More on the ISG Report
Powerline
I've barely had time to dip into the Iraq Survey Group's report, but it's apparent that the report is a treasure trove of information. No one could read even a small portion of the report and conclude that "Iraq had no WMDs" is a fair summary of its contents. Here are just a few tidbits I noted:
<<<Senior military officers and former Regime officials were uncertain about the existence of WMD during the sanctions period and the lead up to Operation Iraqi Freedom because Saddam sent mixed messages. Early on, Saddam sought to foster the impression with his generals that Iraq could resist a Coalition ground attack using WMD. Then, in a series of meetings in late 2002, Saddam appears to have reversed course and advised various groups of senior officers and officials that Iraq in fact did not have WMD. His admissions persuaded top commanders that they really would have to fight the United States without recourse to WMD. In March 2003, Saddam created further confusion when he implied to his ministers and senior officers that he had some kind of secret weapon.>>>
No wonder it was hard for our intelligence agencies, and other countries', to get accurate information about Iraq's weapons. Even Iraq's own military commanders didn't know whether the WMDs existed or not.
A major theme of the ISG report is Saddam's continuing determination to acquire WMDs. This passage is typical:
<<<Saddam asked in 1999 how long it would take to build a production line for CW [chemical weapons] agents, according to the former Minister of Military Industrialization. Huwaysh investigated and responded that experts could readily prepare a production line for mustard, which could be produced within six months. VX and Sarin production was more complicated and would take longer. Huwaysh relayed this answer to Saddam, who never requested follow-up information. An Iraqi CW expert separately estimated Iraq would require only a few days to start producing mustard—if it was prepared to sacrifice the production equipment.
Imad Husayn ‘Ali Al ‘Ani, closely tied to Iraq’s VX program, alleged that Saddam had been looking for chemical weapons scientists in 2000 to begin production in a second location, according to reporting.>>>>
If Saddam could produce mustard gas within a few days, or at most a few months, then the existence or non-existence of stockpiles is a moot point.
This item is tantalizing:
<<<[D]uring the mid-to-late 1990s Saddam issued a presidential decree directing the IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Service] to recruit UNSCOM inspectors, especially American inspectors. To entice their cooperation, the IIS was to offer the inspectors preferential treatment for future business dealings with Iraq, once they completed their duties with the United Nations. Tariq ‘Aziz and an Iraqi-American were specifically tasked by the IIS to focus on a particular American inspector.>>>
I can't see that the report ever says whether the Iraqis were successful in bribing the American weapons inspector. The obvious candidate, of course, is Scott Ritter. We do know that Saddam succeeded in penetrating the U.N.'s inspection teams, so that he had advance knowledge of the inspectors' intentions:
<<<IIS personnel were directed to contact facilities and personnel in advance of UNMOVIC site inspections, according to foreign government information. Former Regime officials state that the IIS developed penetrations within the UN and basic surveillance in country to learn future inspection plans.>>>
Keep that in mind next time someone tells you the inspections were working.
We'll continue posting excerpts from the report as we have more time to go through it.
UPDATE: Glenn Reynolds argues that the ISG report represents "the complete collapse of John Kerry's foreign policy case."
I can't help but think that, for Kerry, every war is Vietnam. And if he's President, I'm afraid that might turn out to be the case.
The "Global Test" bit looks kind of bad, in this light. But it looks even worse when you consider the other revelations of the Iraq Survey Group -- namely, that most of the opposition to the war came from people who were being bribed by Saddam... It's hard to pass the "Global Test" when the people grading it are being bribed to administer a failing grade.>>>>
HERE'S MORE on mustard gas: Reader Harrison Colter writes:
<<<In 1979 I was doing synthetic organic research as an undergraduate. One of the projects I worked on used mustard gas as a precursor. I think it took an hour or two to cook it up. Of course, I was working in 600ml beaker conditions, not production environments, but as I remember, the stuff is so easy to make that if you had the containers and raw materials, ramp up could take all afternoon. The raw materials are very common stuff useful for all kinds of legitimate purposes. In 6 months, the sky would be the limit on production (assuming storage facilities exist). Not that Saddam would have actually done such a thing, of course.
Posted by Hindrocket
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