Naming the War
August 03, 2004
By George Friedman
Of the many things that were included in the 9/11 Commission's report,
perhaps none was more significant in the long run than its criticism of the
name the Bush administration has given the war that began on Sept. 11, 2001:
the war on terrorism. The report argued that the idea of a struggle against
an enemy called "terrorism" was too vague to be meaningful. It argued that
the administration should shift away from fighting a "generic" evil and more
precisely define the threat -- the threat from al Qaeda and a radical
ideological movement in the Islamic world that "is gathering and will menace
Americans and American interests long after" Osama bin Laden is gone.
The commission made two critical points. First, it asserted there was a war
going on. There has been some doubt about this: Some have begun to argue that
the Sept. 11 attacks were an isolated incident and that Americans should "get
over it." Others have argued that it was primarily a criminal conspiracy and
that the legal system should handle it. The commission made the unequivocal
argument that it was a war and should be treated as such.
Wars are against enemies, and the commission makes the case that terrorism is
not, by itself, a meaningful enemy. Rather, the enemy is -- according to the
commission -- al Qaeda, and along with al Qaeda, radical Islam as an
ideology. That means that, from the commission's viewpoint, this is a war
between the United States and al Qaeda or, alternatively, a war between the
United States and radical Islam. Given the gingerly way in which Americans
have approached the question of the nature of the enemy, it is striking that
the commission honed in on what has been one of the few aspects of delicacy
in the Bush administration's approach to war -- completely rejecting the
administration's attempt to subsume the war under the general rubric of
terrorism.
Terrorism is a military strategy: It is an attempt to defeat an enemy by
striking directly against its general population and thereby creating a sense
of terror which, it is hoped, will lead the population to move against the
government and force it to some sort of political acquiescence or
accommodation. During World War II, for example, one of the primary uses of
air power was to create terror among the population. The German bombardment
of London, British nighttime area bombardment of German cities, American
firebombing and atomic bombing of Japanese cities -- all were terror attacks.
They were explicitly designed to put the population at risk, in efforts to
prompt the enemy's capitulation. It did not work at all against the British;
there is debate over what role, if any, it played against the Germans; and it
certainly had a massive, if not decisive, effect in the case of the Japanese.
Terror, of course, was not confined to World War II. It has been a frequent
feature of warfare.
Many countries have used terror attacks. So have individuals and non-state
groups. Timothy McVeigh's attack against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City was intended to generate some sort of political
change. The attacks by the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany during the 1970s or
the bombings of the Weather Underground in the United States were similarly
intended to generate political change. That McVeigh, Ulriche Meinhoff and
Mark Rudd had not the slightest idea of what they were trying to achieve nor
of the relationship between their attacks and their strategy -- such as it
was -- speaks to their own serious limitations. It says nothing about the
potential uses of terror attacks in warfare, nor to the fact that terror
attacks can be effective, given a clear strategy, planning and execution.
Governments can be forced to change strategy when their populations are
placed at risk.
This is the conceptual problem with terrorism: Like any sort of warfare, it
can be successful or not, depending on circumstances. However, terrorism in
some form or another is among the most accessible types of warfare. What we
mean by this is that while it is difficult for a handful of ideologues to
secure a navy and impose a blockade, it is not impossible for a handful of
people to carry out some limited attacks against a population, if it is no
greater than firing a bullet into someone's kneecap or hijacking a plane.
Terrorism provides a unique opportunity for small, non-state groups to wage
war.
Historically, most of these non-state groups have consisted either of mental
or emotional defectives or of individuals whose cause was so hopeless the act
of terrorism could at best be considered a form of bloody theater rather than
as a serious threat. It is extremely difficult to take the Basque separatist
group ETA seriously in the sense of expecting that their attacks against the
population will lead to a desired political evolution. It was certainly
impossible to imagine how Rudd, Meinhoff or McVeigh possibly could have
thought any strategic goal could have been reached through the use of terror
attacks.
The general use of terror attacks by non-state actors has involved people
like this. The concept of terrorism, as it developed since the 1960s, has
focused not on terror as a potentially viable military strategy, but as an
inherently non-state activity. This is a serious historical error. But a more
serious error followed from this: If terrorism is something non-state actors
use, and non-state actors tend in general to be imbeciles, posturers or lost
causes looking for attention, then terrorism is no longer a serious military
tool in the hands of strategists. It is, instead, a form of social and
personal dysfunction, and therefore need not be taken seriously.
It was the secular Palestinian movement after 1967 that adopted the use of
isolated counterpopulation attacks most effectively. Apart from attacks
against Israel and Israelis, where no significant political shift was
expected, terrorism was directed against allies of Israel, such as the United
States. The strategy there -- not unlike the strategy in Iraq today -- was to
impose costs for Israeli allies that would surpass the benefits of alliance.
In this case, terror attacks had a definite goal -- to change the
relationship between Israel and its allies. But the movement was hurt in
several ways. First, the Israelis struck back. Second, many Arab countries,
including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, worked actively against the Palestinian
radicals. Finally, the Palestinians were engaged in an ongoing struggle in
which the terrorist attacks became more focused on defining the relations
among competing Palestinian factions than on any strategic political goal.
Terrorism, therefore, seemed to be a tool in the hands of the strategically
helpless. Some began and ended in hopeless confusion, succeeding in shedding
blood for no purpose. However, the Palestinians who took terrorism as a
tactic to the global stage themselves lost their strategic bearings by the
1980s, when it was no longer clear what they were trying to accomplish with
some of their operations. Terrorism ceased to be regarded as a military
option for nation-states, and it never was quite taken seriously as an
effective strategic option for non-state actors. It became a form of moral
derangement in the hands of the hopelessly confused and the strategically
handicapped. It became a tool of losers.
Al Qaeda uses terrorism. This group pursues counterpopulation operations
designed to generate political evolutions that benefit its goals. By calling
the war against al Qaeda a war on terrorism, the Bush administration
committed two massive mistakes.
First, it lumped al Qaeda in with Mark Rudd and ETA. The latter two are not
serious; the former is very serious. Both use the same tactics, but one has a
strategic mission. In using this label, it became much more difficult for the
administration itself to take al Qaeda seriously. How can you take something
seriously that is part of such a collection of dunderheads? The Bush
administration underestimated its enemy -- always dangerous in war.
Second, it confused the question of who the enemy was. If the war is against
terrorism, then everyone who uses terrorism is the enemy. That's a lot of
groups -- including on occasion, the United States. If one is waging a war
against terrorism, one is at war against a tactic, not a personifiable enemy.
Alternatively, the war must be waged against hundreds or thousands of enemy
groups. The concept of terrorism is a wonderful way to get lost.
The most important problem is that if al Qaeda is simply part of a broader
spectrum of groups using terror operations, then the unique strategic
interests of al Qaeda disappear. Al Qaeda has clear strategic goals: It wants
to foment a rising in the Islamic world that will topple one or more
governments, and replace them with regimes around which the reborn caliphate
can be based. The Sept. 11 attacks were designed to trigger that rising. That
has not happened, but al Qaeda is still there.
By ignoring the strategic goals of the attacks -- and this is critically
important -- the Bush administration lost its ability to measure success in
the war. The issue is not merely whether al Qaeda has lost the ability to
carry out terrorist attacks; the more important question is whether al Qaeda
has achieved its strategic goals through the use of terrorist attacks. The
answer to that is an emphatic no. Al Qaeda not only has not come close to
achieving its goal, but has actually moved to a weaker position since 9/11 --
having lost its Afghan base and having had Saudi Arabia turn against it. By
focusing on the tactic -- terrorism -- rather than on the strategy, the Bush
administration has actually managed to confuse the issue so much that its own
successes are invisible. The terror tactics remain, but al Qaeda's strategic
goal is as far away as ever.
The administration has confused not only the situation but itself at all
levels by focusing on terrorism in general. It not only lost its ability to
measure strategic progress in the war, but also failed to understand the
unique characteristics of al Qaeda. In fairness, this has been a failure
going back to the Clinton administration, but the hangover remains. The term
"terrorism" reminds everyone of hippies running wild and Palestinians
attacking Olympic Games. It loses the particular significance of al Qaeda --
its unique intellectual and strategic coherence. It makes al Qaeda appear
dumber than it is and causes miscalculation on the part of the United States.
It is interesting to remember why the Bush administration chose the name for
the war that it did. Part of it had to do, of course, with the tendency of
terrorism experts to treat al Qaeda as part of their domain. But the more
important part had to do with not wanting to think in terms of a war against
Islam -- radical or otherwise. From the beginning, the administration has not
wanted to emphasize the connection between al Qaeda and Islam. Rather, it has
tried to treat al Qaeda as an Islamic aberration. It was easier to do so by
linking it with terrorism in some generic sense than by linking it with
Islam.
The administration needed Islamic countries to participate in its coalition.
It did not want to appear in any way to be at war with any brand or style of
Islam. In fighting al Qaeda, it was much easier to be at war with terrorism
than with Islam. Stated differently, the administration was afraid that it
would lose control of the war's definition if it focused on al Qaeda's
Islamic links rather than on its terrorist tactics. It did not want pogroms
against Muslims in the United States, and it sought to manage it relations
with Islamic states very carefully.
The selection of the term "war on terror" was, therefore, not accidental. It
has been merely very confusing. It is this very confusion that the 9/11
Commission has pointed out. You cannot be at war with a type of military
operation; you have to be at war with a military actor -- and in this case,
the actor has been an organization that is part of a broader element of
radical Islam -- which is, in turn, fighting for dominance in the Islamic
world in general. That makes it a more important war, a more dangerous war
and a much more complex one than merely a war against terrorism.
(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
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