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Strategies & Market Trends : Booms, Busts, and Recoveries

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To: Maurice Winn who wrote (60272)2/10/2005 10:26:45 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) of 74559
 
Hello Maurice, <<North Korea>> ...

Mr. Chairman Mao would say, and did say, "There is chaos under the heavens, and the situation is excellent".

Nuclear democracy will likely be the new world order, and it will be an order that will likely be more stable than not, allowing small nations to behave like big powers, and ensuring national self-determination for all who sports the membership card at the members-only club.

This is the state of affairs the neo-cons expedited with their amateurish hog-wash and ridiculous hubris, and no, NMD will do naught, because it is only possible under laboratory conditions, and assumes a static anti-anti technology coma.

Here is Stratfor's read, or wishful thinking, figuring the lack of White House reaction is actually a part of deliberate tactic as opposed to bankruptcy of strategy and chaper 11 of ideas.

It should be worrying that N.Korea is supposedly selling their know-how and services, and if not stopped by any means, will lead to J6P paying that much more to maintain his standard of living. And this should be worrying to portfolio holders.

I remember informing that the Bush league are made up of amateurs when they first came to power, pumped up by "end of history nonsense, and new order hubris", readying to do China, got side-tracked, and now ... what a mess ... let's watch.

Chugs, Jay

North Korea's Nuclear Declaration
Feb 10, 2005
stratfor.biz
Summary

In a statement released by the official [North] Korean Central News Agency on Feb. 10, the North Korean Foreign Ministry said Pyongyang has "manufactured nukes for self-defense." The statement was uncharacteristically unambiguous regarding North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons -- at least as far as official pronouncements go. The question, then, is why raise the stakes, and why now?

Analysis

North Korea's Foreign Ministry has made the first official admission of the country's manufacture of nuclear weapons. In a statement directed at the United States on Feb. 10, the ministry said North Korea "had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the NPT [Nuclear Proliferation Treaty] and has manufactured nukes for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration's ever more undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK." Before this point, Pyongyang has always played coy regarding its nuclear weapons program, preferring to claim the "right" to weapons or simply referring to deterrents and the ability to turn various cities into seas of fire.

Washington long has argued that North Korea has nuclear weapons -- with most estimates ranging from three to seven bombs -- so Pyongyang's announcement is more a question of motive and timing than a revelation. In addition, it is a rhetorical, rather than substantive, shift, as Pyongyang has yet to carry out a nuclear test; therefore the actual knowledge of the North's true nuclear capability remains unchanged. So why make the announcement, and why now?

The timing is particularly interesting. It comes on the first day of the Lunar New Year, the second most important holiday in the Koreas and a time when much of Asia is on vacation. This makes reaction times slower in Asia, but the message clearly is received in the United States. The statement criticizes Washington and Tokyo but makes no mention of Seoul -- perhaps a nod to the recently released South Korean defense white paper that no longer uses the term "main enemy" to describe North Korea.

North Korea has just undertaken a series of rallies and meetings extolling Kim Jong Il's Songun policies, and Kim's birthday -- an important occasion in the North -- is less than a week away. There have been rumors in the past couple of months of serious cracks in the North Korean regime, matched by conflicting rumors that Kim is preparing the way for another dynastic succession and is about to start raising one of his sons to a much higher status in the country.

In addition, Pyongyang has laid out hints that it is ready for dialogue with the United States and waited to see how Washington would address Pyongyang in Bush's second term. The response was, apparently, unsatisfactory. Pyongyang was anything but reassured by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's "outpost of tyranny" remarks because they lumped North Korea in with Zimbabwe in the rankings of U.S. foreign policy interests and indicated Washington's goal for North Korea remained -- and was perhaps even more so now -- all about regime change.

Pyongyang's new message of nuclear weapons possession was matched with calls for dialogue and a desire to de-nuclearize the Korean Peninsula. In reality, Pyongyang still wants to negotiate; it still wants a peace accord and diplomatic relations with the United States -- but only because that is considered an assurance that Washington will not try to topple the regime. That belief is fading, however, as Pyongyang has watched Ukrainian elections and realizes that diplomatic ties have little to do with non-interference in regime transitions. Thus, from Pyongyang's perspective, the only surety of security is through military power -- which is, not coincidentally, the very essence of Kim's Songun politics.

A source close to the North Korean regime says that although Pyongyang wants dialogue, it will not participate if there is no hope for a change of U.S. position. Pyongyang's statement is a final call for talks -- a narrow "window" of opportunity -- and if the talks are rejected, Pyongyang has basically signaled it will be unable to go back from its development and possession of nuclear weapons. This is not a new threat -- Pyongyang used a similar negotiating ploy in 2003 -- but the warning of a closing window is somewhat ominous since it hints at a nuclear test, which is an undeniable verification of North Korean nuclear capability.

And while public reactions are fairly muted -- after all, North Korea always negotiates through brinkmanship -- there are less open concerns that North Korea might not be bluffing, and that could lead to a reshaping of the security environment in Northeast Asia if Japan and South Korea, and possibly even Taiwan, fall like dominoes into the international nuclear club. Already, sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense say Moscow has quietly put the Pacific Fleet and Rocket Forces on high alert to prevent any U.S. incursion into Russian airspace should the rhetoric degrade into action.

The next move is Washington's. North Korea has set a very clear choice for the U.S. administration -- engage in a productive dialogue with Pyongyang directly or accept the reality of a nuclear-armed North Korea -- and the collapse of U.S. non-proliferation actions. North Korea is a cautious and careful planner, and a keen observer of global events, and while there is certainly a particular lens through which the nation's leaders and planners view things, their motivation is clear.

With the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers' Party approaching this year, Pyongyang intends to be free from the U.S. box, whether through dialogue or nuclear tests -- and is banking on Washington either seeking to avoid the latter or reshape Northeast Asia into a region where all nations are nuclear-armed, thus reducing the significance of Washington's nuclear umbrella -- and influence.



Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.

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