The guys at NRO's "The Corner" are blogging as they read the report.
CLARKE TID-BIT NOT TO MISS [Rich Lowry]
Check out pages 137-139, the section "The Desert Camp, Feb. 1999." I'm told it details Clarke's very unique contribution to U.S. counter-terrorism during that incident--namely, an extremely damaging leak.
MORE ON THAT CLARKE TID-BIT [Rich Lowry]
We apparently identified bin Laden at a camp, but held off an attack partly because of worries that a member of the UAE royal family was there too. But we hoped bin Laden might return to the camp and we would be able to target him then. Enter Richard Clarke and here is the commission's narrative:
“Even after bin Laden’s departure from the area, CIA officers hoped he might return, seeing the camp as a magnet that could draw him for as long as it was still set up. The military maintained readiness for another strike opportunity. On March 7, 1999, Clarke called a UAE official to express his concerns about possible associations between Emirati officials and bin Laden. Clarke later wrote in a memorandum of this conversation that the call had been approved at an interagency meeting and cleared with the CIA. When the former bin Laden unit chief found out about Clarke’s call, he questioned CIA officials, who denied having given such clearance. Imagery confirmed that less than a week after Clarke’s phone call the camp was hurriedly dismantled, and the site was deserted. CIA officers, including Deputy Director for Operations Pavitt, were irate. ‘Mike’ thought the dismantling of the camp erased a possible site for targeting bin Laden.”
Posted at 11:52 AM
FOILING THE MILLENNIUM PLOT [Rich Lowry]
Page 179: "Later, when asked what made her decide to ask [millenniun plotter Ahmed] Ressam to step out of his vehicle, Diana Dean, a Customs inspector who referred Ressam to secondary inspectors, testified that it was her 'training and experience.' It appears that the heightened sense of alert at the national level played no role in Ressam's detention."
MICHAEL MOORE'S PIPELINE [Rich Lowry]
Remember his conspiracy theory about the pipeline and the Afghan war? It was a Clinton-era diplomatic initiative. Page 111, picking up the story in 1998:
“In Afghanistan, the State Department tried to end the civil war that had continued since the Soviets’ withdrawal. The South Asia bureau believed it might have a carrot for Afghanistan’s warring factions in a project by the Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) to build a pipeline across the country. While there was probably never much chance of the pipeline actually being built, the Afghan desk hoped that the prospect of shared pipeline profits might lure faction leaders to a conference table. U.S. diplomats did not favor the Taliban over the rival factions. Despite growing concerns, U.S. diplomats were willing at the time, as one official said, to ‘give the Taliban a chance.’”
MORE CLARKE [Rich Lowry]
The report vindicates his contention that “going to battle stations” improved communication within the government, especially with regards to the FBI. So why didn't anyone take on the systemic problem? Instead, we immediately went back to the operating under the old rdiculous rules. Page 180:
“But during the millennium alert, with its direct links into the United States from Hijazi, Deek, and Ressam, FBI officials were briefing in person about ongoing investigations, not relying on the dissemination of written reports. Berger told us that it was hard for FBI officials to hold back information in front of a cabinet-rank group. After the alert, according to Berger and members of the NSC staff, the FBI returned to its normal practice of withholding written reports and saying little about investigations or witness interviews, taking the position that any information related to pending investigations might be presented to a grand jury and hence could not be disclosed under then-prevailing federal law.”
A WELL-EARNED REBUKE FOR CONGRESS [Rich Lowry]
E-mail:
From the report, page 107 (talking about terrorism being a second or third priority for Congressional committees with this jurisdiction):
“In fact, Congress had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider. Congress asked outside commissions to do the work that arguably was at the heart of its own oversight responsibilities. Beginning in 1999, the reports of these commissions made scores of recommendations to address terrorism and homeland security but drew little attention from Congress. Most of their impact came after 9/11.”
Posted at 12:29 PM
This kill's JohnM contention.
MORE MOORE [Rich Lowry]
Pages 329-330 devastate his Saudi post-9/11 flight conspiracy-mongering. A sample: “We found no evidence that anyone at the WH above the level of Richard Clarke participated in a decision on the departure of Saudi nationals.” |
