OCTOBER SURPRISE: The planned offensive to recapture the no-go zones in advance of elections is going to occur much sooner than anticipated. Iraqi Defense Minister Hazim Al Shalaan has told Reuters yesterday, "You wait and see what we are going to do. We are going to take all these cities in October."
U.S. Lieutenant General Thomas Metz had said earlier this month that the offensive to recapture insurgent-controlled cities would have to wait until sufficient Iraqi security forces were fully trained and equipped. According to the official line--which has more frequently than not been untruthful--Iraqi forces wouldn't be "ready" until December. "By December, as many more Iraqi security forces become available, the government will be in a much better position to conduct police and military operations," U.S. Brigadier General Erwin Lessel recently told the Christian Science Monitor. The truth is that Iraqi forces won't be at all ready to defeat insurgents in their strongholds, as out of the 100,000 Iraqis in uniform that the president boasts of, only 22,700 Iraqi soldiers, police and National Guardsmen have enough training to be just "minimally effective," according to internal Pentagon documents. The real reason for delaying the offensive was best explained by Interior Ministry spokesman Sabah Kadhim, in a comment to the Monitor: "We do have the problem of the American election, it complicates even more a very complex period over the next few months."
Shalaan has made proclamations in the past that turned out to be empty. During the August crisis at the Imam Ali Shrine, the defense minister would repeatedly pledge to order an attack within "hours," only to be either overruled or overtaken by events. But if an attack is going to occur in the Sunni Triangle next month, that means the Iraqi interim government and the U.S. are going to either fully abandon the fiction of Iraqi combat capability or send Iraqis to be mowed down by the insurgents. In either case, a necessary ingredient for any kind of tactical success--however transient--will be significant numbers of U.S. forces. Even if they attack with the barely-trained Iraqis, it's possible that the Iraqi veneer will be soon stripped from the operation. According to the Iraqi newspaper Addustour, national guardsmen in Tikrit are resigning in protest over U.S. action in the city:
National Guardsmen in the Dolooeya neighbourhood of Tikrit have resigned in protest over US bombardment of houses there. Local commander Captain Ibrahim Khalil and some other Guardsmen resigned due to the bad behaviour of the Americans in the city, which is supposed to be under his responsibility. Dolooeya witnessed clashes in which US forces used helicopters to attack some houses, resulting in the wounding of 61 civilians. A strike by government workers was planned for Wednesday unless the American forces leave the district headquarters they are stationed in.
There are, however, some positive signs. According to the independent newspaper Al Sabah Al Jadeed, four tribal leaders in Falluja are threatening to "fight against armed elements unless they surrender." The paper says the tribal demand comes after U.S. forces threatened to reenter the insurgent-controlled city "within two weeks." (A note of caution: Al Sabah Al Jadeed says the tribal leaders are concerned about the infiltration of "terrorists," which may mean the tribesmen are making a distinction from Iraqi insurgents; furthermore, the paper says the tribesmen have "150,000" people ready to attack the "terrorists," which is hardly a credible number--that would be a force about twice the size of the Kurdish pesh merga, which are the largest organized armed element in the country.)
The biggest problem is what comes after the offensive. Even assuming that the U.S. can win what will probably be bloody, protracted and televised battles to regain a hold on the city in advance of elections, the hard part will be controlling them when the firing stops. As Anthony James Joes of St. Joseph's University writes in his new study of counterinsurgency, Resisting Rebellion, a necessary ingredient for success is keeping a city invested with forces to prevent the reconstitution of the insurgency, which will surely occur if left alone. The U.S., recall, tried to deal a death-blow to the Sunni insurgency last fall, with operations like Iron Hammer, but as soon as U.S. troops left, for instance, Balad to deal with Samarra, they would return to Balad to find the insurgency there had replenished itself. (And then the same thing would occur in U.S.-vacated Sammara.) There simply are not nearly enough U.S. forces to hold these incredibly restive cities after an attack, and the record of Iraqi forces in these cities suggests they will either be loyal to the insurgency, bought off by it, or effortlessly murdered. And, finally, the idea that Sunnis will respond to the razing of their cities with an enthusiasm for January elections is extremely dubious. Al Sabah Al Jadeed reported a few days ago, a statement from "Falluja residents" warned the U.S. "not to use the election as an excuse to enter the city."
In short, there are significant obstacles to the coming offensive producing anything resembling success. But it may be coming in the next few weeks. |
