Blackwater's AAR for Fallujah
Phil Carter
The Raleigh News & Observer reported yesterday on some previously unreported details surrounding the ambush, mutilation and killing of four U.S. contractors in Fallujah that sparked a pitched battle for that city in March and April of 2004. Jay Price and Joseph Neff write that the team of contractors from Blackwater Security Consulting executed the mission with less manpower, armor and security envisioned by Blackwater's policies, and its contract for operations in Iraq.
Wesley Batalona, Scott Helvenston, Michael Teague and Jerry Zovko worked for Blackwater, a private security company based in Moyock in northeastern North Carolina.
The four men drove into an ambush March 31 along a main road in Fallujah without the full six-man team specified in Blackwater's contract to protect a company feeding U.S. troops. The contract was obtained by The News & Observer.
Iraqi insurgents riddled their vehicles with bullets before a mob defiled their bodies and hung two of them from a bridge over the Euphrates River. The incident, shown on television and front pages around the world, kicked off the bloodiest month in the Iraq war and led to a U.S. assault on Fallujah in which 600 Iraqis and 10 U.S. Marines died.
The four men were riding in a pair of Mitsubishi Pajero sport utility vehicles while guarding three flatbed trucks operated by Eurest Support Services, a European food company. Blackwater said the convoy was en route to a military base to pick up kitchen equipment. The Pajeros had no armor on the sides, just one plate in back.
All the factors that led to the ambush may never be clear. But several people who worked with Blackwater said the company should have sent its standard six-man team and two armored vehicles.
Also, they said, squabbling with its client over the vehicles didn't leave Blackwater operators enough time to familiarize themselves with their routes before starting work.
The contract for the work, which Blackwater signed March 12, says that such security teams would include at least six people because of the high risks in parts of Iraq. Topping the danger list: Fallujah.
"Further to Blackwater's analysis of ESS requirements and the current threat in the Iraqi theater of operations as evidenced by the recent incidents against civilian entities in Fallujah, Ar Ramadi, Al Taji and Al Hillah, there are areas in Iraq that will require a minimum of three Security Personnel per vehicle," the contract states. "The current and foreseeable future threat will remain consistent and dangerous. Therefore, to provide tactically sound and fully mission capable Protective Security Details, the minimum team size is six operators with a minimum of two vehicles. ... "
The U.S. military seldom ventured into Fallujah with fewer than four trucks loaded with heavily armed troops. Many private security contractors in Iraq work with at least three people in a vehicle so that the two armed passengers can "scan" 360 degrees around it to try to prevent ambushes.
Blackwater officials declined to discuss the company's decisions.
Analysis: I've written before on the problematic use of private military firms in a war zone, and I think this example illustrates some of those concerns. To be clear, Blackwater is one of the best PMFs in existence. It only selects the most elite former U.S. military personnel for employment, and typically conducts its missions in a very professional manner. Indeed, were it not for Blackwater employees, the U.S. diplomatic mission in Najaf probably would've been overrun in April 2004 by Iraqi insurgents. Nonetheless, the use of these contractors creates significant operational, legal and political challenges for the U.S.
It's not clear that any amount of security -- including two vehicles and six personnel, per Blackwater's rules -- would've made the difference here. Fallujah was a powder keg waiting to explode, and I think this convoy just provided the spark. However, the fact remains that these contractors were operating in a way that few (if any) U.S. military units would have. It's unlikely that any military convoy would have entered Fallujah with that little security, notwithstanding the skill of the Blackwater operators, and I doubt that they would've entered Fallujah at all if they had the choice. The ambush should have never happened, but it did because the contractors here were too audacious for their own good, and they moved out without enough military coordination or personal security.
[Phillip Carter
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