Protean Al Qaeda has declared war on Pakistan
By Ejaz Haider
Friday’s suicide attack on Shaukat Aziz, federal finance minister and prime minister-designate, is unfortunate but not unexpected.
For a start, intelligence agencies were expecting an atrocity on Friday. The warning was there, but the target could not be identified until the bomber tried to take out Mr Aziz. There was some speculation about the possibility of an attack on a mosque or imambargah during Friday prayers, especially in Karachi. It now appears that signals to that effect might have been sent out to obfuscate the real target.
Friday’s attack was a continuation of the war the extremist groups have declared on the government of General Pervez Musharraf, who is seen to be an ally of the United States and the West. General Musharraf himself had a close call twice in less than two weeks last December.
Mr Aziz is widely seen to be General Musharraf’s civilian alter ego, a man who believes in General Musharraf’s policies of allying Pakistan with the West, streamlining the country’s economy and changing the obscurantist direction of this country. Removing him would mean a major blow to General Musharraf and his plans.
This is not to say that the local terrorist groups, to whom Al Qaeda has outsourced its operations, are unlikely to target other prominent personalities in the country. They would, as is clear from intelligence reports and the June 10 attack on Lt Gen Ahsan Saleem Hyat, the Karachi corps commander. But Mr Aziz presented the most important target of opportunity not only because of how and where he is placed, but also because the attackers might have thought it was easy to take him out given his exposure to the public as part of his election campaign.
There should be no doubt about the ideological affinity of the attackers or their motive. It is a tough call for the government. Al Qaeda has shown remarkable flexibility, strategic finesse and a protean character. This is evident from the way groups affiliated with it have behaved in Iraq and elsewhere, including Pakistan. It moves away from cost-prohibitive targets and identifies those that are relatively easier to engage. This strategy allows it to use a wide range of tactics and keep security agencies guessing about its next strike.
It has also found it easy to get recruits to its cause – both financiers and shock troops – because of US policies, a groundswell of resentment against Washington and, by extension, governments in the Muslim countries seen to be sympathetic towards the US and, by definition, opposed to the cause of Islam as identified by the Salafi-Wahhabism of Al Qaeda. The context that sustains it is very important. Western praise of General Musharraf as the point-man in the war on terror has not helped. Pakistan is also seen as straining at the leash to send troops to Iraq. Its ambassador to Washington has been chosen as the special UN envoy for Iraq. These developments have already caused an Iraqi group calling itself Jaish-e Islami to behead two Pakistani captives on Thursday.
The battle lines are drawn. It should be clear why winning this war is important. The very survival of this country hinges on a win. But fighting this war also needs a national consensus. That may be difficult to beget. |
