Why I was wrong about Iraq
John Maples
Chaos will flourish in the Middle East if President Bush’s policy continues unchanged
EVEN DONALD RUMSFELD, in his more private moments, must wonder if the invasion of Iraq was really such a good idea. It has become obvious to almost everyone else, including many such as myself who originally supported the war, that it has been a huge mistake. My support was based solely on the evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), on which the intelligence was exaggerated and which Washington has just admitted it is no longer looking for. There is absolutely no evidence that Iraq was supporting al-Qaeda. I believe that the real reason for the war, at least in the US, was to create a reasonably democratic, free-market Iraq to act as both a beacon and a rebuke to other countries in the region. That possibility looks more and more remote.
The forthcoming elections look unlikely to produce a government with real authority and legitimacy, or to stop the violence, but they must go ahead; let us hope that they prove a step on the road to normality. Despite the bombing of the UN headquarters in August 2003, the current appalling level of violence did not begin until March 2004, a year after the invasion. It might have been more easily contained if the postwar administration had not made so many early mistakes.
The war has made worse all the problems we face in the region. WMD in the hands of irresponsible regimes are a very serious matter. It will now be far harder to deal with Iran, which really is developing nuclear weapons. Military options will lack support and credibility. The Iranian regime may have concluded that possession of nuclear weapons is the best way to avoid Saddam Hussein’s fate.
After 9/11, the War Against Terror had almost universal support. The US built an international coalition for tough UN resolutions and military action in Afghanistan. Much of that goodwill and support has been lost, while we have given al-Qaeda another grievance to add to its list and another battleground for its particularly gruesome brand of terrorism. The Atlantic alliance is in disarray and there is far less willingness to follow a US lead.
The failure of the Arab world to reform its economies and governments has proved a breeding ground for terrorism. Britain and America are trying to help states in the region recognise the problem and encourage reform. It is very difficult to pursue these aims when the dominant images in the Middle East are of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and the killing of civilians by bombs and artillery. We have lost the public relations battle.
The war itself was a military triumph, but the postwar administration has been a disaster. There were not enough troops; there was no civilian authority for several weeks; looting was not immediately stopped; an atmosphere of lawlessness prevailed; the Iraqi army and police were disbanded instead of being conscripted to the allied cause; law and order could be maintained only by US troops and heavy-handed tactics; an interim Iraqi government should have been in place much sooner; and elections should have been held by now. It has been a graphic illustration of the limits of Western power.
Where do we go from here? We cannot simply abandon Iraq: that would leave the country in chaos and cripple US-British policy in the region for a generation. We have to try to see it through. We should, however, start by admitting that we have made a strategic mistake. As an opposition, we made that mistake on the basis of weak and exaggerated intelligence. If we had known the truth, we would not have supported the war. Admitting the mistake would put us in a position to move on. We should ask neighbouring countries for their co-operation in policing Iraq, holding elections and establishing an elected Iraqi government. There needs to be a timetable for troop reductions. Iraq cannot be allowed to become another Vietnam.
We must return to the agenda that we should have been pursuing in the region: encouraging moves towards more democracy and the rule of law; tackling corruption; removing unconditional support from local despots; and showing real commitment to achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace. With a new Palestinian leader, there may be a good chance of achieving this, but whatever the outcome we must show our commitment. We need to co-opt other countries in facing up to Iran's development of nuclear weapons.
Above all, we need to return to traditional American foreign policy of multilateralism and containment. Pre-emptive action and regime change should be abandoned unless vital national interests are threatened. Present US policy is a minority view, even in Washington. We may only be the junior partner in this coalition, but the Prime Minister has more influence in Washington that any other Western statesman. He must use it to bring about a change, or Britain may not be a partner in future military operations.
If current policies continue, the Gulf will become even more unstable, terrorism will have new causes and new recruits, the Arab world will remain the only region where freedom and democracy are unknown, and we will have British and American troops in Iraq for years to come. It took US administrations ten years to acknowledge their mistakes in Vietnam. There is a very moving Vietnam war memorial in Washington, on which the names of the 50,000 American soldiers killed are inscribed. Perhaps the Prime Minister and President Bush should visit it together and reflect on its lessons.
John Maples is a member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and a former Shadow Foreign Secretary
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