Assad’s Maneuvers
by Elliot Chodoff
Under intense pressure from the US and its allies, facing upheaval in Lebanon, and fearing the threat that dreaded democracy is trying to rear its head at home, Syria’s president, Bashar Assad, is doing what he does best: cutting and ducking, and continuing along the same path he was on before the crisis.
Assad is well aware that his country is on all the wrong lists at the moment, and he fears that he may be forced to pay the price for years of repressive policies at home and aggressive policies abroad. The fact that many of the decisions that set Syria on its present collision course with the West were made by his late unlamented father, Hafez, makes his position no less precarious.
The Syrian regime has retained its stranglehold on power for decades through the harsh and sometimes bloody repression of any hint of opposition, dissent, or even attempts to open the society to a freer flow of information. In addition, it has permitted its capital to serve as the headquarters of a wide range of terrorist organizations, ranging from the Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to the Islamic Jihad and Hamas. It has instigated and supported a western front of insurgency against American forces in Iraq, and has served as Iran’s strongest ally in the Arab world.
Syrian military forces have occupied Lebanon since their invasion in the mid-1970’s during the Lebanese Civil War. Taking the Syrian version of a balanced approach, they have slaughtered any and all who were perceived to oppose them, regardless of religion, ethnicity, or national origin. In the 1980’s they, along with their Iranian allies, became the patrons of Hizbullah, one of the worlds most dangerous terrorist organizations.
The assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, apparently instigated by Syria (with Iran somewhere in the wings) provided the spark that ignited a mini revolt in Lebanon against the Syrian occupation prompting the US administration, already irritated with Syrian behavior, to unleash its verbal broadsides against Assad. The Syrian leader, now fearing he had perhaps gone too far, initiated a move that is meant to take the pressure off and leave him in no worse a position than when he started.
Step one was the movement of Syrian troops from one part of Lebanon to another. Pulling out of Beirut to the Bakaa Valley in the east, Assad could claim that he was withdrawing his forces without doing so. Lots of vehicular movement, a few photo ops of Syrian soldiers on trucks, and Reuters reporting that it is the first stage of a two stage withdrawal, can possibly combine to relieve some of the pressure, especially that coming from Europe.
Step two saw the major demonstrations of the past two days in Beirut and Damascus: the former orchestrated by Hizbullah and the latter by the Assad regime itself. The message is meant to go out from the two capitals that Assad is loved by his citizens and subjects, and an effort to remove him (from Lebanon, let alone Syria) runs counter to the will of the population. After all, the American president preaches democracy, doesn’t he?
It is no coincidence that the Syrian Army withdrew its forces to the Bakaa Valley and no further. The Bakaa is home to two critical elements that make life easier for the Syrian regime: the poppy fields that produce the raw materials for the heroin that is a major source of Syrian (and Assad’s) income, and Hizbullah, the Shiite terrorist organization that is both the Syrians’ client and enforcer.
The wave of anti Syrian protest has placed Hizbullah on the horns of dilemma. It has gained political power as a pro-Syrian actor in the Lebanese parliamentary arena, and has garnered publicity and support for its radical and violent activities against Israel, the US, France, Argentina and any other Western country’s citizens that fall within its reach. As both a Lebanese political actor and a terrorist organization, it has benefited from the best of both worlds. Forced to choose, it is unlikely that it will give up on terror.
The leaders of Hizbullah have been forced to confront the reality of either integrating fully into the Lebanese political system, giving up their arms and renouncing their status as a separate armed force within Lebanon or supporting an unpopular Syrian regime and maintaining their “extra-state” status with, importantly, their weapons. They know fully well that radical organizations in the Arab world that have chosen the path of peaceful integration into social and political institutions have invariably lost most of their power. Hizbullah will not follow in that tradition.
The Syrian-Iranian-Hizbullah plan will be to organize more demonstrations of support for Syria in the weeks and months ahead, coupled with the reconstitution of the pro-Syrian Karami government. At the same time, the Syrian pull back will be the trigger for an increase in Hizbullah terrorist activity, most likely against Israel from South Lebanon, hoping to promote chaos, at least in the south. The Syrians will then contend that their withdrawal was the catalyst for chaos, and only a stable Lebanese government, supported by Syrian troops throughout the country, can bring quiet to its borders and cities. It is classic Assad, as it has been for decades; Bashar is truly his father’s son. |
