Re: Reforming China's Very Corrupt Communist Party
The article that follows will NOT interest many on this thread - who are so emotionally caught up in U.S. elections and Iraq - but I was struck as though by lightning by its implications.
Bruce
China: Hu Endangering the Party To Save It?
September 27, 2004
Summary
China's Communist Party released a self-critical statement calling on its members to improve their ability to govern the country, warning the viability of the Party is at stake. The announcement is in line with President Hu Jintao's plans for Party reform, but the question remains: How far is Hu willing to push to make reforms happen?
Analysis
China's Communist Party released a 36-page self-critical report Sept. 26 calling on its members to improve their ability to govern the country and warning that the "life and death of the Party" are at stake. The announcement is in line with Party General Secretary and President Hu Jintao's plans for reform to tackle pervasive corruption that costs China billions of dollars a year and undermines the Communist dynasty's mandate to rule.
The question is: How far is Hu willing to push reform? Strong anti-corruption methods and other reform measures threaten entrenched power and economic interests, risking a severe backlash that could cause the Party to collapse onto itself with destructive infighting. Is Hu willing to risk destroying the Party in order to save it?
The report issued by the Party's Central Committee follows the Sept. 16-19 plenum meeting where the topic of the Party's Ruling Capacity topped the agenda. The plenum also witnessed the resignation of former Party General Secretary and President Jiang Zemin from his post as chairman of the Central Military Commission -- concluding Hu's ascension to the ultimate leadership position in China.
The report was unusually blunt in its analysis of the Party's weaknesses, saying, "Some leading cadres lack ideological and theoretical attainments, the ability to govern according to law and the competence to deal with complicated problems." The document also warned that the Party's rule "will not remain forever" if it does not improve its ways.
The fact that the Party is publicly admitting that it is corrupt and in danger of falling from power demonstrates how concerned Hu is over the situation. Usually, the Party endeavors to project an image of strength and the necessity of its leadership of China -- tacitly warning the population that it is dangerous to challenge its rule and that tearing down the Communist regime would more likely lead to chaos than better government.
Hu's government, however, is changing tack. Hu is preparing the Party for what will likely prove to be a very disruptive internal political reform process to introduce new discipline in the institution.
Rampant corruption has caused public perception of the Party to hit near all-time lows. The primary factor contributing to the regime's legitimacy is rapid economic growth. However, the torrid growth Beijing has engineered for nearly two decades is not only unsustainable, it is also dangerous. Two decades of blistering growth rates have created social inequalities leading to instability, including violent crime and mass demonstrations. In addition, while mismanaged capital is allocated throughout the country, pockets of over-invested industries that ultimately will fail are rising.
Hu and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao hope to rationalize the system -- produce more equitable growth and a more stable but slower-expanding economy. In conjunction with these efforts, the two leaders want to overhaul the Party -- whose members have enriched themselves during the boom years -- and prepare it to sustain itself when 9 percent growth rates are no longer a fact of life.
In the end, Party leaders probably envision creating a smaller and smarter institution, which is easier to control and more effective. The Party reforms could be compared to China's military modernization program, in which Beijing has stripped hundreds of thousands of troops from the military ranks and introduced new technologies and a more professional leadership corps.
Reforming the Party can be a dangerous venture; its leaders and their cronies are heavily vested in the current system, and weaning them from easy money will not ingratiate Hu and Wen with other Politburo members and business tycoons from Beijing to Guangzhou. Foreign investors might get jumpy, too, if their government and business partners begin to get hit in a massive wave of corruption scandals.
Blowback from all sectors will be inevitable if Hu and Wen are as serious about Party reforms as they seem to be indicating. The powerful Shanghai Gang -- a network of political and business interests centered around the city and tied to Jiang -- will probably work against the reforms just as they have resisted macroeconomic controls.
In addition to confronting general resistance to change and an unwillingness to step away from the public trough, Party reform will face the inevitable obstacle that most of its members are none too clean. Accusations and counteraccusations of corruption will be leveled by ranking members of competing factions while they attempt to protect their turf -- creating a vicious circle of debilitating factional warfare.
In the end, Hu's reforms risk destroying the Party from within instead of preserving the regime. However, the Chinese leadership indicates it is ready to give it a go -- and it fully realizes what will happen if it does not make the attempt.
Copyrights 2004 - Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.
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