INTEL DUMP - No more rear areas
One of the biggest lessons to be relearned from Iraq is that there is no safe place on the battlefield for soft-skinned or poorly-trained troops
There were many subtexts to the story of the 343rd Quartermaster Company and its purported refusal to conduct a convoy mission in Iraq. Neela Banerjee and John Kifner reported on one of the most important of these narratives in Saturday's New York Times -- the systemic weaknesses among U.S. Army "rear area" units, which have been systematically exploited by the insurgent enemy in Iraq. The non-contiguous, non-linear, unconventional battlefield has totally destroyed the Army's doctrinal battlefield framework of "deep", "close" and "rear" areas -- and with it, the Army's paradigms for training and equipping units. The story of why today's military logistics units, housed largely in the Army Reserve and National Guard, are so unprepared is a long one, but an important one. Ms. Banerjee and Mr. Kifner provide some of this background.
Under a reorganization of the military after the Vietnam War, support functions were passed from the Army to the Reserve. Historians say the idea was to protect the Army from being sent into another unpopular war because widespread support would be needed to call up the reserves.
In his biography of Gen. Creighton Abrams, "Thunderbolt" (Simon & Schuster, 1992), Lewis Sorley wrote than General Abrams built into the restructuring "a reliance on reserves such that the force could not function without them, and hence could not be deployed without calling them up."
The reliance on the Reserve and National Guard also increased with the shrinking of the active military from roughly 2.1 million at the end of the Persian Gulf war to some 1.4 million today.
But for years, under what is called the Tiered Resourcing System, new equipment went to those most likely to need it - the active Army - while the Reserve and the Guard got the hand-me-downs.
"In addition to personnel shortfalls, most Army Guard units are not provided all the equipment they need for their wartime requirements," said Janet A. St. Laurent of the General Accounting Office in testimony before Congress in April. Ms. St. Laurent noted that many Guard units had radios so old that they could not communicate with newer ones, and trucks so old that the Army lacked spare parts for them.
Army officials concede that the old approach to training and equipping the Guard and Reserve did not prepare them for the new realities of Iraq. Progress appears to have been made in providing modern body armor and some other equipment, families and soldiers say.
The Army says it is on schedule to armor all its Humvees in Iraq by April 2005, despite the fact that only one factory in the United States puts armor on the vehicles. Moreover, the Guard is developing a plan to heighten the training and preparedness of its soldiers, under which a given unit could expect to be deployed every six years.
But the glaring problem for soldiers and families remains the vulnerability of trucks. In a conventional war there would be a fixed front line and no need for supply trucks to be armored. But in Iraq, there are no clear front lines, and slow-moving truck convoys are prime targets for roadside attacks.
Gen. James E. Chambers, the commander of the 13th Corps Support Command, to which the recalcitrant soldiers who refused the assignment are attached, told a news conference in Baghdad: "In Jim Chambers' s opinion, the most dangerous job in Iraq is driving a truck. It's not if, but when, they will be attacked."
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According to figures compiled by the House Armed Services Committee and previously reported in The Seattle Times, there are plans to produce armor kits for at least 2,806 medium-weight trucks, but as of Sept. 17, only 385 of the kits had been produced and sent to Iraq. Armor kits were also planned for at least 1,600 heavyweight trucks, but as of mid-September just 446 of these kits were in Iraq. The Army is also looking into developing ways to armor truck cabs quickly, and has ordered 700 armored Humvees with special weapons platforms to protect convoys.
Analysis: The Army has been incredibly, painfully, and disappointingly slow to adapt to this new reality. During the late 1990s, I served as a military police lieutenant and captain, and watched the Army struggle to find a new warfighting paradigm that would enable it to fight and win the next war. Its theoreticians developed a "contemporary operational environment" which was supposed to look more like tomorrow's battlefields than the old fight against the Soviet hordes in the Fulda Gap. But this "COE", as it was known", never really amounted to much more than incremental change. Massive "Warfighter" computer exercises, which simulated division and corps-level maneuvers, were still fought in much the same way. And as several high-ranking officers have noted, the Army typically called "EndEx" when U.S. forces secured their objective, without paying any thought to the complex warfighting that must be done next to secure the peace. Some doctrinal changes were made in the late 1990s, but not many.
But one area where change barely happened at all was in the area of equipment. In the Army's first digitized division, used as a test-bed for all sorts of organizational and technological innovations, little thought was given to the way that an asymmetric, noncontiguous, nonlinear battlefield would interact with poorly-armored, poorly-protected, and under-equipped support forces. Despite planner predictions that tomorrow's forces would move farther and faster than any in history (see, e.g., the 3rd ID march on Baghdad), their support units received no additional armor or armament with which to deal with the inevitable bypassed forces, insurgents, or myriad threats they would face as they rushed to keep up with the tanks and infantry.
Now look, you can't armor an entire fuel truck or ammo truck. Putting that much armor would make the truck so heavy that would drive even slower than it does, or drink so much fuel that it wouldn't be worth it to drive it up. But you can build an armor "bathtub" for the crew, and you can put ring mounts on these trucks (many already have them) with .50 caliber machine guns or Mk19 grenade machine guns in order unleash a can of whoopa** on any insurgent who tries to ambush them. And once you've turned every U.S. Army convoy into a bristling hornet's nest of heavy weaponry, with armor bathtubs to protect the crews from all but a direct IED hit, then you have effectively defeated two of the insurgents' best weapons -- the direct-fire ambush and the IED. You may still lose a few trucks and shipments, but you save your crews and you probably kill a few more insurgents too.
If this is so simple, why has the Army not done this yet? I could give you a thousand answers for that one, but the biggest one is this: inertia. The Army's procurement's process work at something slower than glacial pace; federal regulations sharply limit what the Army can do with simplified acquisition authority and off-the-shelf acquisition authority. Every new program must go through a series of tests and procurement hurdles designed to ensure that our warfighters get only the best equipment -- but these obstacles have a downside. Many of the key systems today's soldiers use were thought of during the 1970s, procured during the 1980s, and fielded during the 1990s (with some notable exceptions). So even some really bright planners had looked at Mogadishu and Bosnia and come to these conclusions, it would take the Army a while to turn its procurement ship around to start doing the right thing. On top of the significant inertia problem, you also have a lot of parochialism and institutional conservatism, which complicate any change in the Army -- particularly one which would make support units look and fight more like combat units. And finally, there is a great deal of friction in the process, especially since procurement programs of this size would require Congressional approval.
What can be done now? Well, the Pentagon could get serious about its bolt-on armor packages so that soldiers don't have to make their own armor with sandbags and Iraqi manhole covers. The Army could also step up the pace to lateral transfer more crew-served weaponry into logistical units and turn them into truly combat-capable units. In addition to heavy weapons, these units continue to suffer for sufficient numbers of hand-held GPS units, advanced SINCGARS radios, squad radios, and live-fire combat training prior to deployment. All of these moves could be accomplished via internal Army or Pentagon directives -- no Congressional action required. Sure, a few sacred cows might have to be slaughtered, but as they saying goes, sacred cows make the best hamburger.
[Phillip Carter, Monday November 1, 2004 at 4:12pm EST] 0 Trackbacks
Pulling duty in a far-flung place
One company of Marines can teach us a lot about America ought to fight its future wars
David Zucchino, author of the outstanding combat chronicle Thunder Run about the Army's charge into Baghdad, has an excellent dispatch from the Afghan front in Monday's Los Angeles Times. The piece follows a company of Marines along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, where it's often hard to discern the line between insurgents and locals just going about their business. Nonetheless, he reports, the Marines there are having some success in their daily endeavors.
The Marines are focused on Taliban fighters and the Pushtun tribesmen who support them. Compared with U.S. forces here two years ago, they operate from a relatively secure foothold.
"The area has improved dramatically over the past two years," said Maj. Gen. Eric Olson, the operations commander for coalition forces in Afghanistan, citing better security and support from local police and militias who once fought the Taliban.
U.S. forces certainly have more control here than in Iraq. Where the Iraqi insurgency is deep and broad, support for the Taliban is confined to pockets such as the border region and south-central Afghanistan.
Al Qaeda fighters — mostly Arabs and Chechens — are based in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, Olson said. It is mostly Taliban fighters, not foreigners, who receive aid and sanctuary from fellow Pushtuns as they slip back and forth across the porous border — a frontier U.S. troops are not permitted to cross except in certain cases of hot pursuit.
For the Marines of Whiskey Company, maintaining security and beating back the Taliban require regular patrols into the remote mountains, where they face hostile villagers, roadside bombs and rocket attacks.
The troops, from the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, are based at Camp Salerno, a burgeoning military city near Khowst. Two years ago, Salerno was a rough tent camp. Today, it has satellite TV, internet connections, a PX, barbershop and a mess hall that serves hot meals — and steak and lobster on Friday nights.
The Marines encountered the district police chief and sub-governor in Magar, a remote hamlet carved from a mountainside at 7,500 feet. In the mud-and-stone dwelling that serves as the office of the sub-governor, Khanan Mangul, hangs a dusty portrait of interim Afghan President Hamid Karzai. But Wilkinson had dealt with Mangul before and did not fully trust him.
"The sub-governor is a little wishy-washy," said Wilkinson, older and more self-assured than most lieutenants, having served nearly eight years as a Marine enlisted man. "He tends to blow with the wind."
Wilkinson is wary of being manipulated, and he understands the precarious nature of his mission. In a sense, allegiance to the U.S. also is for sale, wrapped in the fragile promise of a generator or well or four-wheel-drive truck.
"You can't buy an Afghan," he said after listening to the sub-governor. "But you sure as hell can rent one."
Analysis: This last point reminds me of something I read in the outstanding article "Welcome to the Green Zone" by William Langewiesche in this month's Atlantic Monthly. The article describes life in the fortified complex in central Baghdad containing the U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority, now the U.S. Embassy, and other U.S. entities. Langewiesche writes about a lot of things in the article -- it's a must-read. But one of the points he makes quite well is how the ideology of the CPA employees there slowly gave way with time to pragmatism. No matter what the field -- law, business development, political reconstruction, humanitarian work -- the daily imperatives of Iraq almost always triumphed over the bright ideas that folks brought with them from the states about how to remake Iraq. And in the process, some good work got done in Iraq, despite some of the best ideas being sent over from Washington.
On a micro-level, you can see this happening in the Marines of Whiskey Company, 3-6 Marines, who Mr. Zucchino follows in Afghanistan. They are learning to get the job done through a variety of means -- everything on the spectrum from peace to war, from subtle political negotiations to conventional infantry raids. In a sense, this is nothing new -- Gunny Highway hit on it in the movie Heartbreak Ridge with the phrase "improvise, adapt, overcome". But it takes a special kind of organization and command climate to actually make this happen on the ground. Such an organization must include extremely well-trained and professional troops with the discipline to know when to shoot and the skill to always execute the mission. And perhaps more importantly, the organization itself must be disciplined enough not to micro-manage its field units, by issuing them mission-type orders which allow them the flexibility to do the job.
On a macro-level, such units represent the heart and soul of America's combat capability. As Stephen Biddle writes in his brilliant book Military Power, the essence of combat power is not numbers; it is not men, nor materiel, nor technology itself. Instead, it is the synergistic combination of men, machines, warfighting doctrine and skill which combine to form what he calls the "modern system". When this war ends (and I have faith that it will eventually end), we must use 1st. Lt. Wilkinson and Whiskey Company as a model. Future wars will require units even more capable of autonomous, decentralized, full-spectrum warfare where the decisions of one lieutenant can have strategic implications for the world. There have been a number of missteps thus far in the war on terrorism, in my opinion, mostly at the strategic and political level. But there have been some incredibly positive effects too, as I wrote in "The Crucible" this summer for the Washington Monthly. Tomorrow's defense planners ought to look very hard at units like Whiskey Company when they plan future procurement initiatives, future doctrinal innovations, and future institutional changes for the military. On Nov. 3, either the Bush White House will start planning for a second term, or the Kerry team will begin planning for its first. These lessons must be internalized and institutionalized so that they don't have to be painfully relearned the next time.
[Phillip Carter, Monday November 1, 2004 at 4:08pm EST] 0 Trackbacks
Trash talkin' from guys who can back it up
Anyone who's spent time in the company of soldiers or Marines -- especially the men of the combat arms -- will probable chuckle a bit at the quotes in this Los Angeles Times dispatch. The comments from the men of 1-8 Marines, poised to strike Fallujah when the word is given, have been stripped of their profanity by the Times' writers and editors. But one can still sense the testosterone-driven enthusiasm of youth, and courage mixing with trepidation, in their comments, even without the colorful patois that normally punctuates every infantryman's speech. Here are a few excerpts:
"I've been waiting for this fight ever since I joined the Marines," said Staff Sgt. Dennis Nash, an 11-year veteran whose platoon has been fine-tuning its skills. "This battle is going to be written about in history books.... The terrorists who want to fight us are in that city, and we're going to get 'em."
* * *
"The terrorists are barking up the wrong tree," said Cpl. Anibal Paz, a 21-year-old from Boston. "They're taking us on and they won't be able to back it up."
The upbeat mood contrasts with the generally spartan conditions here. Many Marines are billeted in bombed-out barracks that once housed fighters from an Iranian exile opposition group sponsored by Hussein. Arabic slogans meant to inspire the Iranians are still scrawled on many walls. Hussein's image stares down in one large room converted to a mess hall.
For many, there is a feeling that an attack would complete a job abandoned in April, when Marines were ordered to cut short an assault on Fallouja.
Commanders downplayed such motivation.
"It doesn't matter what happened in April," said Lt. Col. Gareth Brandl, who commands the 1st Battalion of the 8th Marine Regiment. "There's an enemy [in Fallouja], and my men are ready to go in and destroy the enemy."
* * *
"The Marines are motivated," said Gunnery Sgt. Doug Berry, who was helping oversee the drill. "The enemy has been asking for us, and we're ready to give 'em what they asked for."
And this from the 1-star Marine general overseeing the operation:
"We are gearing up to do an operation," said Brig. Gen. Dennis J. Hejlik, deputy commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. Speaking to reporters at a base near Fallouja, Hejlik said: "If we're told to go, we're going to go. And when we go ... it's going to be decisive, and we're going to go in there, and we're going to whack 'em."
[Phillip Carter, Monday November 1,
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