Yes, I think it was worth going in without the stockpiles. If I had known what we would find, or not find, would I have changed how I fought, or operated in the pacification phase? Perhaps. Stockpiles aside, if I had known several things, for example, that there were ubiquitous arms caches, and a skeletal structure to pursue guerilla operations, I would have done some things differently. But hindsight is 20/20, as they say. I am admitting that, in a perfect world, things could have gone better, but I am not sure how much I would call that "substantial operational errors" rather than the inevitable result of guesswork and an environment which contains a wily enemy. CEOs are not fired for a bad year, they are fired for substandard performance, compared to similarly situated companies, and even that is ordinarily only determined after several years of losses. How much more with COOs, who may participate in the formation of policy, but who are mainly implementors of policy. If the policy is flawed, they rarely take it in the neck. (Admittedly, Rumsfeld was pretty hands on, but there was substantial input from other sources).
I do not feel it is appropriate to have more three ring circuses than have been unavoidable during this period of time, so I think we have given the nod to accountability enough for the time being, with various committees and commissions. And I am not comfortable assigning strict blame right now. It is too damned early, and too much remains to chew over. |
