BARNETT - How not to make—much less keep—friends in the Core
¦"How to Make New Enemies," op-ed by Zbigniew Brzezinski, New York Times, 25 October 2004, p. A25.
¦"Europeans Offer Plan to Ease Dispute on Iran Nuclear Issue," by Craig S. Smith, New York Times, 23 October 2004, p. A7.
¦"Russians Led Hussein Oil Partners," by Jess Bravin, Russell Gold and Steve Stecklow, Wall Street Journal, 22 October 2004, p. A7.
¦"G-8 Nations to Meet on Iran: New Plan Aims to Pressure Tehran About Nuclear Ambitions," by Robin Wright and Dafna Linzer, Washington Post, 15 October 2004, p. A18.
I confess, I don't like much of what Brzezinski writes. To me, he's a lot like reading Kissinger—my eyes just glaze over with all his "hegemonic this" and "balance of powers that."
Here, though Zbig makes a great point: we should logically expect an overlap of strategic interests with New Core powers regarding the region, but if we persist in going-it-alone, that alliance of interests may prove illusory:
This great solitude [a result of recent "unilateralism"] might make a re-elected Bush administration more vulnerable to the temptation to embrace a new anti-Islamic alliance, one reminiscent of the Holy Alliance that emerged after 1815 to prevent revolutionary upheavals in Europe. The notion of a new Holy Alliance is already being promoted by those with a special interest in entangling the United States in a prolonged struggle with Islam. Vladimir Putin's endorsement of Mr. Bush immediately comes to mind; it also attracts some anti-Islamic leaders hoping to prevent Pakistan from dominating Afghanistan; the Likud in Israel is also understandably tempted; even China might play along.
Now, Brzezinski, in his typical distrust of all-non-Europeans, assumes that any strategic alliance with New Core powers is pursued on the other side only as a means of "entangling" the U.S., so naturally he posits that our true strategic alliances lie wholly within the Old Core of Europe and Japan. No surprise there, as Zbig is limited by a Cold War lifetime of professional experiences. He can see the future, and it looks almost exactly like the past: full of conniving Chinese, rogue Russians, and those irritating Indians. So as far as he's concerned, it's the Atlantic Alliance or bust!
But Brzezinski has a point: if the U.S. persists in going it alone, we should expect the New Core powers to likewise go their own way in securing their interests, like a Russia getting into bed with former client Saddam all those years in the nineties, or the Chinese supporting their friends in Islamabad, or the Indians siding with long-term friends in Tehran.
Iran is obviously a key flashpoint in coming months. Why? The mullahs know the U.S. is tied down right now, due to its largely going-it-alone occupation of Iraq. Plus, as UK nonproliferation expert Gary Samore argues, "they think the Russians and Chinese will protect them because of those countries' dependence on Iranian oil and gas."
The place where the Bush (or succeeding Kerry) administration needs to reach some larger Core consensus on how to deal with Iran is not the United Nations, but the G-8. Of course, a G-8 that continues to keep China, India, Brazil and other New Core powers out of the inner halls of summitry (they all belong to the larger G-20 that only meets at the ministerial level) will never get anywhere. But the fact that the upcoming meeting of the G-8 will focus on Iran, just like the last one focused on Iraq, shows me that my idea of the G-20 logically becoming the Functioning Executive for the Core's use of military power to deal with security issues in side the Gap not only makes sense, it's basically in the historical works.
But again, this development won't take off until the G-8 becomes the G-20. |
