Barnett - Bush's Inaugural Speech
Dateline: above the garage and the kids already shoveled the driveway in Portsmouth RI, 22 January 2005
Since so many readers ask . . .
I liked Bush's speech a lot. I liked how he focused on tyranny and oppression and freedom and liberty, and eschewed democracy and made a point about saying we don't seek to impose it on others in some culturally unrealistic way.
I liked how he pushed the big points and didn't mention the current details, which I don't think belong in such a speech, which is naturally written for the ages (and it was Mark Gerson's swan song).
Best analysis I heard was on "Here and Now" from presidential historian who said Gerson reaching for Declaration of Independence linkages, and I like that because it reminds us that U.S. is source code for current era of globalization and that we lead simply because we're just further along in this historical process.
I think it was right for Bush to talk mostly foreign affairs, because they have defined his presidency.
All in all, I found the speech very much in line with PNM's vision, and I think the criticism about it promising too much just misses the point of what that sort of speech is designed to do, plus I hate the logic that says, "if you can't do it all right away, then you shouldn't imply you're going to do it anywhere." That is an asinine slippery-slope argument that basically says, "perfection or hypocrisy--those are the choices."
Those are the choices alright--for non-action. And that's just not Bush. As I said in Esquire this month, the man's is the "just do it" president, and that's what we basically need at this point in history, even if he'll never be my first choice.
Got an email from a reader who wanted me to blog on Charles Krauthammer's recently, rather hysterical op-ed about China and Russia "coming together" against the U.S., which I found painfully hyperbolic in its fear-mongering. Krauthammer's a brilliant guy in so many ways, able to write across so many topics. And I really value his consistent take on U.S. foreign policy. I mean, the man really gets America at its core. But when he ventures much beyond our shores, he tends to get so reflexively suspicious about everybody else, as if, WRT to this argument, somehow it's almost unseemly for any great powers to cooperate militarily and not do so specifically at the behest of, and in conjunction with, the United States.
I just Robert Wright's "Nonzero," and his "first rule for running the world" is a brilliant one: don't fight the inevitable. To me, that's why you deal with Iran on the bomb. And it's why you don't fight China and India linking up with Iran over energy. If you want responsible partners, you've got to give them responsibility—and some trust. The quickest way to kill the unipolar situation on military capabilities is to become obsessed with any movement by others in the direction of diluting that advantage. I mean, does our definition of global stability rule out military cooperation between Russia and China? Where in the hell do you go with that one? The naiveté on that one is—to me—just stunning. Did anyone think this was how we'd win a Global War on Terrorism? Keeping all the Core's major powers suspicious of one another and at arm's length—except with regard to the US? I mean, I just love it when people call me optimistic and then engage in grand strategic thinking along those lines. It's just fantasy.
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