content of their conversation in some important respects. First, when the WINPAC Director first
spoke to Committee staff and testified at a Committee hearing, he said that he had told the NSC
Special Assistant to remove the words "Niger" and "500 tons" from the speech because of
concerns about sources and methods. The NSC Special Assistant told Committee staff that there
never was a discussion about removing "Niger" and "500 tons" from the State of the Union and
said that the drafts of the speech show that neither "Niger" nor "500 tons" were ever in any of the
drafts at all. He believed that the WINPAC Director had confused the State of the Union
conversation with a conversation they had previously had in preparation for the Negroponte
speech in which they did discuss removing "Niger" from the speech because of the WINPAC
Director's concerns about revealing sources and methods.
(U) A few days after his testimony before the Committee, the WINPAC Director found
the draft text of the State of the Union in WINPAC's files and noticed that it did not say "500
tons of uranium from Niger." In a follow up interview with Committee staff, he said that he still
recalls the conversation the way he described it to the Committee originally, however, he
believes that he may have confused the two conversations because the documentation he found
does not support his version of events. The draft text of the State of the Union he found said,
"we know that he [Saddam Hussein] has recently sought to buy uranium in Africa." The White
House also told the Committee that the text they sent to the CIA in January said, "we also know
that he has recently sought to buy uranium in Africa."
(U) Second, the WINPAC Director also told the Committee that the NSC Special
Assistant came up with the idea to source the uranium information to the British during their
conversation when he was attempting to come up with an unclassified way to use the uranium
reporting. The NSC Special Assistant told Committee staff that the reference to the British came
from the White House speech writers who were working to come up with publicly usable sources
for all of the intelligence information in the speech. Because the speech writers obtained
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information regarding Iraq's attempts to acquire uranium from Africa from both the intelligence
underlying the NIE and the British white paper, the speech writers sought to attribute the State of
the Union reference to one of those sources. The NSC Special Assistant told Committee staff the
discussion with the WINPAC Director was focused on which of the two sources would be better
to use and that the WINPAC Director preferred sourcing the information to the British paper
because it was unclassified. Both the WINPAC Director and NSC Special Assistant told
Committee staff that there was never a discussion about the credibility of the information.
(U) Finally, the two disagreed about the WINPAC Director's account that he had told the
NSC Special Assistant that the CIA had urged the British to remove the uranium reference from
their white paper, also because of concerns about sources and methods. The NSC Special
Assistant told Committee staff that the WINPAC Director did not tell him the CIA had asked the
British to remove the reference from their white paper.
(U) The CIA has told the Committee in a written response that the agency did not
coordinate with any other NSC directorates on the reference to Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium
from Africa.
(U) On January 28, 2003, the President noted in his State of the Union address that"...
the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of
uranium from Africa." At the time the President delivered the State of the Union address, no one
in the IC had asked anyone in the White House to remove the sentence from the speech. CIA
Iraq nuclear analysts and the Director of WINPAC told Committee staff that at the time of the
State of the Union, they still believed that Iraq was probably seeking uranium from Africa, and
they continued to hold that belief until the IAEA reported that the documents were forgeries.
/. Secretary Powell's UN Speech
(U) Beginning in late January the CIA, State Department, White House and NSC officials
began to work together to draft, coordinate and clear language to be used in an upcoming U.S.
policy speech to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In the early stages of the process,
it was unclear exactly who would be delivering the speech.
(U) At the White House's request, the initial input for the speech came from the CIA.
The CIA sent the input to the White House which reworked it and added additional material. In
the final days of January and during the weekend of February 2, 2003, the Secretary of State and
officials from the State Department, White House and the CIA, met at CIA headquarters to work
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through the issues the Secretary would address and to provide substantive clearance for the text.
Several CIA analysts told Committee staff, and Secretary Powell has said publicly, that the
Secretary did not want to use any information in the speech which was not supported by IC
analysts.
(U) According to the CIA's former ADDI for Intelligence for Strategic Programs, who
was the point person for coordinating the speech, the CIA removed some of the information that
the White House had added to the speech, gathered from finished and raw intelligence, because
the information was single source and uncorroborated. All of the individuals interviewed by
Committee staff who were involved in drafting and coordinating the speech, said that they never
saw any drafts that referenced Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Africa. The ADDI told
Committee staff that a White House staffer and the Secretary asked about the uranium
information, but after discussing the issue with a WINPAC analyst, did not want to include the
information in the speech. Committee staff spoke to the WINPAC analyst, but he remembered
discussing the issue with a State Department staffer, not a White House staffer. Committee staff
interviewed the State Department staffer who said that he did ask about the uranium reporting.
He said he asked the analysts if they had any new information on the reporting and, when they
said they did not, he dropped the issue.
( ^ ^ H ^ H I ^ H ) On February 3, 2003, the CIA sent a cable to ^ | ^ ^ ^ H
requesting information from the foreign government service, on its January 27, 2003 report
which H ^ ^ H ^ H had information on a Iraq-Niger uranium deal from 1999. The cable
said, "the issue of Iraqi uranium procurement continues to resonate with senior policymakers and
may be part of SecState's speech to the UN Security Council on 5 Feb 2003 if [a foreign
government service] is able to provide a contract for the 1999 uranium deal, confirm that the
information was not from another foreign government service, (
The same day, CIA ^ ^ H ^ ^ ^ l responded that
the foreign government service does not have a copy of the contract, the information was of
•'national origin,"
( | ) On February 4, 2003, the U.S. Government passed electronic copies of the Iraq-Niger
documents to ^ H m | | | m ^ m m | H m H the IAEA.
Because the Director of the IAEA's INVO was in New York at the time, the U.S. Government
also provided the documents to him in New York. Included with the documents were the U.S.
Government talking points which stated, " | ^ H ^ | of reporting suggest Iraq has attempted to
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acquire uranium from Niger. We cannot confirm these reports and have questions regarding
some specific claims. Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad
has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons
program." The H H H H of reporting mentioned refer to the original CIA intelligence reports
from the foreign government service and the CIA intelligence report on the former ambassador's
trip to Niger.
(U) On February 5, 2003, Secretary Powell briefed the UN. His speech did not mention
Iraqi uranium procurement efforts.
(U) On February 7, 2003, the State Department's Office of Language Services,
Translating Division, completed the translation of the Iraq-Niger uranium documents. The State
Department passed the translated documents to the CIA. Some signs that the documents were
forgeries were not conveyed in the translation process.
(I) On February 10, 2003, the U.S. Defense Attache in Abidjan (the capital of the African
country, Ivory Coast) reported that its reports officer examined two warehouses in Benin
suspected of storing uranium on route to Iraq on December 17, 2002. The visit was conducted
almost a month after a Navy report indicated uranium destined for Iraq was transiting through the
warehouses. (See page 59) The report indicated that the warehouses appeared to contain only
bales of cotton. A CIA operations cable on the inspection noted, however, it was not possible to
determine if the cotton bales concealed the uranium shipment and that no radiation detection
equipment had been used during the inspection. The DIA told Committee staff that this report
was not published sooner because of a coup in Ivory Coast and a civil war and unrest in Liberia,
a country for which the Defense Attache in Abidjan had temporary responsibility, occupied the
office with other responsibilities.
(•) On February 11, 2003, a CIA senior Africa analyst sent an intelligence assessment to
other CIA offices for coordination.
On the Iraq-Niger uranium reporting,
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the assessment said, "extensive documentary evidence contains several questionable details and
could be fraudulent,
The assessment was never published because it was deemed by CIA
managers to be policy prescriptive in that it was suggesting a course of diplomatic contact with
the Nigerien leader.
(•) On February 27, 2003, the CIA responded to a letter from Senator Carl Levin, dated
January 29, 2003, which asked the CIA to detail "what the U.S. IC knows about Saddam Hussein
seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa." The CIA's response was almost
identical to the U.S. Government points passed to the IAEA/INVO in early February, saying
• H of reporting suggest Iraq had attempted to acquire uranium from Niger." The response
says the CIA believes the government of Niger's assurances that it did not contract with Iraq but
says, "nonetheless, we question, • | | ^ ^ ^ H m | , whether Baghdad may have been
probing Niger for access to yellowcake in the 1999 time frame." The CIA's response made no
mention of any concerns about the validity of the documents and left out the sentence, "we
cannot confirm these reports and have questions regarding some specific claims," that had been
included in the U.S. Government IAEA/INVO points.
_ _ <|) On March 3, 2003, the IAEA/INYO provided I ^ H I ^ ^ ^ H i l H I ^ ^ ^ H H
H I U.S. Mission in Vienna with an analysis of the Niger uranium documents the U.S. had
provided the previous month. The IAEA/INVO concluded that the documents were forgeries and
did not substantiate any assessment that Iraq sought to buy uranium from Niger. Their
assessment was based on analysis of the documents and interviews with Iraqi officials.
( | ) On March 4, 2003, the U.S. Government learned that the French had based their
initial assessment that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from Niger on the same documents
that the U.S. had provided to the INVO.
On March 8, 2003, the DIA provided an info memo (TS-99-177-03) to the
Secretary of Defense in response to a March 8, 2003 Washington Post article, "Some Evidence
on Iraq Called Fake." The memo said, "we believe the IAEA is dismissing attempted Iraqi
yellowcake purchases, largely based upon a single set of unverified documents concerning a
contract between Niger and Iraq for the supply of 'pure uranium.' The [memo added that the]
USG ha[d] not shared other [information] with the IAEA that suggested a Nigerien uranium deal
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with Iraq." The other intelligence referenced in the memo is the CIA intelligence report on the
former ambassador's trip, which described the Nigerien Prime Minister's belief that an Iraqi
delegation was interested in uranium, the Navy report from November 2002 which said uranium
destined for Iraq was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin, and a fax from late 2001
found in the possession of a Somali businessman which described arrangements for shipping
unidentified commodities in an amount that appeared similar to the amount in the Iraq-Niger
yellowcake deal. The fax, however, did not mention uranium, Iraq, or Niger.
On March 11, 2003, the CIA ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ H H H assessment with limited
distribution, "we do not dispute the IAEA Director General's conclusion - last Friday before the
UN Security Council - that documents on Iraq's agreement to buy uranium from Niger are not
authentic." The assessment said, "[U.S. Government] on several occasions has cautioned IAEA
inspectors that available information on this issue was fragmentary and unconfirmed and early
last month told them, 'We could not confirm these reports and have questions regarding some
specific claims. Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad has
attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear weapons
program.'" The assessment did not say whether the CIA had changed its position that Iraq may
have attempted to acquire uranium yellowcake from Africa.
On March 11, 2003, WINPAC drafted a current intelligence piece
(SPWR031103-04) for the Secretary of Defense titled Iraq 's Reported Interest in Buying
Uranium From Niger and Whether Associated Documents are Authentic. The piece said "we do
not dispute the IAEA Director General's conclusions . . . that documents on Iraq's agreement to
buy uranium from Niger are not authentic." The piece also noted that the
[U.S. Government] . . . has cautioned IAEA inspectors that available information
on this issue was fragmentary and unconfirmed and early last month told them,
"we could not confirm these reports and have questions regarding some specific
claims. Nonetheless, we are concerned that these reports may indicate Baghdad
has attempted to secure an unreported source of uranium yellowcake for a nuclear
weapons program."
- A centerpiece of the British White Paper last fall was U.K. concern over
Iraqi interest in foreign uranium. Given the fragmentary nature of the
reporting,
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(U) The piece never addressed whether the CIA had changed its previous assessment that
Iraq may have been trying to obtain uranium from Africa.
On April 5, 2003, the NIC issued a Sense of the Community Memorandum
(SOCM), {Niger: No Recent Uranium Sales to Iraq, NIC SOCM 2001-12.) The SOCM said,
"we judge it highly unlikely that Niamey has sold uranium yellowcake to Baghdad in recent
years. The IC agrees with the IAEA assessment that key documents purported showing a recent
Iraq-Niger sales accord are a fabrication. We judge that other reports from 2002 - one alleging
warehousing of yellowcake for shipment to Iraq, a second alleging a 1999 visit by an Iraqi
delegation to Niamey - do not constitute credible evidence of a recent or impending sale." The
SOCM added, "the current government of Niger jg^^^gggj^^g^^gg^^g^gg^ ancj
probably would report such an approach by the Iraqis, especially because a sale would violate
UN resolution 687." The SOCM did not say whether the IC continued to judge that Iraq had
been "vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake" from Africa, as indicated in the
October 2002 NIE. To date, the IC has not published an assessment to clarify or correct its
position on whether or not Iraq was trying to purchase uranium from Africa.
(•) On June 12, 2003, the DIA sent an information memorandum to Deputy Secretary of
Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in response to questions about Iraq's nuclear program. The memo said,
"while the Intelligence Committee agrees that documents the IAEA reviewed were likely 'fake,'
other unconfirmed reporting suggested that Iraq attempted to obtain uranium and yellowcake
from African nations after 1998." The other reporting mentioned was the Navy report from
November 2002, which said uranium destined for Iraq was being stored in a warehouse in
Cotonou, Benin.
(U) On June 17, 2003, nearly five months after the President delivered the State of the
Union address, the CIA produced a memorandum for the DCI which said, "since learning that the
Iraq-Niger uranium deal was based on false documents earlier this spring, we no longer believe
that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from abroad." This
memorandum was not distributed outside the CIA and the Committee has not been provided with
any intelligence products in which the CIA published its corrected assessment on Iraq's pursuit
of uranium from Niger outside of the agency.
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K. Niger Conclusions
(U) Conclusion 12. Until October 2002 when the Intelligence Community obtained the
forged foreign language documents9 on the Iraq-Niger uranium deal, it was reasonable for
analysts to assess that Iraq may have been seeking uranium from Africa based on Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) reporting and other available intelligence.
9 (§) In March 2003, the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Rockefeller, requested that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigate the source of the documents, ^ ^ I H I ^ ^ ^ ^ H ^ ^ l ^ H l i H ^ H , the
motivation of those responsible for the forgeries, and the extent to which the forgeries were part of a disinformation
campaign. Because of the FBI's current investigation into this matter, the Committee did not examine these issues.
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