This is the gist of the problem: It takes about 60 lbs. of HEU and not too much technology to build a nuclear weapon similar to the one used in Hiroshima.
The sources of HEU? Why make your own when so much of it is available for the right price? Why go through all the complex steps necessary to manufacture it when those steps might lead to detection?
It's a no-brainer to me. Anyone wanting to build a gun-type nuke, would look for HEU on the black market, not make it himself. Particulary true of terrorists, who do not have a base, and need a lot of infrastructure to go through the steps necessary to make HEU.
Don't take my word for it. Here is what a UN study has to say:
un-globalsecurity.org
PRIORITY MEASURES TO ENHANCE THE GLOBAL PROTECTION OF
FISSILE MATERIAL
WILLIAM C. POTTER
I. Nature of the Problem
The problem of protecting fissile material globally has many dimensions, the most significant of which is the vast quantity of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu) situated at approximately 350 different sites in nearly five dozen countries. It is estimated that there are more than 2,000 metric tons of fissile material – enough for over 200,000 nuclear weapons. Many of the sites holding this material lack adequate material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) measures, some are outside of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards system, and many exist in countries without independent nuclear regulatory bodies or rules, regulations, and practices consistent with a meaningful safeguards culture.
The presence of these huge stockpiles with inadequate safeguards is not a new phenomenon. The dangers they pose, however, have increased significantly due to therise of non-state actors as proliferation threats. The problem is compounded by the fact that most arms control and nonproliferation treaties, bilateral initiatives, and assistance programs were not designed to address the risks posed by nuclear terrorism, especially the prevention of terrorist acquisition of fissile material for the purpose of building and detonating a nuclear explosive device.
II. The Special Dangers of HEU
In a pre-September 11th world where states constituted the main proliferation challenge, it made sense to treat Pu and HEU as roughly equivalent dangers. Today, however, in a world where non-state actors pose greater threats in terms of the likely use of nuclear weapons, efforts must be focused much more on rapidly securing, consolidating, and eliminating the vast stocks of HEU globally. The principal reason for this needed shift in emphasis, which is not yet evident in the policies of either national governments on international organizations, is the much easier task for terrorists of building an HEUbased nuclear weapon. Many experts, for example, have concluded that a gun-type
improvised nuclear device is well-within the technical reach of some non-state actors with access to HEU.
There are many potential sources of HEU for would-be terrorists or state proliferators. Particularly high-risk sites are present in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, and Uzbekistan, as well as other countries which received Soviet-origin HEU. Many of these sites contain HEU fuel for research reactors. Also vulnerable is HEU in the form of fuel for naval reactors. Indeed, a number of the confirmed cases involving illicit nuclear trafficking involve naval fuel.
You might want to read the sources cited here, too.
Message 20342466
My point all along has been that given the ease with which a "gun" type nuke could be built and the ease with which a measly 60 lbs.--and lots more--of HEU could be obtained, we were more than justified in taking out Saddam.
It seems so very simple to me.
I don't understand why we pull our hair out about not finding WMD. How easy would it be to hide 60 lbs. of HEU? Why would Saddam go through the difficult process of making HEU when the chances are that the could buy all the HEU he needed and probably a lot more in any number of places? |
