Hello Ron Hawkmoon, <<All the Islamists have to do is sit back and wait for the current regimes to become socially and politically undermined by their religious extremism, so they can replace the current dictatorships with religious tyranny.. >>
... if it were only as simple as them sitting back waiting.
<<Iraq: Militant Groups United By Common Enemy?
stratfor.com
August 19, 2004
Summary
Al Fallujah guerrilla commanders met with radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr in An Najaf to discuss cooperating against U.S. forces Aug. 18. The most likely form of cooperation would be transferring the Al Fallujah militants' skill and experience to the numerous -- but untrained -- members of al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.
Analysis
A delegation of Al Fallujah Sunni and tribal leaders -- including those waging a guerrilla war against U.S. forces in Iraq -- led a large humanitarian aid convoy to An Najaf on Aug. 18, according to Shiite tribal sources. The convoy delivered food, blankets and medical supplies to the Mehdi Army and An Najaf residents. Most importantly, the Al Fallujah delegation met with renegade Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr to discuss cooperation in their efforts against U.S. forces. The sources indicate the Al Fallujah guerrilla leaders offered military training to al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.
Strategically, this is an attempt by two anti-U.S. armed forces -- Sunni-led guerrillas and al-Sadr's Mehdi Army -- to cooperate against a common enemy: the U.S.-led forces and their local collaborators, the Iraqi government and its security forces. This is a natural development. There has already been some cooperation between the two anti-U.S. groups during the previous al-Sadr-led Shiite uprising and the Al Fallujah siege in April and May; supplies were delivered by convoys from An Najaf to Al Fallujah and vice versa. Also, at a grassroots level, the Mehdi Army and the Sunni-led guerrillas have conducted combat operations together against U.S. troops -- in places like Baghdad, As Samarra and Baqubah -- in areas where Sunni and Shiite residential neighborhoods are located next to each other.
If seasoned Sunni-led guerrillas are offering military training to the Mehdi Army, it would make sense for the latter to embrace it. Al Fallujah guerrillas are seasoned fighters who have clashed repeatedly -- and sometimes successfully -- with U.S. and Iraqi troops; the Mehdi Army has only met U.S. and Iraqi government forces twice -- and it took serious casualties both times. Mehdi Army fighters are highly motivated, but they lack military training and are generally bad at ambushes, hit-and-run tactics and marksmanship. Adding Al Fallujah expertise to Mehdi Army exuberance and numbers would greatly enhance the militia's combat capabilities.
But the most dangerous type of cooperation between Sunni-led guerrillas and the Mehdi Army would be a strategic coordination of attacks against the U.S forces. So far, any cooperation has only been on the tactical level, and for now there is no word from any sources that it is developing. If anything, an al-Sadr acceptance of training from Al Fallujah would indicate that he is not up to fighting U.S. forces. Simply put, training takes time.
There are limits to such cooperation, of course. The Al Fallujah militants have broader strategic goals that al-Sadr has no interest in. The Al Fallujah guerrillas could attempt to convince al-Sadr to turn his militia into a proper guerilla force; al-Sadr will simply turn this down. He sees his Mehdi Army as his ticket to political power, not as an end in its own right.
Other obstacles loom large. First, U.S. intelligence will closely monitor any military evolution of the Mehdi Army, no matter what sort of political resolution the Iraqi government finds in An Najaf. Any signs of training by Al Fallujah guerrillas would lead to a rapid U.S. response before the Mehdi Army has a chance to improve its fighting capabilities. Second, there are forces in both the Shiite and Sunni communities that will strongly oppose such cooperation between the Mehdi Army and Sunni-led guerrillas. Some -- like Sunni Islamist militants -- would see the militarization of the Mehdi Army as the empowerment of apostates. Others, such as Shiite religious authorities, are perfectly happy for there to be a Shiite force absorbing U.S. attentions, but they do not want one that is actually competent for fear of being overshadowed.
Stratfor is confident that communication between the Sunni and Shiite guerillas in Iraq is taking place. The level of cooperation remains very low, and it is still far too early to forecast the potential outcome. But one thing is certain: If the Mehdi Army begins training with Sunni insurgents, al-Sadr has not given up the fight just yet. He did find time to meet the Al Fallujah commanders -- while refusing to receive the delegation from Baghdad.
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