Foreign Secretary Comments on Duelfer's Report on Wmd in Iraq under Saddam Hussein
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE News Release issued by the Government News Network on 6 October 2004
On the publication of Charles Duelfer’s report into WMD in Iraq under
Saddam Hussein, the Foreign Secretary said:
“This report confirms what has been widely reported for some months now –
it is unlikely that Saddam had actual stockpiles of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. That is in line with Lord Butler’s conclusion. The Prime
Minister has already accepted this and taken full responsibility for any
mistakes that were made with intelligence that has subsequently turned out
to be flawed.
“Where this report breaks new ground is by producing extensive new evidence showing that Saddam did indeed pose a threat to the international
community, in the following ways:
– It shows he never abandoned his intentions to resume a chemical
weapons effort when sanctions were lifted. It shows that Saddam:
a.. was in multiple breach of UN Resolutions;
b.. retained the intellectual capability to re-constitute WMD programmes
when he could;
c.. he was pursuing to that end an aggressive strategy to subvert the UN
oil for food programme and bring down UN sanctions;
d.. his strategy for sanctions lift was succeeding. Sanctions – and thus
the policy of containment – were eroding. And it shows;
– the ISG itself concludes that Iraq was in striking distance of a de
facto end to the sanctions regime.
By 2000/1 Saddam had managed to mitigate many of the effects of sanctions
and to undermine their international support. According to his former
science adviser Saddam, by mid to late 2002, had concluded that sanctions
had eroded to the point that it was inevitable they would be dropped.
There is a huge amount of information detailing this deception and intent,
drawing in particular on interviews with former regime officials, including members of Saddam’s inner circle such as Tariq Aziz. The ISG had
unprecedented access to these individuals who were interviewed and answered questions in writing. Not all co-operated. But others did so extensively.
The ISG Report shows that Iraq successfully devised methods to acquire and
import items prohibited under UN sanctions. And it shows that the number of countries supporting Saddam’s schemes to undermine UN sanctions was
increasing. The Iraq Ministry of Oil, with Saddam’s personal approval, used a secret oil voucher distribution system to attempt to influence other nations and individuals to support Iraq’s goals. This earned Iraq 2bn – part of an 11bn total that Iraq illegally amassed from illicit revenue streams.
Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a chemical weapons effort
when sanctions were lifted. Iraq organised its chemical industry after the
mid 1990s in a way which allowed it to conserve the knowledge base to
restart a CW programme. It retained the ability to weaponise CW agent when
the need arose. The ISG also found that between 1991 and 2003 the Iraq
Intelligence Service maintained a set of undeclared covert laboratories to
research and test chemicals and poisons, primarily for intelligence
operations. The programme included the use of human subjects for testing.
The report shows Saddam’s longstanding desire for long-range delivery
systems. In the years after co-operation with UNSCOM ended in 1998, the
pace of Iraq’s missile programmes accelerated, and the regime authorised
scientists to develop systems with ranges in breach of the 150km limit
imposed by UN Resolutions. In addition to the illegal al-Samoud II
missiles exposed by UNMOVIC in early 2003, the ISG uncovered Iraqi plans
and designs for ballistic missiles with ranges of 400km, 800km and 1000km.
Although none had reached the production stage by 2003, Iraqi investments
in technology and infrastructure lead the ISG to conclude that Saddam
clearly intended to reconstitute his long-range delivery systems.
The Report judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s
belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view WMD helped to save the regime
numerous times. The report says there is clear evidence of his intent to
resume WMD development as soon as sanctions were lifted. There were no
written instructions to this effect, but Saddam’s lieutenants understood
this was his goal from his firm verbal comments and directions to them.
We have accepted that it is unlikely that Saddam had actual stockpiles of
WMD. It should however be remembered that it was the view of the whole
international community that Saddam had WMD. UNSCR 1441 was signed
unanimously. The disagreement within the international community was not
whether Saddam had WMD, nor that he posed a threat to international peace
and stability, but how the threat should be dealt with.
In turn, on the basis of this report, others have to accept that not only
did Saddam possess the capability and intent to develop WMD but also that
the policy of containment was not working. Sanctions were a wasting asset.
He posed a threat and the world is a safer place without him in power.”
FCO Press Office: 020 7008 3100
Kristian Sharpless
Press Office
W8
Foreign Office
Tel: 020 7008 3104
kristian.sharpless@fco.gov.uk
Latest News:
news.scotsman.com
news.scotsman.com |
