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From: Volsi Mimir1/31/2005 11:22:48 PM
   of 53068
 
fun read---

Clock Games: Theory and Experiments*
Markus K. Brunnermeier†
Department of Economics
Princeton University
John Morgan‡
Haas School of Business
and Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley
This version: December 4, 2004
Abstract
Timing is crucial in situations ranging from currency attacks, to product
introductions, to starting a revolution. These settings share the feature that
payoffs depend critically on the timing of a few other key players—and their
moves are uncertain. To capture this, we introduce the notion of clock games
and experimentally test them. Each player’s clock starts on receiving a signal
about a payoff relevant state variable. Since the timing of the signals is random,
clocks are de-synchronized. A player must decide how long, if at all, to delay
his move after receiving the signal. We show that (i) equilibrium is always
characterized by strategic delay—regardless of whether moves are observable
or not; (ii) delay decreases as clocks become more synchronized and increases
as information becomes more concentrated; (iii) When moves are observable,
players “herd” immediately after any player makes a move. We then show, in
a series of experiments, that key predictions of the model are consistent with
observed behavior.

princeton.edu;
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