ARAB SPRING
Assad's War
Syria's dictator is in retreat, but he's unlikely to go quietly.
BY MICHAEL YOUNG
Mr. Young is opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Lebanon and a contributing editor at Reason magazine.
WSJ.com OpinionJournal - Saturday, March 5, 2005 12:01 a.m.
BEIRUT--As tens of thousands of Lebanese gathered this week to demand a withdrawal of Syrian forces from their country, they chanted a refrain mocking Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. In Arabic "Assad" means lion, and in a play on words the protestors sang: "Assad in Lebanon, a rabbit on the Golan." The jingle was first used against Bashar's father, Hafiz al-Assad, who, as defense minister during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, lost Syria's Golan Heights to Israel. For the protestors, however, it summed up their view of Syria as a state bending to the powerful but beating up on the weak.
After the Feb. 14 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Lebanon's weak struck back, forcing pro-Syrian Lebanese Prime Minister Omar Karami to resign in the face of massive demonstrations. Mr. Karami, a pitiable figure for having earlier been chased out of office by protests in May 1992, left the Syrians in a bind by resigning despite the likelihood that he would have won a planned vote of confidence in parliament. Yet the prime minister knew that this would merely have been, in the words of one opposition politician, "confidence sent through a fax machine" by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services. Mr. Karami, derided as a Syrian puppet, and loathed for having threatened the opposition with his "We'll show them" bravado, wisely chose to call it a day.
But what of Syria? Thanks to a succession of recent blunders by Mr. Assad, the Syrian order in Lebanon is collapsing. Welcome as this may be in Lebanon, shipwrecks can be messy affairs. Few Lebanese, many of whom blame Damascus for Mr. Hariri's murder, believe Syria will go quietly. In an interview with Rome's La Repubblica this week, Mr. Assad displayed no intention of bowing to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559 demanding an immediate and total Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon, an end to Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs, and the disarmament of armed groups--among them Hezbollah. "Technically, the withdrawal can take place within the year," he said. "However, strategically, it can only happen with serious guarantees: In a word: peace."
Linking a departure from Lebanon to regional peace is not only unacceptable to the Lebanese opposition, it contradicts Resolution 1559 and shows that Mr. Assad is not paying heed to what's going on around him. As a reminder, the Bush administration sent a senior State Department official, David Satterfield, to Beirut last Sunday. While not setting a deadline for withdrawal, Mr. Satterfield underlined that it must take place within a short period: "Enough," he emphasized. "It's time for the people of Lebanon and Syria to move on."
Yet that's precisely what Mr. Assad wants to avoid. His assessment of Lebanese affairs has often been distinguished by ill-concealed contempt. For example, a senior Lebanese politician recently told me, the president "despised" Mr. Hariri, though the latter did Syria some crucial favors and was instrumental in rebuilding postwar Lebanon. Similarly, last August, Mr. Assad decided to impose an extension of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's mandate, against the advice of most politicians in Beirut (and the advice, also, of his own vice-president, Abdel Halim Khaddam, as well as that of the political intelligence chief, Ghazi Kanaan, both experienced in Lebanese affairs). The decision provoked Syria's growing Lebanese troubles and prompted passage of the U.N. resolution. Ludicrously, Mr. Assad and his men perceived it as a successful gambit.
With Syria facing crossfire from the U.N. and the Lebanese street, Mr. Assad must also consider that his Arab brethren are no longer willing to give the Syrians a blank check in Lebanon. While Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the Saudi government may wish to provide Damascus with cover to withdraw from the country on its own terms, both have called for a full Syrian pullout. Syria entered Lebanon in 1976, riding an Arab and international consensus. Mr. Assad has squandered this in a short time, showing his static understanding of regional dynamics.
That is certainly the moral of Syrian behavior in Iraq. This week, Saddam Hussein's half-brother, Sabawi Ibrahim Hassan, was arrested with Syrian assistance and handed over to the interim Iraqi government. It was a transparent effort to reduce U.S. displeasure on Lebanon, but also to peddle Syrian usefulness in Iraq to the Bush administration. The ploy won't work. The mood in Washington is beyond bargaining. Syrian denials notwithstanding, it is no secret that insurgents and weapons, often dispatched by members of the Syrian political and security elite, have steadily been making their way to those fighting American forces in Iraq. And while the U.S. military may be disinclined to open a new front against Syria, the Bush administration and the Iraqis are not likely to soon forget, or forgive, Syria's transgressions.
One Syrian tactic to climb out of its isolation has been to call for a resumption of negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights. But that, too, misses the point. Syria thinks that by supporting Hamas and Islamic Jihad, it gains leverage. In reality, however, the impact has been the opposite, with Syrian peace overtures ignored by the U.S. and Israel. As Mr. Satterfield put it, "Syria must stop its involvement in terrorism; until it does so, it cannot be a partner for peace."
Given their mindset, the Syrians are understandably confused. In the 1980s, Mr. Assad's father plotted or winked at deadly attacks against Americans, particularly in Lebanon. For his efforts he was rewarded with political recognition and the admiration of Washington "realists," agog with the man's cunning. The son is trying to replicate that game, blending sustenance for adversaries of the U.S. and Israel with inducements to do America favors in exchange for a deal. But the Bush administration knows that behind the façade is a rotting structure, unworthy of indulgence. Mr. Assad tries to sell Syria as part of the solution in the Middle East; the U.S. sees his regime as part of the problem.
Had only the Syrian president engaged in internal reforms to prop up his authority. Yet even there the promises accompanying Mr. Assad's arrival to power in June 2000 have evaporated. The short-lived "Damascus Spring," where Syrian intellectuals began openly criticizing their system, was suffocated in early 2001, while economic reform has floundered. Mr. Assad's halfhearted efforts to break the stranglehold of the Baath Party have also failed. Meanwhile, Islamism is making a comeback thanks to displeasure with the regime, but also via the regime's own efforts to sponsor Islamic institutions to shore up its legitimacy (which was scarred badly by Hafiz al-Assad's crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982).
Expectations of a liberal opening have been neutralized by the president's need to consolidate his authority. This is Mr. Assad's dilemma: to effect economic and political reform he needs more power; but in accumulating power, he becomes more of an autocrat. There is also a sense that authority in Syria is more than ever turning into a family affair. Mr. Assad's brother-in-law was recently named head of military intelligence, while the president's closest kin hold positions of major influence, formal or informal.
Just as the Assad regime has an interest in Syria's neighbors, so, too, do Syria's talented people, who have endured 25 years of cold, authoritarian sterility. Daily, now, they watch the ferment in Lebanon, as well as the remaking of Iraq. In both places, they see glimpses of their own salvation. Mr. Assad's main challenge, in the months ahead, might not just be to keep a personal grip on power, but also to give the Syrian people hope for a better future. It is hard to see how he can do both.
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