Blix was under the misimpression that it was his job to be scrupulously fair, rather than to mistrust Iraq from the start. He was under the misimpression that his role was juridical, and therefore that, if the evidence were short of what would lead to conviction in a court of law, he was not supposed to draw conclusions. Thus, while admitting that the accounts of stockpiles were inadequate, he would always add that there might be a benign explanation, rather than admitting that it was prima facie proof that there were still stockpiles. Although he would acknowledge that the regime was hampering excess to candid interviews with scientists, and that the scientists appeared anxious, he would not draw the conclusion that they were under coercion, and that there was something to hide. He would only express pious hopes of greater cooperation.
But the main thing is that Saddam was used to playing shell games, and had extensive underground facilities, and therefore could always be a jump ahead of inspectors, merely by moving things to facilities they could not visit, because they were unknown. It was impossible for the inspectors to catch him if he were determined not to be caught. There could never be a truly clean bill of health. |
