<<At $40 a barrel, huge profits of astronomical proportions are being made>> ... not really, because oil region regime change costs money, first billions, then hundreds of billions, then trillions, ... and then area of operations expands, and new oppositions gather and organize ... you know how these affairs go, and so $40/barrel is cheap, too cheap ;0)
[OT: the following Stratfor article mentions a plasma stealth technology. Being curious, I looked it up, and it is a StarTrek type of cloaking method content.miw.com.sg ... "The plasma generator would envelop the aircraft in a film of ionized gas, which would be impervious to radar pulses, theoretically rendering the warplane electronically 'invisible'" ... I am wondering if the method can be applied to nuclear war heads re-entry vehicles, and if so, how will Bush's NMD system work or not work, and what happens to the gabillions of that program ... perhaps it will result in a new coding process that will compete against QCOM? ]
Venezuela: A New Security Doctrine
Feb 07, 2005
stratfor.biz
Summary
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez will implement a new national security doctrine and related national defense plans by mid-2005 based on the strategic premise that the United States will someday invade Venezuela, end Chavez's Bolivarian revolution and seize control of the country's oil and gas resources. The new doctrine forms part of a broader foreign policy shift that contemplates severing all political, security and energy ties with the United States. It is not clear if Chavez's Bolivarian army could successfully face an invasion by a superior force. However, the Venezuelan military now taking shape would be an effective force for domestic political purposes.
Analysis
Venezuela's armed forces (FAN) have developed a new national security doctrine and related national defense plans by order of President Hugo Chavez, Gen. Melvin Lopez Hidalgo, secretary of the National Defense Council (CODENA), said. He said this new doctrine, which the FAN will implement by mid-2005, is based on the core strategic assumption that the U.S. military will someday invade Venezuela to seize control of the country's crude oil and natural gas reserves.
It is unlikely that the U.S. government contemplates invading Venezuela. Washington could easily overcome any disruption in Venezuelan oil shipments to the United States by finding new oil suppliers within a few weeks. In fact, Chavez's real goal might be to use a bigger and meaner FAN as an instrument of domestic politics.
Recent remarks in Beijing and Buenos Aires by Chavez make it clear the FAN's new national security doctrine is an important part of a broader foreign policy shift in Caracas that seeks to break off energy, economic and military ties between Venezuela and the United States.
Chavez has announced that he wants to redirect Venezuela's oil exports to China, and he is implementing economic policies that discourage foreign investment. Chavez also has prohibited the FAN's command from maintaining links with a U.S. military group that works out of the U.S. Embassy, but worked for decades inside Venezuelan military headquarters at Fort Tiuna.
Historically, the FAN's national security doctrine was focused on repulsing a military invasion from Colombia with conventional infantry, naval and air force combat tactics. The new security doctrine calls for what Lopez Hidalgo described as "an asymmetrical, low-intensity" response against invading U.S. forces.
A Venezuelan military source describes the new national defense plan as consisting of "Iraqi-style guerrilla attacks" against U.S. troops by combined forces of conventional FAN personnel, military reservists and new "popular defense units" that Chavez created in the country's slums, or "barrios."
The FAN is adopting the Cuban security doctrine of "popular war" that could be used against any invading foe, whether from the United States, Colombia or elsewhere. It reflects how much influence the Cuban military has acquired within the FAN since Chavez became president in 1999.
The new security doctrine confirms the Chavez government's complete elimination of ties between the FAN and the U.S. military, and the consolidation of a new military alliance with Cuba. Chavez plans to modernize and expand the FAN with new infantry and advanced weapons, communications and surveillance systems acquired mainly from Russia, China and Brazil. Cuban military advisers would train the FAN's personnel in the use of new weapons systems ranging from assault rifles to tanks and fighter aircraft.
Chavez likely is counting on Russian military trainers to teach Venezuelan pilots to fly the MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters he wants to purchase that will be equipped with plasma stealth technology, plus advanced avionics and weapons targeting systems.
Chavez is maintaining the FAN's active duty personnel at about 100,000 troops in the army, navy and air force. However, he also has created a military reserve that totals 30,000 and should reach 100,000 by the end of 2006. The creation of the barrio-based "popular defense units" will augment those numbers.
Chavez did not say how many people would be recruited for these neighborhood militia units. However, a European military attache in Caracas says Venezuela's total military forces easily could reach 300,000 by 2007. The reserves would be equipped with the FAL 7.62 mm assault rifles, which have been the FAN's standard issue infantry weapon for about 40 years. The FAN reportedly has an arsenal of more than 100,000 of the rifles that would be transferred to the reservists as new Russian assault rifles arrive in Venezuela.
Though Chavez's new FAN would not constitute a direct threat to the United States, it could affect U.S. security interests in neighboring Colombia if bilateral tensions between Caracas and Bogota were to escalate sharply again. This could happen if more Colombian militant leaders are captured in Venezuelan territory by Colombian security forces operating clandestinely.
Tensions between Venezuela and Colombia also likely would flare up again if Chavez beefs up his weak border defenses and if clashes occur between FAN troops and Colombian soldiers hunting Colombian militants along the border with Venezuela. However, it is unlikely that Chavez would provoke a possible U.S. response by seeking to start an armed conflict with Colombia.
Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.
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