Listened to whom? to what? No other coherent policy to deal with the problem was being advanced anywhere by anyone. Just a "DONT DO ANYTHING" from the left and Saddam's payees, with tacit agreement from the realists at State. Nobody had any constructive suggestions for getting containment to work, or solving the problem any other way.
What exactly was the problem? You seem unwilling to accept that Saddam was not in fact posing any immediate threat to anyone. The problem of dealing with Saddam was a subset of a larger problem: the need to develop a new global “rule set”, to use the Barnett expression, capable of confronting the linked problems of dictatorships, failed states, and terrorism. We backed away from that challenge – which would, like most important tasks, have been difficult – and based our moves on short term domestic political considerations.
We rushed when there was no imperative need for immediate action, and no we are dithering in the Sudan, where there is real need of immediate action, and in Iran, where the stakes are higher than they ever were in Iraq.
There’s an interesting article in the current Foreign Affairs, arguing that containment was actually working. Worth reading, if you don’t mind challenging your preconceived notions. |
