9/11 Commission Report: Iraq
Posted by Jon Henke
While Iraq is certainly not central to the 9/11 Commission Report. I thought it could be interesting to see what they have to say about it.
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Holy crap.
While certainly not conclusive evidence of extensive collaboration, the 9/11 report seems to give a great deal of weight to the charges that there were <font color=red>"ties"<font color=black> between Iraq and Al Qaeda. It also rains on the parades of one Mr Clarke, who had claimed Iraq was a diversion, that there was <font color=red>"absolutely no evidence that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda, ever"<font color=black>. In fact, it is quite devastating on that point, using Clarke's own words. We'll get to it.
The important Iraq references....
Page 58 - Bin Laden built his Islamic army with groups in various countries, including Iraq.
Bin Ladin now had a vision of himself as head of an international jihad con federation. In Sudan, he established an <font color=red>“Islamic Army Shura”<font color=black> that was to serve as the coordinating body for the consortium of terrorist groups with which he was forging alliances. It was composed of his own al Qaeda Shura together with leaders or representatives of terrorist organizations that were still independent. In building this Islamic army, he enlisted groups from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, <font color=red>Iraq<font color=black>, Oman, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Somalia, and Eritrea.
Page 61 - <font color=red>Bin Laden willing to explore a relationship with Iraq.<font color=black>
Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda—save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against <font color=red>“Crusaders”<font color=black> during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army.
Page 61 - Bin Laden agrees to stop supporting activities against Saddam; Reports indicate Saddam may have supported, or at least tolerated, Ansar al-Islam.
To protect his own ties with Iraq, Turabi reportedly brokered an agreement that Bin Ladin would stop supporting activities against Saddam. Bin Ladin apparently honored this pledge, at least for a time, although he continued to aid a group of Islamist extremists operating in part of Iraq (Kurdistan) outside of Baghdad’s control. In the late 1990s, these extremist groups suffered major defeats by Kurdish forces. <font color=red>In 2001, with Bin Ladin’s help they re-formed into an organization called Ansar al Islam. There are indications that by then the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.<font color=black>
Page 61 - <font color=red>Bin Laden met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, and asked for assistance. No evidence of an Iraqi response. This was not the last attempt.
With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request.55 As described below, the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections.<font color=black>
Page 66 - <font color=red>Iraq took the initiative to contact Al Qaeda.
In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. In March 1998, after Bin Ladin’s public fatwa against the United States, two al Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet with Iraqi intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin’s Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. In 1998, Iraq was under intensifying U.S. pressure, which culminated in a series of large air attacks in December.<font color=black>
Page 125 - <font color=red>Clarke points out that Iraq had discussed hosting Bin Laden.<font color=black>
Clarke commented that Iraq and Libya had previously discussed hosting Bin Ladin, though he and his staff had their doubts that Bin Ladin would trust secular Arab dictators such as Saddam Hussein or Muammar Qadhafi.
Page 128 - <font color=red>Clarke suggests that a chemical factory is probably the result of an Iraq-Al Qaeda agreement. Chemical evidence backs that up.<font color=black>
The original sealed indictment had added that al Qaeda had <font color=red>“reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.”<font color=black>109 This passage led Clarke, who for years had read intelligence reports on Iraqi-Sudanese cooperation on chemical weapons, to speculate to Berger that a large Iraqi presence at chemical facilities in Khartoum was <font color=red>“probably a direct result of the Iraq–Al Qida agreement.”<font color=black> Clarke added that VX precursor traces found near al Shifa were the <font color=red>“exact formula used by Iraq.”<font color=black>110 This language about al Qaeda’s <font color=red>“understanding”<font color=black> with Iraq had been dropped, however, when a superseding indictment was filed in November 1998.
Page 134 - <font color=red>Clarke discusses the possibility--even likelihood--that Bin Laden would move to Baghdad, if attacked in Afghanistan, and cooperate with Saddam.<font color=black>
[Clarke] wrote Deputy National Security Advisor Donald Kerrick that one reliable source reported Bin Ladin’s having met with Iraqi officials, who <font color=red>“may have offered him asylum.”<font color=black> Other intelligence sources said that some Taliban leaders, though not Mullah Omar, had urged Bin Ladin to go to Iraq. If Bin Ladin actually moved to Iraq, wrote Clarke, his network would be at Saddam Hussein’s service, and it would be <font color=red>“virtually impossible”<font color=black> to find him. Better to get Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, Clarke declared.134 Berger suggested sending one U-2 flight, but Clarke opposed even this. It would require Pakistani approval, he wrote; and <font color=red>“Pak[istan’s] intel[ligence service] is in bed with”<font color=black> Bin Ladin and would warn him that the United States was getting ready for a bombing campaign: <font color=red>“Armed with that knowledge, old wily Usama will likely boogie to Baghdad.”<font color=black>135 Though told also by Bruce Riedel of the NSC staff that Saddam Hussein wanted Bin Ladin in Baghdad, Berger conditionally authorized a single U-2 flight.
Page 334 - <font color=red>Clarke's report found anecdotal evidence of an Iraqi link to Al Qaeda, but no compelling case that Iraq was involved in 9/11.<font color=black>
Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke’s office sent a memo to Rice on September 18, titled <font color=red>“Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.”<font color=black> Rice’s chief staffer on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence linked Iraq to al Qaeda. The memo found no <font color=red>“compelling case”<font color=black> that Iraq had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7) and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the secularism of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional weapons.
Page 335 - The Camp David discussions....
According to Rice, the issue of what, if anything, to do about Iraq was really engaged at Camp David. Briefing papers on Iraq, along with many others, were in briefing materials for the participants. Rice told us the administration was concerned that Iraq would take advantage of the 9/11 attacks. She recalled that in the first Camp David session chaired by the President, Rumsfeld asked what the administration should do about Iraq. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made the case for striking Iraq during <font color=red>“this round”<font color=black> of the war on terrorism.
Page 335 - <font color=red>DoD presents the three priorities: al Qaeda, the Taliban, Iraq<font color=black>
A Defense Department paper for the Camp David briefing book on the strategic concept for the war on terrorism specified three priority targets for initial action: al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three, al Qaeda and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. <font color=red>Iraq’s long-standing involvement in terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass destruction.<font color=black>
Page 335 - <font color=red>Bush did not accept that Iraq was an immediate priority.
Secretary Powell recalled that Wolfowitz—not Rumsfeld—
argued that Iraq was ultimately the source of the
terrorist problem and should therefore be attacked.66
Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his
belief that Iraq was behind 9/11. <font color=black>“Paul was always of the
view that Iraq was a problem that had to be dealt with,”<font color=red>
Powell told us. <font color=black>“And he saw this as one way of using this
event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem.”<font color=red> Powell said
that President Bush did not give Wolfowitz’s argument
<font color=black>“much weight.”<font color=red>67 Though continuing to worry about Iraq in
the following week, Powell said, President Bush saw
Afghanistan as the priority.
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Page 335 - <font color=red>Bush decides Iraq is off the table, barring new information.
President Bush told Bob Woodward that the decision not to invade Iraq was made at the morning session on September 15. Iraq was not even on the table during the September 15 afternoon session, which dealt solely with Afghanistan.69 Rice said that when President Bush called her on Sunday, September 16, he said the focus would be on Afghanistan, although he still wanted plans for Iraq should the country take some action or the administration eventually determine that it had been involved in the 9/11 attacks.
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Page 335 - <font color=red>A WoT Phase Two could include Iraq, if necessary.<font color=black>
At the September 17 NSC meeting, there was some further discussion of <font color=red>“phase two”<font color=black> of the war on terrorism.71 President Bush ordered the Defense Department to be ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted against U.S. interests, with plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields.
Page 335 - Wolfowitz continues to push for Iraq.
Within the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued to press the case for dealing with Iraq. Writing to Rumsfeld on September 17 in a memo headlined <font color=red>“Preventing More Events,”<font color=black> he argued that if there was even a 10 percent chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum priority should be placed on eliminating that threat. Wolfowitz contended that the odds were <font color=red>“far more”<font color=black> than 1 in 10, citing Saddam’s praise for the attack, his long record of involvement in terrorism, and theories that Ramzi Yousef was an Iraqi agent and Iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.73 The next day, Wolfowitz renewed the argument, writing to Rumsfeld about the interest of Yousef ’s co-conspirator in the 1995 Manila air plot in crashing an explosives-laden plane into CIA headquarters, and about information from a foreign government regarding Iraqis’ involvement in the attempted hijacking of a Gulf Air flight. Given this background, he wondered why so little thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a <font color=red>“failure of imagination”<font color=black> and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.
Page 336 - <font color=red>Blair asks about Iraq; Bush tells him Iraq is not the immediate problem.
On September 20, President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the two leaders discussed the global conflict ahead. When Blair asked about Iraq, the President replied that Iraq was not the immediate problem. Some members of his administration, he commented, had expressed a different view, but he was the one responsible for making the decisions.<font color=black>
Page 336 - <font color=red>CENTCOM/General Franks wanted to plan for possible movement against Iraq. Bush rejected it.
Franks told us that he was pushing independently to do more robust plan ning on military responses in Iraq during the summer before 9/11—a request President Bush denied, arguing that the time was not right. (CENTCOM also began dusting off plans for a full invasion of Iraq during this period, Franks said.) The CENTCOM commander told us he renewed his appeal for further military planning to respond to Iraqi moves shortly after 9/11, both because he personally felt that Iraq and al Qaeda might be engaged in some form of collusion and because he worried that Saddam might take advantage of the attacks to move against his internal enemies in the northern or southern parts of Iraq, where the United States was flying regular missions to enforce Iraqi no-fly zones. Franks said that President Bush again turned down the request.<font color=black>
Page 502 - Iraqi Fedayeen member not involved with 9/11 plot.
We now know that two other al Qaeda operatives flew to Bangkok to meet Khallad to pass him money. See chapter 8. That was not known at the time. Mihdhar was met at the Kuala Lumpur airport by Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, an Iraqi national. Reports that he was a lieutenant colonel in the Iraqi Fedayeen have turned out to be incorrect. They were based on a confusion of Shakir’s identity with that of an Iraqi Fedayeen colonel with a similar name, who was later (in September 2001) in Iraq at the same time Shakir was in police custody in Qatar.
Page 559 - <font color=red>Clarke and Bush dispute versions of post-9/11 meeting. Clarke's secretary claims they did meet, but Bush's manner was not <font color=black>"intimidating".
President Bush told us that Clarke had mischaracterized this exchange. On the evening of September 12, the President was at the Pentagon and then went to the White House residence. He dismissed the idea that he had been wandering around the Situation Room alone, saying, <font color=red>“I don’t do that.”<font color=black> He said that he did not think that any president would roam around looking for something to do. While Clarke said he had found the President’s tone <font color=red>“very intimidating,”<font color=black> (<font color=red>“Clarke’s Take on Terror,”<font color=black> CBSnews.com, Mar. 21, 2004, online at www.cbsnews.com/stories /2004/03/19/60minutes/printable607356.shtml), President Bush doubted that anyone would have found his manner intimidating. President Bush and Vice President Cheney meeting (Apr. 29, 2004), Roger Cressey, Clarke’s deputy, recalls this exchange with the President and Clarke concerning Iraq shortly after 9/11, but did not believe the President’s manner was intimidating.
Page 559 - No credible evidence of Iraqi involvement in 1993 WTC bombing.
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