CIA scrapped plan to kidnap bin Laden in 1998 as too risky
Thomas Crampton NYT Monday, July 26, 2004
iht.com
WASHINGTON In May 1998, the CIA's director, George Tenet, scrapped a heavily rehearsed raid to snatch Osama bin Laden from his compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to the report by the Sept. 11 commission.
.
Under the plan, developed from satellite photographs and on-the-ground intelligence, Afghan operatives would have executed a daring kidnapping and then hand bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, over to the CIA.
.
"No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation," the report said.
.
The tale of the canceled raid, as described in the commission's report, shows senior CIA and security officials balancing the operation's risks against jeopardizing the lives of operatives and the repercussions of failure. Ultimately, the CIA senior management declared the plan too dangerous.
.
The CIA's counterterrorist center conceived of the nighttime raid on bin Laden's compound after Afghan tribal members told the CIA about an attempted roadside ambush of bin Laden that had failed.
.
The compound, Tarnak Farms, had about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a three-meter-high, or 10-foot-high, wall on a vast stretch of isolated and treeless desert on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport.
.
CIA officers mapped the entire site, identifying houses that belonged to bin Laden's wives and the one where he would most likely sleep. Working with Afghan tribal members, the CIA drew up plans for a raid and ran two rehearsals in the fall of 1997, the report said.
.
Planners at the CIA were ready to seek White House approval by early 1998. On Feb. 13, Tenet walked President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, through the operation.
.
A group of Afghan operatives would subdue guards at the compound, then enter to grab bin Laden by stealth, the commission's report said. The tribal members then would take him to a site in the desert outside of Kandahar and hand over bin Laden to a second group of tribal members, who would take him to a desert landing zone for a handoff to a CIA plane.
.
The briefing papers presented to Berger acknowledged several possible hitches: People might be killed, or retaliation might come from bin Laden supporters in the form of the kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Kandahar.
.
The briefing papers also highlighted other CIA options against bin Laden, including paramilitary or sabotage attacks in Kandahar and Sudan, as well as providing intelligence support for U.S. military strikes.
.
The briefing papers noted that each plan had shortcomings, but so did inaction, including the specter of weapons of mass destruction.
.
"Sooner or later," the papers said, "bin Laden will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD," or weapons of mass destruction.
.
Richard Clarke, head of an interagency counterterrorism security group, told the CIA to carry on with planning and begin drafting the legal documents necessary for covert action.
.
In March, CIA planners conducted their third rehearsal and briefed Clarke on the outcome. In a note to Berger on March 7, 1998, Clarke described the operation as "somewhat embryonic" and the CIA as "months away from doing anything."
.
The chief of the CIA's bin Laden unit was quoted as thinking that the plan was "the perfect operation." The required infrastructure was minimal and the plan had been modified to keep bin Laden in hiding for up to a month before handover to the United States, thus enhancing the chances of keeping the United States involvement hidden. According to the Sept. 11 commission's report, the field officer, Gary Schroen, said the plan was "about as good as it can be," meaning a 40 percent chance of capturing or killing bin Laden. Even the best planning, Schroen added, would not stop that point when "we step back and keep our fingers crossed."Berger, however, worried about what would be done with bin Laden if he were captured. The hard evidence against him was still skimpy, Berger was reported to have said, and there was a danger of bringing him back to the United States only to see him acquitted.
.
From May 20 to 24, the CIA ran another rehearsal with FBI participation and the date of the raid was set for June 23, 1998.
.
On May 29, however, the bin Laden unit chief cabled his field operatives to "stand down on the operation for the time being." Cabinet-level officials, the unit chief wrote, thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high.
.
Tenet told the commission that he had made the decision to scrub the mission based on the recommendation of his chief operations officers.
.
The New York Times
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< < Back to Start of Article WASHINGTON In May 1998, the CIA's director, George Tenet, scrapped a heavily rehearsed raid to snatch Osama bin Laden from his compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to the report by the Sept. 11 commission.
.
Under the plan, developed from satellite photographs and on-the-ground intelligence, Afghan operatives would have executed a daring kidnapping and then hand bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, over to the CIA.
.
"No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation," the report said.
.
The tale of the canceled raid, as described in the commission's report, shows senior CIA and security officials balancing the operation's risks against jeopardizing the lives of operatives and the repercussions of failure. Ultimately, the CIA senior management declared the plan too dangerous.
.
The CIA's counterterrorist center conceived of the nighttime raid on bin Laden's compound after Afghan tribal members told the CIA about an attempted roadside ambush of bin Laden that had failed.
.
The compound, Tarnak Farms, had about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a three-meter-high, or 10-foot-high, wall on a vast stretch of isolated and treeless desert on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport.
.
CIA officers mapped the entire site, identifying houses that belonged to bin Laden's wives and the one where he would most likely sleep. Working with Afghan tribal members, the CIA drew up plans for a raid and ran two rehearsals in the fall of 1997, the report said.
.
Planners at the CIA were ready to seek White House approval by early 1998. On Feb. 13, Tenet walked President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, through the operation.
.
A group of Afghan operatives would subdue guards at the compound, then enter to grab bin Laden by stealth, the commission's report said. The tribal members then would take him to a site in the desert outside of Kandahar and hand over bin Laden to a second group of tribal members, who would take him to a desert landing zone for a handoff to a CIA plane.
.
The briefing papers presented to Berger acknowledged several possible hitches: People might be killed, or retaliation might come from bin Laden supporters in the form of the kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Kandahar.
.
The briefing papers also highlighted other CIA options against bin Laden, including paramilitary or sabotage attacks in Kandahar and Sudan, as well as providing intelligence support for U.S. military strikes.
.
The briefing papers noted that each plan had shortcomings, but so did inaction, including the specter of weapons of mass destruction.
.
"Sooner or later," the papers said, "bin Laden will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD," or weapons of mass destruction.
.
Richard Clarke, head of an interagency counterterrorism security group, told the CIA to carry on with planning and begin drafting the legal documents necessary for covert action.
.
In March, CIA planners conducted their third rehearsal and briefed Clarke on the outcome. In a note to Berger on March 7, 1998, Clarke described the operation as "somewhat embryonic" and the CIA as "months away from doing anything."
.
The chief of the CIA's bin Laden unit was quoted as thinking that the plan was "the perfect operation." The required infrastructure was minimal and the plan had been modified to keep bin Laden in hiding for up to a month before handover to the United States, thus enhancing the chances of keeping the United States involvement hidden. According to the Sept. 11 commission's report, the field officer, Gary Schroen, said the plan was "about as good as it can be," meaning a 40 percent chance of capturing or killing bin Laden. Even the best planning, Schroen added, would not stop that point when "we step back and keep our fingers crossed."Berger, however, worried about what would be done with bin Laden if he were captured. The hard evidence against him was still skimpy, Berger was reported to have said, and there was a danger of bringing him back to the United States only to see him acquitted.
.
From May 20 to 24, the CIA ran another rehearsal with FBI participation and the date of the raid was set for June 23, 1998.
.
On May 29, however, the bin Laden unit chief cabled his field operatives to "stand down on the operation for the time being." Cabinet-level officials, the unit chief wrote, thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high.
.
Tenet told the commission that he had made the decision to scrub the mission based on the recommendation of his chief operations officers.
.
The New York Times WASHINGTON In May 1998, the CIA's director, George Tenet, scrapped a heavily rehearsed raid to snatch Osama bin Laden from his compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to the report by the Sept. 11 commission.
.
Under the plan, developed from satellite photographs and on-the-ground intelligence, Afghan operatives would have executed a daring kidnapping and then hand bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, over to the CIA.
.
"No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation," the report said.
.
The tale of the canceled raid, as described in the commission's report, shows senior CIA and security officials balancing the operation's risks against jeopardizing the lives of operatives and the repercussions of failure. Ultimately, the CIA senior management declared the plan too dangerous.
.
The CIA's counterterrorist center conceived of the nighttime raid on bin Laden's compound after Afghan tribal members told the CIA about an attempted roadside ambush of bin Laden that had failed.
.
The compound, Tarnak Farms, had about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a three-meter-high, or 10-foot-high, wall on a vast stretch of isolated and treeless desert on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport.
.
CIA officers mapped the entire site, identifying houses that belonged to bin Laden's wives and the one where he would most likely sleep. Working with Afghan tribal members, the CIA drew up plans for a raid and ran two rehearsals in the fall of 1997, the report said.
.
Planners at the CIA were ready to seek White House approval by early 1998. On Feb. 13, Tenet walked President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, through the operation.
.
A group of Afghan operatives would subdue guards at the compound, then enter to grab bin Laden by stealth, the commission's report said. The tribal members then would take him to a site in the desert outside of Kandahar and hand over bin Laden to a second group of tribal members, who would take him to a desert landing zone for a handoff to a CIA plane.
.
The briefing papers presented to Berger acknowledged several possible hitches: People might be killed, or retaliation might come from bin Laden supporters in the form of the kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Kandahar.
.
The briefing papers also highlighted other CIA options against bin Laden, including paramilitary or sabotage attacks in Kandahar and Sudan, as well as providing intelligence support for U.S. military strikes.
.
The briefing papers noted that each plan had shortcomings, but so did inaction, including the specter of weapons of mass destruction.
.
"Sooner or later," the papers said, "bin Laden will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD," or weapons of mass destruction.
.
Richard Clarke, head of an interagency counterterrorism security group, told the CIA to carry on with planning and begin drafting the legal documents necessary for covert action.
.
In March, CIA planners conducted their third rehearsal and briefed Clarke on the outcome. In a note to Berger on March 7, 1998, Clarke described the operation as "somewhat embryonic" and the CIA as "months away from doing anything."
.
The chief of the CIA's bin Laden unit was quoted as thinking that the plan was "the perfect operation." The required infrastructure was minimal and the plan had been modified to keep bin Laden in hiding for up to a month before handover to the United States, thus enhancing the chances of keeping the United States involvement hidden. According to the Sept. 11 commission's report, the field officer, Gary Schroen, said the plan was "about as good as it can be," meaning a 40 percent chance of capturing or killing bin Laden. Even the best planning, Schroen added, would not stop that point when "we step back and keep our fingers crossed."Berger, however, worried about what would be done with bin Laden if he were captured. The hard evidence against him was still skimpy, Berger was reported to have said, and there was a danger of bringing him back to the United States only to see him acquitted.
.
From May 20 to 24, the CIA ran another rehearsal with FBI participation and the date of the raid was set for June 23, 1998.
.
On May 29, however, the bin Laden unit chief cabled his field operatives to "stand down on the operation for the time being." Cabinet-level officials, the unit chief wrote, thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high.
.
Tenet told the commission that he had made the decision to scrub the mission based on the recommendation of his chief operations officers.
.
The New York Times WASHINGTON In May 1998, the CIA's director, George Tenet, scrapped a heavily rehearsed raid to snatch Osama bin Laden from his compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to the report by the Sept. 11 commission.
.
Under the plan, developed from satellite photographs and on-the-ground intelligence, Afghan operatives would have executed a daring kidnapping and then hand bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, over to the CIA.
.
"No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation," the report said.
.
The tale of the canceled raid, as described in the commission's report, shows senior CIA and security officials balancing the operation's risks against jeopardizing the lives of operatives and the repercussions of failure. Ultimately, the CIA senior management declared the plan too dangerous.
.
The CIA's counterterrorist center conceived of the nighttime raid on bin Laden's compound after Afghan tribal members told the CIA about an attempted roadside ambush of bin Laden that had failed.
.
The compound, Tarnak Farms, had about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a three-meter-high, or 10-foot-high, wall on a vast stretch of isolated and treeless desert on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport.
.
CIA officers mapped the entire site, identifying houses that belonged to bin Laden's wives and the one where he would most likely sleep. Working with Afghan tribal members, the CIA drew up plans for a raid and ran two rehearsals in the fall of 1997, the report said.
.
Planners at the CIA were ready to seek White House approval by early 1998. On Feb. 13, Tenet walked President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, through the operation.
.
A group of Afghan operatives would subdue guards at the compound, then enter to grab bin Laden by stealth, the commission's report said. The tribal members then would take him to a site in the desert outside of Kandahar and hand over bin Laden to a second group of tribal members, who would take him to a desert landing zone for a handoff to a CIA plane.
.
The briefing papers presented to Berger acknowledged several possible hitches: People might be killed, or retaliation might come from bin Laden supporters in the form of the kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Kandahar.
.
The briefing papers also highlighted other CIA options against bin Laden, including paramilitary or sabotage attacks in Kandahar and Sudan, as well as providing intelligence support for U.S. military strikes.
.
The briefing papers noted that each plan had shortcomings, but so did inaction, including the specter of weapons of mass destruction.
.
"Sooner or later," the papers said, "bin Laden will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD," or weapons of mass destruction.
.
Richard Clarke, head of an interagency counterterrorism security group, told the CIA to carry on with planning and begin drafting the legal documents necessary for covert action.
.
In March, CIA planners conducted their third rehearsal and briefed Clarke on the outcome. In a note to Berger on March 7, 1998, Clarke described the operation as "somewhat embryonic" and the CIA as "months away from doing anything."
.
The chief of the CIA's bin Laden unit was quoted as thinking that the plan was "the perfect operation." The required infrastructure was minimal and the plan had been modified to keep bin Laden in hiding for up to a month before handover to the United States, thus enhancing the chances of keeping the United States involvement hidden. According to the Sept. 11 commission's report, the field officer, Gary Schroen, said the plan was "about as good as it can be," meaning a 40 percent chance of capturing or killing bin Laden. Even the best planning, Schroen added, would not stop that point when "we step back and keep our fingers crossed."Berger, however, worried about what would be done with bin Laden if he were captured. The hard evidence against him was still skimpy, Berger was reported to have said, and there was a danger of bringing him back to the United States only to see him acquitted.
.
From May 20 to 24, the CIA ran another rehearsal with FBI participation and the date of the raid was set for June 23, 1998.
.
On May 29, however, the bin Laden unit chief cabled his field operatives to "stand down on the operation for the time being." Cabinet-level officials, the unit chief wrote, thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high.
.
Tenet told the commission that he had made the decision to scrub the mission based on the recommendation of his chief operations officers.
.
The New York Times WASHINGTON In May 1998, the CIA's director, George Tenet, scrapped a heavily rehearsed raid to snatch Osama bin Laden from his compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to the report by the Sept. 11 commission.
.
Under the plan, developed from satellite photographs and on-the-ground intelligence, Afghan operatives would have executed a daring kidnapping and then hand bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, over to the CIA.
.
"No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation," the report said.
.
The tale of the canceled raid, as described in the commission's report, shows senior CIA and security officials balancing the operation's risks against jeopardizing the lives of operatives and the repercussions of failure. Ultimately, the CIA senior management declared the plan too dangerous.
.
The CIA's counterterrorist center conceived of the nighttime raid on bin Laden's compound after Afghan tribal members told the CIA about an attempted roadside ambush of bin Laden that had failed.
.
The compound, Tarnak Farms, had about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a three-meter-high, or 10-foot-high, wall on a vast stretch of isolated and treeless desert on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport.
.
CIA officers mapped the entire site, identifying houses that belonged to bin Laden's wives and the one where he would most likely sleep. Working with Afghan tribal members, the CIA drew up plans for a raid and ran two rehearsals in the fall of 1997, the report said.
.
Planners at the CIA were ready to seek White House approval by early 1998. On Feb. 13, Tenet walked President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, through the operation.
.
A group of Afghan operatives would subdue guards at the compound, then enter to grab bin Laden by stealth, the commission's report said. The tribal members then would take him to a site in the desert outside of Kandahar and hand over bin Laden to a second group of tribal members, who would take him to a desert landing zone for a handoff to a CIA plane.
.
The briefing papers presented to Berger acknowledged several possible hitches: People might be killed, or retaliation might come from bin Laden supporters in the form of the kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Kandahar.
.
The briefing papers also highlighted other CIA options against bin Laden, including paramilitary or sabotage attacks in Kandahar and Sudan, as well as providing intelligence support for U.S. military strikes.
.
The briefing papers noted that each plan had shortcomings, but so did inaction, including the specter of weapons of mass destruction.
.
"Sooner or later," the papers said, "bin Laden will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD," or weapons of mass destruction.
.
Richard Clarke, head of an interagency counterterrorism security group, told the CIA to carry on with planning and begin drafting the legal documents necessary for covert action.
.
In March, CIA planners conducted their third rehearsal and briefed Clarke on the outcome. In a note to Berger on March 7, 1998, Clarke described the operation as "somewhat embryonic" and the CIA as "months away from doing anything."
.
The chief of the CIA's bin Laden unit was quoted as thinking that the plan was "the perfect operation." The required infrastructure was minimal and the plan had been modified to keep bin Laden in hiding for up to a month before handover to the United States, thus enhancing the chances of keeping the United States involvement hidden. According to the Sept. 11 commission's report, the field officer, Gary Schroen, said the plan was "about as good as it can be," meaning a 40 percent chance of capturing or killing bin Laden. Even the best planning, Schroen added, would not stop that point when "we step back and keep our fingers crossed."Berger, however, worried about what would be done with bin Laden if he were captured. The hard evidence against him was still skimpy, Berger was reported to have said, and there was a danger of bringing him back to the United States only to see him acquitted.
.
From May 20 to 24, the CIA ran another rehearsal with FBI participation and the date of the raid was set for June 23, 1998.
.
On May 29, however, the bin Laden unit chief cabled his field operatives to "stand down on the operation for the time being." Cabinet-level officials, the unit chief wrote, thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high.
.
Tenet told the commission that he had made the decision to scrub the mission based on the recommendation of his chief operations officers.
.
The New York Times WASHINGTON In May 1998, the CIA's director, George Tenet, scrapped a heavily rehearsed raid to snatch Osama bin Laden from his compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to the report by the Sept. 11 commission.
.
Under the plan, developed from satellite photographs and on-the-ground intelligence, Afghan operatives would have executed a daring kidnapping and then hand bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, over to the CIA.
.
"No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation," the report said.
.
The tale of the canceled raid, as described in the commission's report, shows senior CIA and security officials balancing the operation's risks against jeopardizing the lives of operatives and the repercussions of failure. Ultimately, the CIA senior management declared the plan too dangerous.
.
The CIA's counterterrorist center conceived of the nighttime raid on bin Laden's compound after Afghan tribal members told the CIA about an attempted roadside ambush of bin Laden that had failed.
.
The compound, Tarnak Farms, had about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a three-meter-high, or 10-foot-high, wall on a vast stretch of isolated and treeless desert on the outskirts of the Kandahar airport.
.
CIA officers mapped the entire site, identifying houses that belonged to bin Laden's wives and the one where he would most likely sleep. Working with Afghan tribal members, the CIA drew up plans for a raid and ran two rehearsals in the fall of 1997, the report said.
.
Planners at the CIA were ready to seek White House approval by early 1998. On Feb. 13, Tenet walked President Bill Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, through the operation.
.
A group of Afghan operatives would subdue guards at the compound, then enter to grab bin Laden by stealth, the commission's report said. The tribal members then would take him to a site in the desert outside of Kandahar and hand over bin Laden to a second group of tribal members, who would take him to a desert landing zone for a handoff to a CIA plane.
.
The briefing papers presented to Berger acknowledged several possible hitches: People might be killed, or retaliation might come from bin Laden supporters in the form of the kidnapping of U.S. citizens in Kandahar.
.
The briefing papers also highlighted other CIA options against bin Laden, including paramilitary or sabotage attacks in Kandahar and Sudan, as well as providing intelligence support for U.S. military strikes.
.
The briefing papers noted that each plan had shortcomings, but so did inaction, including the specter of weapons of mass destruction.
.
"Sooner or later," the papers said, "bin Laden will attack U.S. interests, perhaps using WMD," or weapons of mass destruction.
.
Richard Clarke, head of an interagency counterterrorism security group, told the CIA to carry on with planning and begin drafting the legal documents necessary for covert action.
.
In March, CIA planners conducted their third rehearsal and briefed Clarke on the outcome. In a note to Berger on March 7, 1998, Clarke described the operation as "somewhat embryonic" and the CIA as "months away from doing anything."
.
The chief of the CIA's bin Laden unit was quoted as thinking that the plan was "the perfect operation." The required infrastructure was minimal and the plan had been modified to keep bin Laden in hiding for up to a month before handover to the United States, thus enhancing the chances of keeping the United States involvement hidden. According to the Sept. 11 commission's report, the field officer, Gary Schroen, said the plan was "about as good as it can be," meaning a 40 percent chance of capturing or killing bin Laden. Even the best planning, Schroen added, would not stop that point when "we step back and keep our fingers crossed."Berger, however, worried about what would be done with bin Laden if he were captured. The hard evidence against him was still skimpy, Berger was reported to have said, and there was a danger of bringing him back to the United States only to see him acquitted.
.
From May 20 to 24, the CIA ran another rehearsal with FBI participation and the date of the raid was set for June 23, 1998.
.
On May 29, however, the bin Laden unit chief cabled his field operatives to "stand down on the operation for the time being." Cabinet-level officials, the unit chief wrote, thought the risk of civilian casualties was too high.
.
Tenet told the commission that he had made the decision to scrub the mission based on the recommendation of his chief operations officers.
.
The New York Times |
