Georgia: Zhvania's Death Not Necessarily Accidental
Feb 03, 2005
Summary
If Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania's death was not accidental, the incident would be even more dangerous to Georgia's stability and security than if his death were an accident. An assassination would imply that there are forces deliberately pushing Georgia to the edge. Among the likely perpetrators are Georgian government hard-liners and other political rivals of Zhvania, corrupt politicians, organized crime and even Chechen militants -- all of whom could benefit from the consequences of Zhvania's death.
Analysis
Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and Kvemo-Kartli Regional Deputy Gov. Raul Yusupov were found dead in Yusupov's apartment in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi the night of Feb. 3. While the immediate cause seems clear -- carbon monoxide poisoning from a malfunctioning gas heater -- it is unclear whether the heater malfunctioned on its own or if someone caused the fatal carbon monoxide leak.
Though accidental gas poisoning is widespread in Georgia and other former Soviet Union countries, it is not inconceivable that this particular case was arranged deliberately. Sources in the Georgian Interior Ministry say the gas balloon and heater were installed in Yusupov's apartment shortly before the fatalities, and nobody could guarantee the heating system worked properly or that nobody had damaged the system to cause a leak. Also, it would have been easy to orchestrate the "accident" in Yusupov's apartment, which sources say has no special protection features -- such as regular security checks -- except Yusupov's bodyguards doing physical surveillance outside.
Additionally, Zhvania did have multiple enemies who, in their minds, had reason to kill him. Among his adversaries are Georgian organized crime rings and many Georgian politicians, who hated Zhvania either because of the major anti-corruption campaign he was pushing hard in the government or because of political struggles brought about by differing political views.
Tbilisi's hard-liners clearly could benefit from -- and could be behind -- Zhvania's death. Many hard-liners have military and security service backgrounds, and some of them could have the connections necessary to order Zhvania's protection personnel to carry out an assassination disguised as accidental carbon monoxide poisoning.
Zhvania was at the heart of the ongoing power struggle in Georgia. The main figure among moderates in the government, he opposed radical government members driving the country toward armed conflict with its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In spite of his anti-Russian statements, Zhvania understood well that confronting Russia outright could be catastrophic for Georgia, so he tried to improve relations with Russia in order to solve the Georgian reunification problem by talks rather than by force. Georgian hard-liners, led by recently appointed Defense Minister Irakliy Okruashvili, strongly resisted the action.
The hard-liners hold a very strong influence over Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, but as long as Zhvania had Saakashvili's ear they could not persuade the president to order an immediate attack against the breakaway regions. Now, with Zhvania dead, the hard-liners could gain a defining influence over the decision-making process in Tbilisi. One sign of the hard-liners' increasing influence is the first step Saakashvili took after the news of Zhvania's death: refusing to appoint Georgi Baramidze, No. 2 dove after Zhvania, as acting prime minister. Instead, Saakashvili appointed his protege, Okruashvili, Georgian sources say. But before news reached the world, many Georgian politicians protested strongly and threatened to quit the alliance with the government did Saakashvili cancel this decision and appoint himself to the position, sources in the Georgian government say. However, the struggle for the prime minister post has begun, and Okruashvili could get appointed.
Chechen Islamist militants and the Chechen mafia also could benefit from Zhvania's death, and both groups have expertise in assassinations. Both groups also are very active and operate with little difficulty in Georgia. Chechen militant leaders long have wanted to destabilize Georgia's security situation, sources close to Chechen separatists say. The militants would benefit from hard-liners taking power in Georgia and attacking South Ossetia, because Russia would get dragged into that struggle -- thus, the armed conflict in the Caucasus would be internationalized, and Russia would have fewer opportunities to deal with Chechen militants in Chechnya. Not only would Russian forces be preoccupied with the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict, but the world's eyes would be on the Caucasus, and Russia would not want to take any action against the Chechens that might anger its neighbors and allies.
Georgian Interior Ministry and South Ossetian sources have reported that Chechen militant leader Shamil Basayev sent special commando units to the conflict zone on the Georgian-South Ossetian border to secretly shoot at both sides to provoke a war. Also, the recent car explosion that killed six people, including policemen, in the Georgian region of Gori -- which borders South Ossetia -- bears marks of Chechen work with the same goal: destabilizing Georgia. Given these circumstances, it is possible that Chechen militants killed Zhvania.
Some Georgian politicians blame Russia for Zhvania's death. While we do not rule this out, Moscow's ordering such an assassination is doubtful, given that Zhvania was the strongest moderate force trying to lead Georgia to negotiate with Russia; ordering his death would be counterproductive for Moscow. Russia would benefit more by having the main Georgian hard-liners killed than it would from the assassination of Zhvania, its objective ally. Russia understands that Zhvania's death will likely lead to the hard-liners' rise in Georgia and probably will lead to an attack against South Ossetia sooner and easier. Also, since 1991, Russia's post-Soviet government has never been implicated or reasonably accused of assassinating foreign state officials.
There is a far-fetched theory that by having the moderate leader Zhvania killed, Moscow would push Tbilisi into an even more radically anti-Russian posture and deprive Georgia of support from Western countries, who would be leery of Tbilisi's new radicalism. However, the United States and other Western powers do not believe it would be in their national interests to abandon Tbilisi, no matter how radicalized the Georgian government becomes. This will soon be evident when a new prime minister -- most likely a hard-liner -- is appointed and the West's support for Georgia, including military support, does not decrease.
By the same token, by killing Zhvania -- the main force inside Tbilisi keeping Georgia from attacking breakaway regions -- separatist leaders would invite attacks, so ordering his assassination would be counterproductive to them, too. It is not inconceivable that some rogue separatist individuals or small groups could have tried to assassinate Zhvania; but Georgia's hard-line leaders -- such as Okruashvili-- who demand an immediate invasion of South Ossetia would be more likely targets.
Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.
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