Diplomad Blog has some interesting comments on Powell, which sound on the mark to me:
Powell Calls It Quits
The following posting is by a recently retired FSO, who has been back in the Department as a WAE (Note: "When Actually Employed." An odd term open to all sorts of jokes that refers to retired FSOs brought back for special tasks for a limited time.) He wrote it a couple of weeks ago in anticipation of Powell's retirement; we asked him last night to update it. We've edited a bit for length and where we thought some references to people and offices were too specific and could lead to our correspondent being identified.
The Diplomad will write more on this topic once Secretary Powell actually departs.
"Powell had made no secret that he would resign after the election. We had been hearing rumors all last week that Powell had submitted his resignation letter; on Friday, November 12, a source in (an office) told me that Powell had sent his letter to the President. On Monday, of course, it was all over the media.
I was in the Department the day that Powell arrived. He was a breath of fresh air after a string of very bad Secretaries of State, starting with Jim Baker, continuing with the comatose Warren Christopher, and then the vile Madeleine Albright. The State Department was in disarray, morale was at rock bottom, literally hundreds of officers had quit or taken early retirement. Our Embassies in many countries were barely functional, and very exposed to terrorist attack. Department employees were constantly being lectured on the need "to do more with less" but no reform of the bureaucracy was undertaken to make it leaner and more efficient; everything was pretty much left as it was, but just given less money -- except of course for Albright's travels, in (my office) she was known as the "Empress" for her lavish demands on the budget.
So Powell was a relief. He quickly set about getting State extra resources, undertook some reforms (not enough in the end) of how we operated, pushed more resources out to the Embassies, and dragged State into a modern communications/IT environment (some offices and Embassies were still using WANGs!) He spoke of empowering the "field commanders," making them less dependent on Washington, encouraged unorthodox thinking, and reminded supervisors of the need to "take care of the troops." He loosened up the onerous restrictions on FSOs talking to members of Congress and staff. All good things.
On the substance of policy, however, he proved highly conventional. He was a classic Europe-oriented Wilsonian; he believed in established international institutions; in the Atlantic Alliance; was slow to reposition State to focus more on the Pacific; and was clearly at odds with the President or, at least, uncomfortable with the White House stance on key policy issues, e.g., Kyoto, International Criminal Court, Article 98 waivers, the ABM treaty. He quickly also became a more traditional manager; much of his initial talk of encouraging new ideas and debate and dissent quickly fell by the wayside, as he and his management team (many of them military) instituted a very top-down, no talk-back, "we know what's best for you" management style that demanded absolute unquestioning loyalty to the "cult of Powell."
I can make the criticism that follows because I am retired; active duty FSOs would be terrified to say it. Despite all his talk of the need for loyalty up and down the chain, Powell himself was not completely loyal to the President. His loyalty -- as one political appointee in the XX bureau noted -- was to "his own celebrity status." He was always triangulating, making sure that however a major initiative turned out, he, Powell, would still look good in the eyes of the Washington Post, New York Times, and the talking heads in DC. His relationship with Carl Bernstein is instructive. In every one of Bernstein's recent books on Washington, Powell always comes off looking wise and sage; Powell was obviously a major source of information for Bernstein -- and other prominent MSM purveyors -- on the inner workings of the Administration. His performance on the WMD issue was a classic Powell act; he insisted on the Administration supporting Blair by going to the UN for one more resolution; this proved a major mistake as it gave the French an opportunity to humble us at the UN. He put on a terrific show presenting the evidence on WMDs, while simultaneously letting it be known to certain journalists that he had serious doubts about the information. His career as a senior military officer was marked by the same sort of triangulation: It was most notable during the first Gulf war when Powell, then JCS Chief, was the foremost advocate of not going to war against Saddam, then quickly claimed the credit for the successful execution of the war, and then insisted on ending it some 48 hours too soon because of his concern over excessive Iraqi casualties -- an issue for the NYT and WaPo. Likewise he distanced himself from Bush's 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns, trying not too look too political or too close to a cause that might fail.
The recent GQ piece in which close Powell associates openly criticized the President and the White House was stunning. Only Powell could have done something like that and gotten away with it, again, because of his status as a celebrity. I have no doubt that he will write a kiss-and-tell book that will be very critical of the Administration.
His record is definitely mixed."
As we said above, The Diplomad will wait until Powell actually departs before commenting more on this issue. We do not agree with all that our correspondent has stated, but thought it important to present unvarnished as one experienced (and now retired) FSO's view.
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