Thinking about the unthinkable. Deterring a terrorist nuclear attack with our own nukes. A blogger's Herman Kahn-ish thinking which is sure to raise a few hackles. Enjoy:
americanfuture.typepad.com
Deterring Terrorism
During the 40 years preceeding the fall of the Berlin Wall, the fear of nuclear annihilation was omnipresent. Between the wonderful evening of November 9, 1989, when Germans from both sides of the divide climbed to the top of the Wall, and the terrible morning of September 11, 2001, when Al Queda terrorists attacked America, the threat of nuclear extinction was no longer a serious concern. With the toppling of the World Trade Center and the burning of the Pentagon, the fear that had been put to rest was revived. The fear will be with us for the indefinite future.
In one respect, the threat we now face is less serious than the former one. Had they chosen to launch their huge arsenal of multi-megaton ICBMs, the Soviet Union could have destroyed the United States many times over. A nuclear attack by terrorists would pale in comparison: their weapons would be fewer in number and smaller in destructive capability. They would be exploded in one or possibly a very small number of American cities. Still, millions could die. The aftermath of a Soviet first strike would have been total devastation. Rebuilding would not have been an issue, as there would be no one left. The aftermath of a terrorist attack would be very different and, in some respects, worse. In addition to mourning the dead, we would be faced with a mammoth rebuilding effort at a time when our economy would be in shambles.
In other respects, however, today's threat is more serious. Unlike the later-day Soviet leaders, the terrorists are fanatics. Worse still, they are theocratic fanatics who are not only unafraid to die but welcome death as the entry into a blissful heaven. While we and the Soviets were enemies, we both preferred life to death. It was this common denominator that made deterrence, in the form of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), efficacious. Because the terrorists do not partake of this common denominator, there is a widely-held body of opinion that terrorists cannot be deterred.
Two other consideration cast doubt on the viability of nuclear deterrence as a strategy to persuade terrorists to not attack us with nuclear weapons (or other weapons of mass destruction). Unlike the Soviets, the terrorists are stateless actors who are not responsible for the preservation of a physical infrastructure. The poses the question of what assets should be targeted in our response to a nuclear attack.
The second consideration is similar to the first one. If a large number of missiles were to have appeared on our radar screens during the Cold War, there would have been no doubt that it was the Soviets who had launched them. If a terrorist organization explodes a bomb and does not take public responsibility for the act, we will not immediately know which terrorist group perpetrated the act. The group could be domestic extremists that hate Muslims acting on the belief that our government would assume that Islamists pulled the trigger and would respond accordingly. A nuclear detonation would be proof that our intelligence community had less-than-perfect information: if the information were perfect, the detonation would have been prevented.
Not withstanding these considerations, I believe that terrorists can and should be deterred. Terrorists do not exist in a stateless vacuum. In each state in which they have refuse, there are two other actors: the people, some of whom are sympathetic to the terrorists and some who are not; and the government, which may (1) actively support, (2) condone, (3) actively oppose, or (4) be unable to oppose the terrorists. While the terrorists may welcome death and have little or no physical assets, at least some of the general population prefers life to death and the government does have an infrastructure that it is responsible for protecting.
The objective of a deterrence policy -- more precisely, a warning that the U.S. will respond with a nuclear attack on targets of our choosing, including Islam's holy sites -- should be to cause ordinary people and governments to fear the consequences if terrorists explode one or more nuclear weapons on our soil. By making the nuclear second strike doctrine public, it would hopefully have enough credibility to alter the behavior of people and governments. The specter of devastation should be an incentive for both people and governments to stop supporting terrorists and for governments to root them out. The less fanatical of the terrorists, recognizing these changes, may decide to pursue other, less deadly, activities.
During the Cold War, a second strike would have had to be launched as soon as it was recognized that we were under attack. There would have been precious few minutes between recognition and devastation. Because the countries in which terrorists make their home lack the ability (for now) to attack our homeland, our response need not be immediate. Thus, our intelligence agencies would have time to establish which terrorist group was responsible and which country was unwilling or unable to reign them in.
The most prominent objections to a publicly-announced nuclear second strike doctrine are that it would inflame the Muslim world, where the U.S. is already despised, and make it impossible for those Muslim governments that are cooperating with us in the war on terror to continue to do so. In other words, the effects of the policy I am advocating would be precisely the opposite of those that I anticipate.
If I am wrong, would we be any worse off than we are now? For the past 25 years, starting with the Iranian hostage crisis, we have pursued a policy of weakness toward Islamic fundamentalists. The disastrous attempt to rescue the hostages, the withdrawal from Lebanon after the truck-bombing of the Marine barracks, the withdrawal from Somalia, the pin-prick response with cruise missiles to the African embassy bombings, and the absence of any response to the Khobar Towers and USS Cole bombings all contributed to the perception, shared and exploited by Bin Laden, that America was a paper tiger. With the 9/11 attacks, Bin Laden finally discovered the threshold for concerted U.S. military action. Even after 9/11, our military has operated with one hand tied behind its back: our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been conducted with an eye on minimizing civilian casualties against enemies intent on maximizing civilian casualties.
Our restraint during the past quarter century did not prevent the rise of anti-Americanism in Islamic lands, especially in the Middle East. By having power without the will to power, we lost the respect of those for whom the former without the latter is a sign of weakness and decay. Should the doctrine that I have proposed have effects that are the opposite of those that are intended, the result will be a continuation of a long-established trend set in motion by policies of weakness.
Another objection is that there are alternatives -- such as encouraging the growth of moderate Islam -- to a big-stick policy. There are two problems with this "soft-power" approach to dealing with the Islamists. First, as with the big-stick policy, there is no guarantee that it would be successful. Second, it would, at best, take several years to produce the attitudinal changes that are its objective. The threat of nuclear terrorism in America is here and now. It must be met by a policy that would have an immediate impact, not by a policy that promises dividends in the indefinite future. |
