Bush and Arafat: A hate-hate relationship
By Shmuel Rosner, Haaretz Correspondent
In the wake of the reelection of U.S. President George Bush, a column writer in the Palestinian daily Al-Ayyam wrote, "There will be no joy for the Arabs in the next four years."
Perhaps, another pundit added with a smile, Arafat simply died of grief when he witnessed the Ohio results.
And if that had been the case, Arafat would have had sufficient cause. He truly did not stand a chance with Bush. There was a wall between them.
Arafat brought the erection of that wall upon himself in that fateful month of January, 2002. That month began with the capture of the Karine-A in the Red Sea, and ended with the Bush speech describing Arafat as a "supporter of terror."
During this period, the Bush administration began to understand the Palestinian-Israeli conflict "the way Israel does," as one analyst wrote. That was a month in which Arafat erred twice: Once when he foiled an American diplomatic mission by dispatching the weapon-laden ship, from Iran, no less, and the second time when he lied to the president in a letter claiming he had no connection to the ship.
"He really hates to be lied to," noted one of Bush's acquaintances. After he lied, Arafat was relegated to the list of September 11 villains. The relationship to the Palestinian leader changed from one of alienation and lack of sympathy to outright loathing, based on a strategic decision. Steven Hadley, Condaleezza Rice's deputy in the National Security Council, presented the changed relations with Arafat in Ronald Kessler's book "A Matter of Character" as an example of Bush's willingness to discard old policy formulas.
According to Hadley, "Everyone had focused on territory and borders. The president said that was the wrong starting point. Let's focus on building the institutions of the Palestinian state. That means new leadership that is not committed to terror."
Failed, as usual
A meeting was called in the middle of that same January, where Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld suggested it was time to cut off ties with Arafat.
Two weeks later, on January 25, another meeting convened. By April and June, Bush had already begun calling Arafat a "problem."
Arafat was transformed into a loathsome figure, and what he represented was made marginal until a new leadership was in place. A leadership without lies and without terror. A leadership worthy of the red carpet at the White House.
Only several months before, Bush had said that Arafat deserved "applause" for his attempts to "control radical elements" in his midst. Therefore, had Arafat only made an effort, he would have been privy to a fair modicum of respect from the Bush administration. (There was no true love here. Bush, unlike Bill Clinton, already refused to meet with Arafat in the early days of his first term in office.)
But Arafat failed, as usual. ("I had warned Arafat twice that it was about to come to an end, that I could no longer deal with him if he didn't do something about terrorism," said Secretary of State Colin Powell to Kessler.) Now his heirs will get a second chance, and this chance will be a real one.
Clear worldview
According to sources in the U.S. capital, the president already has great hopes that they will make the significant strides in the Middle East that he needs like oxygen. He is aware of Mahmoud Abbas' (Abu Mazen) name, and will be happy to assist the new leader in every way that is possible. (When Abbas became prime minister and his name was first mentioned in a Bush staff meeting, Bush described him as young, energetic and promising, until one of Bush's aides reminded him with a smile, "Mr. President, he is 68."
The Bush staff has a clear worldview, that is easily comprehended, if inconsistently implemented. The Palestinians deserve a state of their own, even if hands must be forced, including the hand of Ariel Sharon. They must only meet basic conditions.
The Bush administration, unlike its predecessors, does not see the Palestinian question as the key to the region's problems. They do not consider the Palestinian problem to be the cause of Arab enmity toward the U.S. and Israel, but, at most, an excuse that the Americans would be happy to neutralize. That would complicate the cause of Bush's opponents in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, and please his friends in Beirut and Europe.
That way the president could tell them, "When there is a responsible Arab leadership, we are happy to meet them in the middle." That way he could say that Arabs can live in a democratic nation.
Then, when terror continues elsewhere, he can say that the Palestinian problem is not the root of terror - it is motivated by true hatred of everything that the West represents: freedom, progress and democracy. And now, please help us wage the war against them. The Palestinian problem is behind us. In Washington, there are already those who believe. |
