Strutting their stuff in Asia, to the delight of war-planners inside DoD
Thomas P M Barnett
¦"China Now Test-Flying Homemade AWACS: Radar Planes Intended For Use in Taiwan Strait," by Edward Cody, Washington Post, 13 November 2004, p. A19.
¦"Japan Protests To China Over Incursion by Nuclear Sub," by Associated Press, Washington Post, 13 November 2004, p. A19.
¦"Exercise Displays Japan's Ambitions: Seeking New International Stature, Government Steps Away From Pacifist Past," by Anthony Faiola, Washington Post, 7 November 2004, p. A21.
The U.S. Navy has long presented itself as the "glue" of Asia, meaning the "presence" force whose constant loitering in-area and persistent efforts at building up military-to-military ties on a bilateral basis with every possible navy in the region have served to decrease local ambitions for military power, obviated local arms races, and kept a lid on inter-state rivalries. And while that perspective is maintained out there in the field (meaning Pacific Command in Honolulu), let me tell you, the Navy back home seems to take increasing delight in hyping what they believe is the growing threat of war in Asia.
Is there a growing threat? I think there is a Japan and a China that are both committed to having a bigger military role in both the region and the world at large—ones befitting their mature (Japan) and emerging (China) economic clout. I think both militaries, having nothing better to do, tend to get overly excited about one another out of boredom. Other than the threat which is Taiwan's bid for independence, these two states basically have nothing to fight over, unless you're stupid enough to believe one side's navy is going to be able to enforce some claim over undersea oil reserves believed to lie between the two states. Why the two countries would bother fighting over these reserves instead of simply exploiting them jointly, is apparently beyond the military strategists on both sides (clear proof that military strategists the world over tend to plan for war solely in the context of war instead of taking into account the context of everything else—here, the growing economic integration of the two states).
Japan is becoming highly dependent on China as a target for production outsourcing as well as a market for exports (China's domestic demand was basically THE reason why Japan emerged out of its long-term economic recession). Meanwhile, China becomes dependent on Japanese investments.
Meanwhile, however, their two militaries seem to delight in dicking with one another like two bored cats with nothing else to do but grab each other's tails. Where is this going? Absolutely nowhere, but it does warm the hearts of national insecurity experts within the naval community, who delight in recounting each and every tail, reminding us all unceasingly, that if we'd just give them the chance, we could find ourselves involved in some really cool wars in Asia.
What can America do to end this shadow boxing? We can involve both militaries in larger means, not to mention better ends. The answer is we need to grab both countries and stick them into an East Asian NATO. We need to harness their energy toward goals beyond just dreaming of idiotic wars with one another.
Until then, naval experts back here will continue to wax poetic about the "possibilities"!
Posted by Thomas P.M. Barnett
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