Waxman Requests Hearings on Bush Administration Manipulation of Nuclear Intelligence
October 4, 2004
The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On Sunday, an exhaustive front-page article in the New York Times described in detail how the Bush Administration exaggerated the nuclear threat posed by Iraq in building the case for war.[1] This extraordinary expose should be the subject of immediate hearings in our Committee.
The New York Times article analyzed the evidence supporting a key argument that was made repeatedly by top White House officials in the months leading up to the war: that shipments of aluminum tubes into Iraq were evidence that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. The article detailed the serious doubts that the Administration's leading nuclear experts had about this assertion, as well as the evidence that the White House deliberately ignored these doubts.
As the New York Times revealed, Administration officials learned in early 2001 of a plan by Iraq to purchase 60,000 aluminum tubes from Hong Kong.[2] In April 2001 a "junior analyst" at the CIA posited that the tubes were suitable for use in a uranium centrifuge, and the CIA subsequently presented these arguments in briefings to policy makers.[3] However, the nation's foremost nuclear experts at the Department of Energy "immediately challenged" this theory, based on the fact that the tubes were the wrong size for use in a centrifuge.[4] These DOE experts soon determined the tubes actually had the same dimensions - a "perfect match" - as tubes used to make combustion chambers for artillery rockets.[5]
After analyzing a June 2001 intercept of the tubes, a group of DOE experts described as the "A-team of the intelligence community" for questions on nuclear centrifuges produced a detailed assessment on August 17, 2001. They found that the use of the tubes in centrifuges was "unlikely" and that "rocket production is the much more likely end use for these tubes."[6] DOE analysts produced another classified analysis by the end of 2001 that "even more firmly rejected" the centrifuge theory, concluding that "it was 'unlikely that anyone' could build a centrifuge site capable of producing significant amounts of enriched uranium 'based on these tubes.'"[7]
According to the New York Times article, the White House knew about the serious doubts of nuclear experts based on multiple reports and presentations to the White House:
On May 9, 2001, initial findings of DOE scientists were published on "Intelink, a Web site for the intelligence community and the White House";
"[I]n interviews, CIA and administration officials disclosed that the dissenting views were repeatedly discussed in meetings and telephone calls" between the CIA and the White House, and one senior official noted, "'There was certainly nothing that was hidden'";
"Four agency officials insisted that Winpac [the CIA division for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control] analysts repeatedly explained the contrasting assessments during briefings with senior National Security Council officials who dealt with nuclear nonproliferation issues." Further, a "senior administration official" confirmed that Winpac had presented these differing views, acknowledging that "he knew by late 2001 that there were differing views on the tubes";
A DOE spokeswoman said that DOE "strongly conveyed its viewpoint to senior policy makers," and a senior Administration official said that "he also spoke to senior officials at the Department of Energy about the tubes"; and
The "bureaucratic infighting" within the Administration on the tubes issue was "so widely known that even the Australian government was aware of it," noting in a July 2002 intelligence report that "'U.S. agencies differ on whether aluminum tubes . . . were meant for gas centrifuges.'"[8]
Although the Times expose was the most exhaustive account to date, other news organizations have published similar accounts. As early as March 18, 2003, the Washington Post reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had determined that the aluminum tubes "were for conventional weapons and 'it was highly unlikely' that the tubes could have been used to produce nuclear material."[9] On August 10, 2003, a lengthy article in the Washington Post raised many doubts about the Administration's statements about the aluminum tubes.[10]
Despite the fact that the Administration's best experts disputed the evidence, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and other senior Administration officials repeatedly pointed to the aluminum tubes as proof of Iraq's nuclear ambitions. President Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice cited the aluminum tubes shipments as evidence that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons programs, without noting that the nation's top nuclear design experts disputed this theory.[11] Vice President Cheney was particularly outspoken, stating in September 2002 that the tubes were "irrefutable evidence."[12] Appearing on Meet the Press just days before the war, Vice President Cheney publicly derided the IAEA's conclusion that the tubes were intended for conventional arms, claiming that the IAEA was "wrong" and that Iraq "has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons."[13]
This weekend Ms. Rice explained her previous public assertions about the tubes by claiming that she "actually didn't really know the nature of the dispute."[14] This explanation is extraordinary in light of the evidence laid out in the New York Times account. It was her job, as National Security Advisor, to be aware of these disputes and ensure that the President received only the most accurate information.
In effect, what the New York Times is reporting is that President Bush, Vice President Cheney, and their top advisors may have taken the nation to war on false pretenses. These are gravely serious charges that our Committee has a constitutional duty to investigate. I ask that you hold immediate hearings to pursue this matter.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
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